Cadiz being closely invested by the army of the Duc de Bellune, it appeared from the geographical position of the neighbouring country, that the most effectual mode of interrupting the siege, and harassing the enemy, would be to send detachments to various parts of the Spanish coast; which, by occupying their attention, would oblige them to weaken the besieging army, in order to succour the points menaced with attack.

It was also at this time of the utmost moment to support and keep alive the animosity of the peasantry, by affording them every possible assistance; without which, their exertions would certainly grow weaker; and it was even to be feared that they might ultimately surrender themselves to the French in despair. Besides, the French army before Cadiz drawing its supplies chiefly from Seville, the seranos (or mountaineers) of the Sierra de Xeres, and of the chain of mountains extending from Ronda Xeres, and from hence in a southeast direction by Mijas and Fiangerolla, were particularly to be encouraged, in order to induce them to act with vigour in cutting off the enemy’s supplies.

To these circumstances must also be added, that in the beginning of October, information was received at Gibraltar, through various channels, that at Ronda the enemy’s force consisted of only nine hundred men, viz. one company of grenadiers, one of riflemen, and eighty dragoons, in all two hundred and forty French; the remaining six hundred and sixty being composed of Germans, Poles, &c, upon whom little dependance could be placed. The same information stated that at Fiangerolla the enemy had but two hundred men, at Mijas but forty, and at Ronda one hundred, chiefly dragoons; while the country surrounding these ports, was said to be in the possession of a body of well armed, fierce, and exasperated mountaineers, nearly capable of keeping the French in check, having already obliged them several times to abandon St. Roque and Algeziras, with considerable loss.

The vicinity of these mountaineers, as well as the extreme badness of the road between Ronda and Fiangerolla, appeared to render it very difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy to send any reinforcement from the former to the latter place; while at the same time it was understood that much dissatisfaction reigned in Malaga, and that the inhabitants would readily unite their efforts with any force that might be sent to assist them in driving the French out of the town. Such was the situation of the enemy’s detached forces, while they were carrying on the siege of Cadiz with vigour, having completed several batteries opposite the town, from whence, by means of very large mortars, they threw shells much farther than the usual distance, and thereby rendered the anchorage of our shipping very insecure.

The most certain means of checking the progress of the siege, was, as I have already observed, to call the attention of the enemy to other points; and, with this idea, several expeditions had been already sent to various places with different degrees of success. In furtherance of this principle, and after a communication between the Lieutenant-Governor of Gibraltar and the Spanish Government at Cadiz, it was determined to send a force from the former place against the ports already named, as well as to co-operate with the loyalist party in Malaga.

His Excellency Lieutenant-General Campbell did me the honour of confiding to me the conduct of this expedition; and on the 10th of October I accordingly received orders to prepare for secret service, and to take under my command four com panies of His Majesty’s 89th regiment, amounting to three hundred rank and file, together with five hundred German, Polish, and Italian deserters. With this force I was directed to proceed to Ceuta, where it was to be increased by the Spanish regiment of Toledo. As dispatch was an object of the first consequence, not a moment was lost, and the whole detachment was clothed, accoutred, and embarked on the same day and as soon as I received my final instructions, I repaired on board His Majesty’s ship Topaze, from whence I issued the necessary orders and instructions, and also prepared an address to the people of Malaga, which will be found in the Appendix.

Early in the morning of the 11th October, the squadron weighed and stood across for Ceuta; but light airs preventing our anchoring there until a late hour in the evening, I was obliged to defer going on shore till the morning. That no time might however be lost, I acquainted Major-General Frazer of my arrival by letter, and requested him to expedite the embarkation of the Spanish regiment. The following morning I proceeded on shore, and breakfasted with the General, but found it impossible to prevail on him to interfere in any manner, with respect to the object of my orders; and I was therefore under the necessity of applying personally to the Spanish Governor, who received me most politely, and chearfully assured me of every assistance in his power. I must here observe, that the Spaniards of Ceuta looked on the English with the most jealous suspicion, and though General Frazer’s force consisted of but one weak regiment (the second battalion of the fourth), the guns of the citadel, in which it was quartered, and which commands the town, had been all removed.

The embarkation of the Spanish troops being completed in the forenoon, I visited several of the transports, and in some of them found the Spaniards much dissatisfied with the nature of their provisions, owing entirely to the masters adhering literally to their instructions, and issuing meat an a maigre day, when common sense should have pointed out to them, the propriety of serving out other species in lieu. Indeed, I have frequently observed that foreign soldiers are dissatisfied with the species of provisions they receive on board our ships; and as these complaints could be so easily remedied, it seems extraordinary that no attention has been hitherto paid to them.

