Napoleon, when threatening Alexander with war if he did not accede to his wishes, hardly took into account the difficulties of his position. However, when he learnt the reverses which he had undergone in Spain and Portugal, he seemed to hesitate about engaging in a war of which the result seemed very uncertain. General Bertrand told me how Napoleon often repeated at St. Helena that at first his only idea was to frighten the Emperor Alexander into carrying out the treaty. 'We were,' he would say, 'like two equally good fencers, who seem ready to try conclusions, but neither one nor the other quite liking it. They advance by small steps, threatening with eye and with blade, each hoping that fear of crossing swords will make his enemy give way.'

But the Emperor's comparison was not exact; for one of the fencers had behind him a bottomless abyss ready to engulf him if he took a step backwards; and thus placed between an ignominious death and the necessity of fighting with some chance of success, he was bound to take the latter course. Such was the situation of Alexander, made still worse by the intrigues of the Englishman, Wilson, with General Benningsen and the officers of his staff.

Still Napoleon hesitated, and seemed willing to listen to the prudent counsels of Caulaincourt, formerly ambassador at St Petersburg. He questioned French officers who had lived in Russia, and knew the country and its resources. Among them was Lieutenant-Colonel de Ponthon, one of the engineer officers whom Napoleon had, at Alexander's request, authorized, and even asked, to enter the Russian service after the Peace of Tilsit. He was an able and very modest man, and did not give his opinion until the Emperor questioned him; then, like an honourable man devoted to his country, he felt bound to speak the whole truth, and without fear of displeasing the head of the state, he pointed out all the obstacles in the way of his enterprise. The chief of these were, the apathy of the Lithuanian provinces, and the unlikelihood of their offering any support; the fanatical resistance of the Russians proper; the scarcity of provisions and forage, the need of crossing almost desert regions, the impracticability of the roads for artillery after some hours' rain; but, above all, he insisted on the rigour of the winter, and the physical impossibility of fighting after the snow fell, which it usually did in the early days of October. Finally, with real courage, because he was running the risk of giving displeasure and compromising his own career, M. de Ponthon went so far as to fall at the Emperor's knees and entreat him in the name of the fortunes of France and his own glory, not to undertake this dangerous expedition, all the disasters of which he predicted. The Emperor heard him calmly, and took leave of him without remark. For several days he was pensive, and the rumour got about that the expedition was postponed. But very soon the Duke of Bassano brought the Emperor back to his original plan, and it was said that Marshal Davout was no stranger to Napoleon's resolution of moving the army of Germany to the banks of the Niemen. From that moment, although M. de Ponthon remained in the Emperor's immediate service and went everywhere with him, Napoleon never spoke to him again during the whole march to Moscow, and when on the retreat he was forced to admit that that excellent officer's prevision had been only too completely verified, he avoided meeting him. Nevertheless, he promoted him to full colonel.

Let us, however, not anticipate events, and let us return to the preparations which Napoleon was making to persuade or coerce Russia into accepting his conditions. In April the French troops in Germany and those of the allied princes of the Germanic confederation were set in motion, and their march towards Poland was delayed only by the difficulty of procuring forage. Meanwhile the Emperor left Paris on May 9, and, with the Empress, betook himself to Dresden. He was awaited there by his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, and nearly all the German princes, some drawn by the hope of seeing their States extended, others by fear of displeasing the arbiter of their destiny. The only king absent was the King of Prussia. Not belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine he had not been summoned to the meeting, and dared not present himself without Napoleon's leave. For this he humbly begged, and when he had obtained it, hastened to make another among the crowd of sovereigns who had repaired to Dresden to pay their court to the all-powerful conqueror of Europe.

The protestations of fidelity and devotion which were there lavished on Napoleon dazzled him till they made him commit a most serious mistake in the organization of the contingents which were to compose the Grand Army. Instead of weakening the Governments of Austria and Prussia, his former foes, by requiring them to contribute the larger part of their available troops, whom prudence would have enjoined him to place in the advanced guard, as much to spare French blood as to enable him to keep an eye on his new and wavering allies, Napoleon not only contented himself with taking 30,000 men from each of these Powers, but employed them on the wings of his army. The Austrians, under Prince Schwarzenberg, were on the right, in Volhynia; the Prussians, whom he placed under a French marshal, Macdonald, formed the left; the centre was composed of French troops and the contingents from the Confederation of the Rhine. The faults of this organisation struck many intelligent men, who were sorry to see the wings of the Grand Army composed of foreigners, who, placed on the frontiers of their own countries were in a position to form, in case of a reverse, two armies in our rear, while our centre, consisting of trustworthy troops, would be deep within the Russian Empire. Austria was retaining 120,000 soldiers ready to act against us in case of our failure, Prussia had 60,000 men over and above her contingent. It is astonishing that the Emperor took so little heed of what he was leaving behind him, but so confident was he that, when the King of Prussia begged him to allow his eldest son (the present King 1) to go with him as aide-de-camp, Napoleon, although the young prince would have been a valuable hostage for the loyalty of his father, would not consent. It was a remarkable fact that, while the Austrian generals expressed their satisfaction at the union of their flag with ours, the inferior officers and the men regretted having to march against Russia. In the Prussian contingent it was just the contrary. The generals and colonels felt humiliated at being obliged to serve their conqueror, while the junior officers and the soldiers rejoiced at the opportunity of fighting beside the French, to show that, if they had been beaten in the Vienna campaign, it was not for want of courage but because they had been badly led.

