Deducting the garrisons left at Rodrigo, Almeida, and Salamanca, with the sick, the total number of combatants amounted to 50,000, with sixty guns and a great quantity of ammunition chests. This was far too large a train for a rough country like Portugal, where there were scarcely any high roads. Almost the only communications are narrow, rocky paths, often very steep, and everything is transported on mule-back. There are even districts where roads are absolutely unknown. Lastly, except in certain valleys, the soil is mostly arid, and offers insufficient resources for maintaining an army. Masséna had therefore every reason to go through the least difficult and most productive country. He did, however, just the contrary.

Having left the neighbourhood of Almeida on September 14, 1810, the army assembled next day at Celorico, where it saw the rich valley of the Mondego opening before it and might march on Coimbra by Sampayo and Ponte de Murcelha, over roads which, if not good, were at least tolerable. But under the influence of Major Pelet, his adviser, the marshal left the practicable country where the troops might have lived in comfort, and went off to the right into the mountains of Viseu, where the roads are the worst in Portugal. One need only look at the map to see how unreasonable it was to go by Viseu on the way from Celorico to Coimbra; a mistake all the greater from the fact that Viseu is separated from the Sierra d'Alcoba by high hills, which the army might have avoided by marching down the valley of the Mondego. The neighbourhood of Viseu produces no corn or vegetables, and the troops found nothing there but lemons and grapes--not very sustaining food.

Masséna's expedition very nearly came to an end at Viseu through lack of foresight on the marshal's part. He made his artillery park march on the extreme right of the column outside the masses of infantry, its only escort being an Irish battalion in the French service and a company of French grenadiers. Marching in single file more than a league in length, the park was proceeding slowly and laboriously by difficult roads, when suddenly on its right flank appeared the English colonel Trant, with 4,000 or 5,000 Portuguese militia. If the enemy, profiting by his superior strength, had surrounded the convoy and made a resolute attack, all the ammunition and provisions of the army would have been captured or destroyed. But Colonel Trant, as he himself said afterwards, could not suppose that a general of Masséna's experience could have left unsupported a convoy so essential to the safety of his army, and, supposing that a powerful escort must be close at hand, he dared to advance only with extreme caution. He confined himself, therefore, to attacking only the leading company of grenadiers, who answered by a heavy fire, killing some fifty men. The militia men recoiled in alarm, and Trant, doing what he should have done at first, overlapped a portion of the convoy. As he went forward he discovered the weakness of the escort, and sent a flag of truce to the commander, summoning him to surrender or he would attack him all along the line. The French officer adroitly consented to negotiate, in order to give the Irish time to come up from the rear of the convoy. They appered at length, coming up at the double. As soon as the French officer saw them he broke off the conference, saying: 'I cannot treat any further; here is my general coming to my support with 8,000 men.' Each resumed his position, but Trant shortly left his and made off, thinking he had to with the advanced guard of a strong column. Thus the artillery was saved, but the army soon learnt the danger in which it had been and the excitement was great. Ney, Junot, Reynier, and Montbrun went straight off to Viseu and addressed strong remonstrances to General Fririon, chief of the staff. He, however, asserted that, in spite of his demands, no information of the march of the columns had been given him, everything being settled by Masséna and Pelet. Horrified and indignant at this state of things, the commanders of the four corps called on Masséna with a view of making well-deserved remarks on it. Ney was the speaker, and from the aide-de-camps room we could hear him protesting; but Masséna, foreseeing that the conversation would become animated, took the generals into a more distant apartment. I do not know what was decided, but it appears that the commander-in-chief promised to change his mode of action, for in a quarter of an hour we saw Masséna walking quietly in the garden, taking the arm of each of his lieutenants in turn. Unanimity seemed to be restored, but it was not for long.

As I have already said, childish reasons sometimes produce great and mischievous results. We had a striking example of it, which influenced the result of a campaign which was to have driven the English out of Portugal, but which by its failure increased their confidence in Wellington, while it seasoned the troops who did most to bring about our defeat in the following years. All the army knew that Masséna had brought Mme N— to Portugal with him. This lady, having crossed the whole of Spain in a carriage, and having remained at Salamanca during the sieges of Rodrigo and Almeida, thought fit to follow Masséna on horse-back as soon as he set out to march through a country impracticable for carriages, which produced a very bad effect. The marshal, who generally took his meals alone with her, had had his table laid that day under a clump of lemon-trees, the aide-de-camp's table being a hundred yards away in the same garden. Dinner was about to be served, when the commander-in-chief, wishing probably to cement the good relations which had just been established between himself his lieutenants, remarked that as each of them had several leagues to go in order to reach his headquarters it would best for them to dine with him before starting. All four accepted, and Masséna, in order to prevent any further remarks on the incident of the convoy, ordered that for once the aide-de-camp's table should be set by his.

