Napoleonic Literature
The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot - Volume II
Chapter XLII
THE German fortresses in which we had left garrisons were soon invested, and some of them besieged. By the end of 1813 only four were still standing. These were Hamburg, where the intrepid Devout succeeded in holding the place till the Emperor abdicated and the garrison was recalled to France; Magdeburg, which General Le Marois also held till the end of the war; Wittenberg, which was bravely defended by old General Lapoype, and taken by assault on January 12; and, lastly, Erfurt, which had to capitulate for want of provisions. All the other fortresses had already fallen into the hands of the enemy. In the case of Dresden and Dantzig, their occupation was discreditable to the allied armies. When, after the battle of Leipzig, Napoleon was retreating to France with the remnants of his army, leaving 25,000 men at Dresden under Saint-Cyr, the marshal endeavoured to cut his way through the blockading force. Several times he drove them back, but at length, overwhelmed by superior forces, and short of provisions, he was constrained to accept an honourable capitulation. The terms were that the garrison should retain their arms, that they should not be prisoners of war, and should return to France by regular marches. The marshal would have preferred that his troops should march as a united army corps, and bivouac together every night, which would have allowed them to defend themselves in the event of treachery; but the enemy's generals pointed out that the country was too much exhausted to furnish rations for 25,000 men in the same place; and, yielding to necessity, the French marshal agreed to divide his force into columns of 2,000 to 3,000 men, who marched one or even two days' journeys apart.

During the first days all went on as it should; but as soon as the last column was out of Dresden, having handed over the forts and the munitions of war, the allied generals declared that they had no power to sign the capitulation without the consent of the generalissimo, Prince Schwarzenberg, and that as he would not ratify it it was null and void. They offered, indeed, to let our troops return to Dresden, putting them in exactly the position in which they were on the day of the capitulation, that is, with provisions for a few days only. But so long as the French occupied the place they had concealed their destitution; now that the enemy knew it, their offer was, of course, illusory. Our troops were indignant at this breach of faith; but what could they do? The enemy had taken care to surround our isolated detachments with battalions, posted previously at the places where the news of the breach of the capitulation would reach the various columns. Resistance was out of the question, and our people were under the sad necessity of laying down their arms.

After the treachery committed on the field of Leipzig came the breach of capitulations, which up to then all civilized nations held sacred. None the less have the Germans chanted 'Victory'; for everything, even dishonour, seemed to them allowable in order to crush Napoleon. All the allied sovereigns having adopted this new and iniquitous law of nations, they put it in force with regard to the garrison of Dantzig. After a vigorous defence of that place, General Rapp was forced, by want of provisions, to surrender, on condition that the garrison should return to France. Yet, in spite of the treaty signed by the Prince of Wurtemberg, who commanded the besieging army, this condition was basely violated, and the brave defenders of Dantzig, to the number of 10,000, were sent as prisoners into Russia, where most of them perished from their hardships.

A conspicuous feature of that siege was the conduct of an infantry captain in the garrison, M. de Chambure. This brave and intelligent officer obtained leave to form a 'free company,' composed of picked volunteers. This band undertook the most venturesome enterprises. It used to go at night and surprise the besiegers' outposts, penetrate within their trenches, destroy their works, spike their guns, and go out into the country to plunder their convoys. One night, Chambure took boat with his men, surprised a Russian cantonment, set fire to an ammunition train, destroyed several magazines, killed or wounded more than 150 men, and returned in triumph with a loss of only three. Not long after, he attacked a breaching battery, captured it, and spiked the guns. Then, uniting banter to courage, he left in the muzzle of a mortar a letter to the Prince of Wurtemberg, to this effect: 'Prince: as your shells spoil my sleep, I have had to come and spike your mortars. Do not wake me any more, or I shall be obliged to come and see you again.' He did, indeed, come again more than once, and spread a panic among the enemy's sappers and gunners. Horace Vernet has made his name popular by a picture of him in the act of depositing his letter in the mortar.