Besides enclosing the Grand Army between Austrian and Prussian contingents, Napoleon had lowered the tone of the French troops by mingling foreign regiments with them. Thus the first corps commanded by Marshal Devout reckoned on June 1st 67,000 men, of whom 58,000 were French, the balance consisting of Germans, Spaniards, and Poles. In the second corps under Oudinot, with 34,000 French, there were 1,600 Portuguese, 1,800 Croats, and 7,000 Swiss. In Ney's corps, the third, the proportion of French was even smaller, while in the fourth and sixth corps, united under Eugène Beauharnais, the French composed less than one-half, the remainder being Croats, Bavarians, Spaniards, Dalmatians, and Italians, and of the 44,000 cavalry under Murat 27,000 only were French. It is not my intention here to name all to forces at Napoleon's disposal when he entered Russia, but I wished to show to what extent the French element was mingled with foreigners, who were themselves in the most heterogeneous confusion with regard to language, manners, customs, and interest; all served very badly, and often paralysed the efforts of the French troops. This was one of the principal causes of the reverses which we underwent.

Leaving Dresden on July 29, 2the Emperor went towards Poland, by way of Dantzig and Prussia Proper. His troops were crossing this country at the same time, and he reviewed them as he came up with them. The 23rd Mounted Chasseurs was brigaded with the 24th. This brigade, commanded by General Cartex, formed part of the 2nd army corps, under Marshal Oudinot. I had known General Cartex for some time; he was an excellent man and I got on perfectly with him throughout the campaign. Marshal Oudinot had seen me at the siege of Genoa, as well as in Austria, in 1809, and he treated me with much kindness. On June 20 the 2nd corps was ordered to halt at Insterburg, to be reviewed by the Emperor. These military solemnities were always awaited with impatience by those persons who hoped to share in the favours which Napoleon distributed on such occasions. I was of the number, believing myself all the more certain to be appointed colonel of the regiment that, besides the promises which the Emperor had made to me, General Cartex and Marshal Oudinot had told me that they were going to recommend me officially, and that they believed that M. de la Nougarède was going to be placed, with the rank of general, at the head of one of the grand remount depots which would be established in rear of the army. But the same fatality which had so frequently postponed the delivery of my commission as major pursued me afresh in obtaining that of colonel. The reviews involved severe examinations by the Emperor of the regimental commanders, especially on the eve of a campaign. Besides the usual questions as to the numerical strength in men and horses, he used to address a heap of unexpected queries which people were not always prepared to answer. For instance, ‘How many men have you had from such a department in the last two years? How many carbines from Tulle or from Charleville? How many Norman horses have you? How many Breton? How many German? How many men of that troop have got three stripes? How many two, or one? What is the average age of your soldiers? Of your officers? Of your horses?'and so on. These questions, always put in a short, imperative tone, accompanied with a piercing glance, put many colonels out of countenance; and yet woe to him who hesitated to answer: he got a bad mark in Napoleon's mind. I had prepared myself so well that I had an answer for everything, and the Emperor, after complimenting me on the fine condition of the regiment, would probably have named me colonel, and promoted M. de la Nougarède general. But just then the latter, with his legs wrapped in flannel, had got hoisted on his horse, to follow the movements of his regiment at a distance, while I commanded in his place, and, hearing his name, came up to Napoleon and irritated him by an untimely request on behalf of an officer, a relation of his, who was unworthy of any interest. This request raised a storm of which I experienced the recoil. Napoleon flew into a violent rage, ordered the gendarmes to expel the officer in question from the army, and galloped away, leaving La Nougarède confounded; so he was not made general. Marshal Oudinot having followed the Emperor to inquire his orders with regard to the 23rd Chasseurs, his Majesty replied, 'Let Major Marbot continue to command it.' Before I obtained colonel's rank I was to be wounded again, and that severely.

To do M. de la Nougarède justice, I must say that he expressed in the frankest manner his regret at having been the involuntary cause of the delay in my promotion. I was much concerned by the worthy man's awkward position; he feared that he had lost the Emperor's confidence, and at the same time his infirmity prevented him from recovering it by good conduct in battle.

I had been fortunate enough on the review day to obtain all the promotions and decorations which I had asked for on behalf of my officers and men; and, as the gratitude for those favours always falls upon the commander who has secured them, my influence in the regiment increased considerably, and mitigated my regret at not having been promoted to the rank of which I was discharging the functions. At this time I received letters from Marshal Masséna and the Maréchale, the former commending to me M. Renique, the latter her son Prosper. I was touched by this attention, and accepted both as captains in my regiment; but Prosper Masséna never came to Russia; nor could he, indeed, have borne the climate.