So far all went well; but just before sitting down Masséna sent for Mme N—. On seeing the generals she drew back, but he said to Ney, 'My dear marshal, kindly take Madame.' Ney turned pale, and nearly burst out; but, restraining himself, he led the lady by the finger-tips, to the table, and placed her, by Masséna's direction, on his right. During the whole meal, however, Ney said not a word to her, but talked to Montbrun, his neighbour on the left. Mme N— , who was too quick-witted not to see how false a position she was in, was seized with a nervous attack, and fell in a faint. Then Ney, Reynier, Montbrun and Junot left the garden, not without a vigorous and audible expression of his views on the part of Ney. Reynier and Montbrun also said plainly what they thought; Junot spoke so bitterly, that I took the liberty of reminding him of the way in which he had met Mme N— at Valladolid. He answered, laughing, 'Because an old hussar like me has his games sometimes, that is no reason for Masséna to imitate them. Besides, I must stand by my colleagues.' From that day forward the four generals were on the worst of terms with Masséna, who, on his side, bore them no goodwill. 1

This quarrel among the chiefs could not fail to aggravate the causes making for the ill-success of the campaign. There arose mainly from our utter want of topographical knowledge of the districts in which we were fighting; arising from the omission of the Portuguese Government—either as a defensive measure, or through indolence—to have good maps made of the kingdom. The only one in existence was as bad as could be; so that we had, as it were, to feel our way along. There were officers in plenty who had campaigned in Portugal with Soult and Junot, but they had not been in the provinces where we were, and could be of no use as guides. On the staff we had some thirty Portuguese officers, among them two generals—the Marquis of Alorna and Count Pamplona who had come to France in 1808 with the contingent furnished to Napoleon by the court of Lisbon. Though they had only obeyed the orders of the former Government, they were proscribed by the Commission of Regency, and thus had returned to seek possession of their confiscated goods in the train of our army. Masséna had hoped to get some useful information from these exiles; but except in the neighhourhood of Lisbon they knew nothing of their own country; while the English, who had been going all about it for two years knew its configuration perfectly, gaining thereby a great advantage over us.

Another cause told no less powerfully against us. Lord Wellington, being allowed a perfectly free hand by the Government, used it to compel all the people to leave their houses, destroy all provisions and mills, and retire with their cattle to Lisbon on the approach of the French, who thus were unable to obtain any information, and had to beat the country to a great distance in order to get provisions. The Spaniards had constantly refused to adopt this terrible means of resistance at the instance of the English; but the Portuguese were more docile. We thus crossed vast districts without seeing a single inhabitant; such an exodus had not been seen within human memory. The city of Viseu was totally deserted when we entered it, yet Masséna halted the army there for six days. This was a second mistake added to that which he had committed in leaving the valley of the Mondego. If on the morrow of his arrival at Viseu the French general had made a rapid march and attacked the Alcoba, on which Lord Wellington had then very few troops, the fault might have been repaired. But our delay of six days allowed the English to ford the Mondego above Ponte de Murcelha, and to unite their army on the ridges of the Alcoba at Busaco. No military writer of any country has been able to account for Masséna's inactivity of nearly a week at Viseu, but the marshal's staff can testify that Mme N—'s fatigue had much to do with delaying Masséna and keeping him at that place. The country was in arms, and it would have been impossible to leave her behind without exposing her to the danger of her being captured. Moreover, when he had made up his mind to start, Masséna made only very short marches, halting first at Tondella. The next day, September 26, after establishing his headquarters at Mortagoa, on the right bank of the Criz, he lost precious time in securing the lady's quarters; and it was not till two in the afternoon that he set out with his staff for the outposts—five good leagues off, at the foot of the Alcoba.

This mountain ridge, about three leagues in length, abuts upon the Mondego to the east, and to the west is connected with detached hills of great steepness, impassable for an army. At the highest point is a convent, named Saceo. The central part of the summit forms a sort of plateau, on which the English artillery was posted. It had freedom of action along the whole front of the position, and its range extended to beyond the Criz. A road passing round the ridge of Busaco afforded easy conumunication between the various portions of the enemy's army, while the slope facing towards the direction from which the French approached was, from its sharpness, well adapted for defence. The enemy's left rested on the hills above Barria; his centre and reserves on the convent; his right on the heights, a little in rear of San Antonio de Cantara. So formidable was the position that the English had some fear that the French commander-in-chief might not venture to attack.

When Masséna came up on the evening of the 26th he found that the army had in his absence been posted by Ney as follows: the 6th corps on the right, at the village of Moira; the centre facing the convent; Reynier's corps on the left, at San Antonio; and the 8th corps, under Junot, with the artillery, marching to take up a position in reserve in rear of the centre. The cavalry, under Montbrun, was at Bienfaita.