The regiment of Toledo being better cloathed, and apparently composed of a more orderly set of men than the generality of Spanish soldiers at this time, I paid their Colonel some compliments on their appearance, and requested to be informed if they were compleat in every respect, which he assured me they were. Aware, however, of the astonishing neglect which pervaded every part of the Spanish military affairs, I did not choose to put implicit confidence in this assertion; and on enquiring minutely into the state of their arms and ammunition, I found a deficiency of one hundred and forty-eight firelocks, and that they had embarked literally without a single round of ammunition. I immediately wrote  to the Spanish Governor, stating the impossibility of my supplying the latter, as our cartridges would not fit the Spanish arms. He returned a very polite answer, and the necessary ammunition was immediately sent off: the deficiency of muskets I supplied, together with one hundred cartridges for each.

Having delivered the Spanish Colonel his instructions, the squadron weighed and stood for the coast of Spain. The lightness of the wind rendered our passage tedious, and in the night of the 13th Captain Hall of the navy, commanding a detachment of gunboats under my orders, came on board from Gibraltar, with letters from his Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor. Captain Hall expressed himself very sanguinely as to the possibility of carrying Malaga by a coup de main, and founded his opinion on information received at Gibraltar, that the guns on the Mole had been removed; he therefore proposed that the troops should occupy the enemy’s attention on the land side, while the ships bombarded the town to the eastward, and that the boats should at the same time push for the Mole, and throw a party into the town, to favour and assist an insurrection of the inhabitants. To this plan I found it impossible to give my approbation, well assured that no intelligence received from the Spaniards was to be depended on; and besides there being an extensive plain between the Rio Grande and Malaga, in which a large body of cavalry could act to the greatest advantage and as I had every reason to believe that the enemy could immediately collect a force of this description, it seemed to me highly imprudent to risque encountering it, with the motley troop of foreigners that composed two-thirds of my detachment. These seasons induced me to determine on proceeding to the Calle de la Morals [Cala de Mora], a small bay, one league east of Marabella and two west of Fiangerolla, with the intention of attacking the latter fortress, the possession of which would be of the greatest consequence to my future proceedings, as affording the means of receiving regular and certain information, as well as of organizing the peasantry, and commanding the neighbouring country.

On the morning of the 14th the Sparrowhawk joined the squadron, and I was informed that arms had been distributed to the peasants, pursuant to orders which I had previously given. At nine o’clock the squadron anchored in the bay of Calle de la Moralle, and the signals were immediately made to prepare for landing the troops, and for the boats to assemble alongside the Topaze. The shoalness of the water preventing the larger vessels from approaching the shore so as to cover the landing, the gunboats only were employed in that service; and having taken their station, at half past ten, the boats pushed for the shore, and the troops landed without accident or opposition on a fine sandy beach: indeed there did not appear to be any preparation whatever made by the enemy to oppose us. As soon as the troops were all formed on shore, I issued regulating orders for their movements, calculated to prevent the confusion that might arise from such a mixture of nations as composed my shall force, there being English, French, Italians, Spaniards,  Poles and Germans. I therefore directed that all movements should be carried into execution by the sound of the bugle, and restricted the sounds to four. When tolerably perfect in this exercise, I gave orders to advance, but found the country so very mountainous, and without any road, that it was impossible the artillery could accompany us, and it was therefore of necessity sent by water.

Previous to marching I had some conversation with Captain Miller of the 95th regiment, who, with several other officers, had been latterly employed in organizing the Spanish peasants. He informed me that a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition had been distributed amongst them, and consequently that I might expect a number to join me immediately; in this however I was entirely disappointed, not more than ten or twelve making their appearance. One Spaniard I am, however, bound to notice, with the praise he deserves for the loyalty and fidelity with which he has always served the cause of his country; he is well known at Gibraltar, but at the present moment it would be improper and imprudent to name him. His loyalty was entirely disinterested, and indeed it is but doing justice to the Spaniards in general to observe that their zeal seems to proceed from real patriotism, without any hope or expectation of pecuniary emolument. The services rendered to the cause by the person above alluded to, certainly entitled him to a considerable reward from the English, yet his sole request was to be permitted to wear a sash similar to that of our officers,, which of course was granted, and from it he seemed to derive no small share of consequence in the eyes of his countrymen. Indeed, when I observed the delight expressed by the Spaniards at receiving the smallest honorary distinction, I was surprised that the finish loyal government had not created a military order of merit, to reward those who might be most a active and enterprising in the cause; the hope of acquiring such a distinction from their legal rulers, would not only increase emulation, but diminish the value of the distinctions conferred by the French on their partisans. The desire of chivalric distinctions is indeed universal throughout all Christian Europe: the cold phlegmatic German receives them with pleasure, and the Italian, burning with the ardour of a more genial climate, with delight; but it is in France, above all other countries, that they are sought after with the greatest avidity, and where they inspire their possessors with the greatest degree of vanity and self-consequence, as well as of military ardour, and the hopes of the croix d’honneur is perhaps the most powerful stimulant to the courage of the French soldier. When we reflect on this general feeling, we cannot account for the Junta’s and Regency’s having hitherto neglected the establishment of so certain and so cheap a mode of attaching the people to their cause.