The frequent desertions which took place at this time remind me of the following anecdote. 1 Among the generals who served under Washington in the War of American Independence, the bravest, most able, and most esteemed by the army was General Arnold. He had lost a leg in battle, and yet such was his patriotism that he continued to fight against the enemies of his country. Ultimately, however, having quarrelled with Washington, on account of some supposed favouritism, he deserted and took service in the British army, becoming one of the most dangerous enemies of his countrymen. Some time afterwards an armistice was signed. Several American officers advanced between the two camps, and were met by some English officers, among whom was General Arnold. A friendly conversation ensued, until Arnold, perceiving that his former friends were displeased at his presence, remarked that he was surprised at this, for though he was fighting against them now, they should not forget that he had lost a leg in the American service. Upon this an American replied, 'We remember it quite well, and if ever you fall into our hands your wooden leg shall be deposited in the Capitol to remind our descendants of the heroic courage you displayed when fighting for the independence of your country, after which we shall hang the remainder of you on a gallows as a warning to traitors.'

But let us return to the situation of the French armies in December 1813. Spain, the original cause of the catastrophe which marked the end of Napoleon's reign, had been stripped of a great many of the best troops, who were required to reinforce the army in Germany. There were, however, still more than 100,000 men in the Peninsula—enough to keep the enemy in check if Napoleon had left Marshal Soult in command. But as he was determined to turn his brother Joseph into a general capable of defending the kingdom which he had given him, the Emperor entrusted the command of the army in Spain to that highly estimable but very unmilitary prince. It is true he gave him Marshal Jourdan as chief of the staff; but Jourdan was prematurely old, and had seen no service since the early days of the Revolution. He was worn out, morally and physically, and inspired no confidence in the troops. Thus, in spite of the ability shown by Suchet, Reille, Foy, Clausel, and other generals who served under King Joseph, the Anglo-Portuguese armies commanded by Lord Wellington, and assisted by the Spanish guerrillas, inflicted on us irreparable losses. The French had been compelled to leave Madrid, recross the Ebro, and concentrate their main forces round the town of Vittoria. Attacked in that position by an army three times greater than their own, 2they lost a battle all the more disastrous in its results that King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan had taken no precautions to secure the retreat. The king's carriages, those of a number of Spaniards who had taken his side, and were flying from the vengeance of their countrymen, parks of artillery, treasure wagons, everything was in confusion, and the regiments had much difficulty in making their way through. They did not, however, break up, and, in spite of the vigorous attacks of the enemy, the bulk of the army succeeded in retreating to Pampeluna. The battle of Vittoria did credit to the ability and courage of General Clausel, who rallied and directed the army. In that unhappy day the French lost 6,000 killed. wounded, and prisoners, and left most of their artillery, and nearly all their baggage, in the enemy's hands.

In spite of this check our troops might have maintained their footing in Navarre, but King Joseph ordered them to retreat beyond the Bidassoa, directing General Foy, who commanded the rear-guard, to destroy the bridge. Thus, by the end of June we had abandoned Spain in that direction. Marshal Suchet still held out in Aragon, Catalonia, and the kingdom of Valencia, but after the battle of Vittoria Wellington was able to send reinforcements to the south of Spain, and Suchet had to evacuate Valencia, both kingdom and city.

At this moment the Emperor was still triumphant in Germany. As soon as he learned the state of affairs beyond the Pyrenees he hastened to revoke the powers he had given to Joseph and Jourdan, and appointed Marshal Soult his lieutenant-general over all the Spanish armies. After reorganising the divisions Soult made a great effort to succour the French garrison left in Pampeluna; but the place was obliged to capitulate, and he had to take his troops back across the Bidassoa. The fortress of St. Sebastian, under its brave governor, General Rey, held out for a long time; but it was finally taken by assault, and the English and Portuguese, oblivious of all humanity, pillaged, violated, and massacred the unhappy inhabitants, allies though they were. The English officers took no steps to put a stop to these atrocities, which, to the disgrace of Wellington, his generals, and the English nation, went on for three whole days. 3

Foot by foot Soult defended the Pyrenees, and beat Wellington several times; but the superior forces at the disposal of the latter allowed him to return incessantly to the attack, until he succeeded in establishing himself within our frontiers, and fixing his headquarters at St. Jean de Luz, the first French town, which had never been lost to France, either by the defeats of Francis I. or the disastrous wars at the end of the reign of Louis XIV.