When an army has undergone a check it is but too common to find the generals throwing the blame on each other. This happened after Busaco, and thus it is necessary to mention here the opinion expressed before the battle by Masséna's lieutenants, who, having first urged him on to the commission of his greatest blunder, after the unfortunate event criticised his conduct. I have said that on the day but one before the battle the corps under Ney and Reynier were at the foot of the Alcoba, and in presence of the enemy. While impatiently waiting for the commander-in-chief, these two generals exchanged in writing their respective views on the position of the Anglo-Portuguese army. There exists a letter, 2dated on the morning of September 26, in which Marshal Ney says to General Reynier, 'If I were in command I would attack without a moment's hesitation.' Both expressed the same feeling in their correspondence with Masséna:—'The position is far less formidable than it looks and if I had not been in so subordinate a position I would have carried it without awaiting your orders.'Relying on the assurance of Generals Reynier and Junot that nothing could be easier, Masséna made (although the contrary has since been affirmed) not the smallest attempt to reconnoitre and, merely replying, 'Very well, I will be back at daybreak, and we will attack,' he turned and rode back to Mortagoa. Great was the astonishment at this abrupt departure, for, seeing Masséna join his troops, who were encamped within cannon-shot of the enemy, everyone supposed that he would use the remaining daylight to study the position which he had to carry, and would stay with the army. In going off thus, without seeing anything for himself, he no doubt made a great mistake; but I do not think that, after lulling to sleep his usual vigilance and urging him to attack, his lieutenants had any right to blame him as they afterwards did. On tbe contrary, they might well have found fault with themselves; for, after spending two days at the foot of the Alcoba, they advised a front attack, in spite of the steepness, and made no inquiries as to the possibility of turning it—a course, as you will presently see, offering no difficulty.

It was a misfortune for the army that General Sainte-Croix was not then with Masséna. His instinct for war would certainly have led him, taking advantage of the marshal's confidence in him, to induce him to abandon the idea of attacking directly so formidable a position before making sure that it could not be turned. But he was with his brigade some leagues to the rear, escorting a convoy.

Hardly had the commander-in-chief with his staff left the army than night came on—and Masséna had only one eye was not a good horseman. Our road was strewn with large stones and pieces of rock, so we had, in the darkness, to go for more than two hours at a walk to accomplish the five leagues to Mortagoa. As we went along I meditated sadly on the probable results of the battle which we were going to fight on the morrow at such a disadvantage, and imparted my reflections in a low voice to my friend Ligniville and to General Fririon. We were all most anxious that Masséna should alter his dispositions; but no officer save Pelet was allowed to submit any suggestions to him directly. Yet the matter appeared urgent, and we decided to employ an artifice, which we had sometimes used with success, for bringing the truth indirectly to his notice. Agreeing upon our parts, we got near the marshal, feigning not to see him in the darkness; then we began to talk about the coming battle, and I said that I was sorry the commander-in-chief intended to assault the position in front without being certain that it could not be turned. Then General Fririon playing his part as arranged, answered that Ney and Reynier had stated positively that there was no other way to get past, to which Ligniville and I replied that we could not believe that, for it was impossible that the people of Mortagoa should have lived for centuries devoid of direct communication with Boialva, and with no other way to the Oporto road than by Busaco, over the steepest part of the mountains. I added that when I had made the same remark to the aides-de-camp of Ney and Reynier, and asked which of them had reconnoitred the extreme left of the enemy's position, not one answered, from which I concluded that no one had vlsited that part. If Masséna saw badly his hearing was extremely keen, and, as we hoped, he had not missed one word of our talk. So much struck was he, that he came up to our group, and, joining in the conversation, admitted—cautious as he was—that he had assented too easily to the plan of assaulting in front. He said that he would counter-order this, and that if a way could be found of turning the position he would let the army rest next day, and on the following night would concentrate it opposite the vulnerable point and attack unawares. No doubt there would be a day's delay, but the chances of success would be better and the probable loss lighter.

So determined did the marshal appear, that when we reached Mortagoa he bade Ligniville and me try to find some inhabitant who could show us a road to Boialva without passing Busaco. It was a difficult job, for the inhabitants had all fled at the approach of the French, and the extreme darkness was against our search. At length, however, we found in a monastery an old gardener who had stayed to take care of a sick monk. He brought us to this monk, who answered our questions freely; he had often been from Mortagoa and Boialva by a good road which branched off a short league from the place where we were. He was all the more surprised at our not knowing this, that part of our army in going from Viseu to Mortagoa had passed the turning. Guided by the old gardener, we went to verify the monk's statement, and found that an excellent road actually went in the direction of the mountains and appeared to pass round the enemy's left. Yet Marshal Ney had stayed two days at Mortagoa without exploring this road, a knowledge of which would have saved us many disasters.

Ligniville and I, delighted at our discovery, hastened to report it to the marshal; but we had been away more than an hour, and we found him with Major Pelet, surrounded by maps and plans. Pelet said that he had examined the mountains with a telescope by daylight and had seen in their configuration no sign of a pass to our right; moreover, he could not believe that Marshal Ney had not explored the neighbourhood while he was at Mortagoa, and as he had not found a pass it was clear that none existed, nor could we convince him of the contrary. In vain did we offer to go round and ascend the hill which the monk assured us was less steep than that of Busaco, or even to go as far as Boialva if they would give us three battalions of the headquarters guard. In vain did General Fririon beg the marshal accept this offer: all was useless. Masséna was very tired, he said that it was near midnight and that we must be off at four o'clock to reach the camp by daybreak, and with that he went to bed. Never did I pass a more melancholy night; and my comrades were as sad as I. At last the hour came for our start, and we reached the outposts with the first morning light of September 27, an ill-omened day which was to hold one of the most terrible reverses which the French army ever suffered.