We were now close upon the Russian frontier, and once more about to see the Niemen, which had been our limit in 1807. The army was arranged in the following order. The Austrians, under Schwarzenburg, on the extreme right, to his left between Bielostock and Grodno, two army corps under King Jerome, and next to them Eugène Beauharnais; the centre faced Kowno, consisting of 220,000 combatants, under Murat, Ney, Oudinot, Lefebvre, and Bessieres; the Emperor being with it in person. Macdonald, with 35,000 Prussians, formed, as I have said, the left wing at Tilsit. Behind the Niemen was the Russian army, 400,000 strong commanded by the Emperor Alexander, or rather by Benningsen. It was divided into three principal corps under Bagration, Barclay de Tolly, and Wittgenstein.

Four historians have written on the campaign of 1812. The first was Labaume, a mapping engineer—a member, that is, of a corps which, although part of the military establishment, never went into action, and only accompanied the army or surveying purposes. He never commanded troops and had no practical knowledge of the art of war. His judgments are, therefore, usually incorrect, even when not unjust to the French army. As, however, Labaume's work appeared soon after the restoration of Louis XVIII., party spirit, as well as the desire for information about the terrible events of the Russian campaign, gave it some celebrity, increased by the fact that no one took the trouble to refute it, and thus the public got into the way of regarding its accuracy as unquestioned.

The second narrative is that of Colonel Boutourlin, aide-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander. This work, although written by an enemy, contains much sensible criticism, and if the author is not always strictly accurate it is for want of documents, for he has impartially done all that was in his power to discover the truth, and is in general esteem as having written like an honourable man.

Labaume's libellous work was already forgotten when General the Count de Ségur published, in 1825, a third history of the campaign of 1812. More than one survivor of that campaign was distressed by the spirit of the work and even our enemies called it a military romance. It had nevertheless a great success, both from the purity and elegances of its style, and on account of the reception which it had from the court and the ultra-royalist party. The old officers of the Empire, feeling that they were attacked, charged General Gourgaud to reply. He did it successfully, but in too bitter a fashion, and a duel resulted between him and M. de Segur, who was wounded. It must be owned that if the 'latter shows little favour to Napoleon and his army, General Gourgaud is too flattering, for he will see none of the Emperor's mistakes. I certainly have no intention of writing the history afresh, but I think I ought to record the principal facts, since they form an essential part of the period in which I have lived, and in many cases are connected with my fortunes. I wish, however, in this brief summary to avoid the contrary extremes into which Segur and Gourgaud fell. I will neither detract nor flatter: I will tell the truth.

At the moment when the two mighty empires were about to clash together, England, Russia's natural ally, was bound to make every effort to assist her to repel invasions. By lavishing gold 3on the Turkish Ministers the English Cabinet succeeded in establishing peace between Russia and the Porte, thus enabling the former to call home her army, then, on the frontier of Turkey, which army played an important part in the war. England had also arranged a peace between the Emperor Alexander and France's natural ally, Sweden, on whom Napoleon had all the more right to count, since Bernadotte had just been appointed Crown Prince, and was governing the country in the name of the old King, his adoptive father. I have already told you 4the curious concourse of circumstances by which Bernadotte had been raised to the position of heir-presumptive to the Swedish crown. After all his assurances that he would remain a Frenchman at heart, the new prince let himself be inveigled or intimidated by the English, who could, indeed, easily have overthrown him. He sacrificed the true interests of his new country when he let himself be swayed by England and allied himself with Russia, as he did in a meeting with the Emperor Alexander at the Finnish town of Abo. The Russians had just conquered that province, and promised to indemnify Sweden by the cession of Norway, which was to be torn from Denmark, the too faithful ally of France. Thus Bernadotte, instead of relying on our army to get back his provinces, sanctioned these encroachments by placing himself among the allies of Russia. If he would have acted with us the geographical position of Sweden would have served our common interests admirably.

So far, however, the new Crown Prince did not definitely take sides against us; he waited till he could judge the chances of victory, and did not declare himself till the next year. Deprived of support from Turkey and Sweden, Napoleon's only available allies towards the north were the Poles: a turbulent race, whose forefathers, when they formed an independent state, could not agree, and from whom no moral or physical support could be hoped for. Indeed, Lithuania and the other provinces of the former Poland had in their forty years' subjection to Russia almost wholly lost the remembrance of their ancient constitution, and regarded themselves as Russians of old standing. The sons of the nobles, accustomed to enter the Czar's armies, were not likely to attach themselves to the French. With regard to those Poles who were subject to Austria and Prussia, they marched against Russia, but only under the flag of their present sovereigns, with no enthusiasm for Napoleon. The grand duchy of Warsaw, added to Saxony by the Treaty of Tilsit, alone retained a trace of national feeling and attached itself to France; but what could so small a state do? Still , Napoleon, confident alike in his might and in his genius, resolved to cross the Niemen. On June 23, wearing the cap and cloak of a Pole in his guard, he examined the banks; and that evening at 10 P.M. ordered the passage to begin. Three bridges of boats had been thrown across opposite Kowno, and our troops occupied that town without resistance.