It is hard to believe that after the desertion of the German troops at Leipzig Marshal Soult should have thought that he could keep German soldiers in the Army of the Pyrenees. In one night they all went over to the enemy and increased Wellington's forces. However, Soult collected several divisions under the ramparts of Bayonne, and attacked the English again. On December 9 a battle began which lasted five days, and was one of the most bloody of the war. It cost the enemy 16,000 men, and the French 10,000; but they, nevertheless, took up their position again round Bayonne.

Before this, Marshal Suchet, having heard in October of Napoleon's reverses in Germany, understood that he could no longer hold out in the south of Spain, and prepared to draw nearer to France. Retreating on Tarragona, he blew up the ramparts, and added the garrison to his army. His retreat, though molested by the Spaniards, was effected in good order, and by the end of December 1813 he and his troops were established at Gerona.

To complete our view of the situation of the French armies at the end of 1813, we must remember that in the spring of that year the Emperor had assembled in Tyrol, and in his kingdom of Italy, a numerous army under his stepson, Eugène Beauharnais. That prince was a man of a kind and gentle disposition, and very devoted to the Emperor; but, though a far better soldier than Joseph, he fell very far short of being fit to command an army. On this point the Emperor was misled by the affection he felt for him. On August 28, the day on which the armistice between Napoleon and the allies was to end in Germany, the Austrians, who had hitherto been neutral, declared themselves our enemies beyond the Alps. Hostilities were never very active, for the chiefs on both sides understood that the success of the campaign would depend upon the result of events in Germany. Still there were frequent combats with varying fortunes; but the superior forces of the Austrians, who were soon joined by an English corps, ultimately compelled the viceroy to withdraw the Franco-Italian army across the Adige.

In November came the news of the defection of Murat, King of Naples. The Emperor, to whom he owed everything, could not at first believe it; but it was only too real. Murat had joined his flag to that of Austria, and his troops were already in occupation of Bologna. Such is the fickleness of Italians that they everywhere greeted the Austrians and Neapolitans, whom they had hated before, and soon afterwards hated still more bitterly. In December the viceroy's army, 43,000 strong only, occupied Verona and the neighbourhood.

On seeing all Europe in coalition against him Napoleon could not hide from himself that the first condition of peace imposed on him would be the re-establishment of the Bourbons on the throne of Spain. He resolved, therefore, to do of his own proper motion what he foresaw he would presently be compelled to do. He restored King Ferdinand VII. to liberty, and ordered Suchet's army to retire on the Pyrenees.

Thus at the end of 1813 we had lost all Germany, all Spain, and most of Italy; while Wellington's army had crossed the Bidassoa, and was encamped on French territory, threatening Bayonne, Navarre, and the district of Bordeaux.


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1. Many regrettable desertions took place, even among officers, from the garrisons of the fortresses, notably from that of Dresden, which was composed of troops belonging to different nations. The deserters were warmly welcomed in the Russian camp, and fought against us during the subsequent campaign in France. Return to paragraph text.

2. [The Anglo-Portugese army numbered somewhat over 83,000, with 90 guns. The french muster-roll was lost in the battle, but Soult had probably about 60,000 combatants, and 143 of his guns were captured (Napier).] Return to paragraph text.

3. [Readers of Napier will remember the indignant tone in which he speaks of the atrocities committed by some of the English and Portugese soldiers at the capture of St. Sebastian, and also the manner in which English and Portuguese officers, at the risk, and in some cases at the cost, of their own lives, exerted themselves to get the men in hand again.] Return to paragraph text.