Napoleonic Literature
The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot - Volume II
Chapter XLIV
THE strongest opponents of the Emperor are compelled to admit that in the winter campaign of the first three months of 1814 he surpassed himself. Never did the general display such talents or do so much with such feeble resources. With a few thousand men, a great part of whom were untried recruits, he made head against all the armies of Europe; showing a front in every direction with the same troops' whom he carried about with a marvellous rapidity. Making clever use of the defensive resources of the country, he flew from Austrians to Russians, from Russians to Prussians; from Blucher back to Schwarzenberg and Sachen, sometimes repulsed, but more often victorious. There was even at one moment a hope of chasing the strangers out of French territory. One more effort on the part of the nation would have done it; but there was a wide-spread weariness of war, and conspiracies against the Empire everywhere, especially at Paris. Several military writers have expressed surprise that France did not rise as in 1792 to repel the invaders, or at least form, like the Spaniards, a focus of national defence in every province. To this the answer is, that twenty-five years of war, and the conscription too frequently anticipated, had worn out the enthusiasm which in 1792 had improvised armies. In most departments only old men and boys remained. The example of Spain does not apply to France. Paris has been allowed to gain too much influence, and unless she puts herself at the head of the movement, France is helpless. In Spain, on the other hand, each province, being a little government, could act and raise an army, even when the French held Madrid. France was ruined by centralisation.

It forms no part of my plan to relate the feats of the French army in the campaign of 1814. One would have to write volumes and notice all that has been published on the subject; nor have I the heart to dwell on the misfortunes of my country. I will only say, therefore, that after disputing every foot of the ground between the Marne, the Aube, the Saône, and the Seine, the Emperor devised a great scheme which must have saved France if it had succeeded. This was to march upon Lorraine and Alsace, by Saint-Dizier and Vitry, thereby threatening the enemy's rear, and alarming him for his communications, and thus forcing him to retire to the frontier while he could. But two conditions were needed to bring this superb strategic movement to a good issue, and these were not satisfied. They were loyalty on the part of the great state officials, and some means of preventing the enemy from marching on Paris in case he took no notice of the Emperor's march on his rear. Unhappily the loyalty of the Chambers had been so weakened that it was their principal members, Talleyrand, the Duke of Dalberg, and others who secretly kept the allied sovereigns informed of the disaffection of the upper classes, and invited them to attack the capital. As regards defences, I must confess that sufficient provision had not been made. The gates on the right bank had been palisaded, but no works thrown up to contain cannon. The garrison, consisting of a few line troops, pensioners, and Polytechnique students, was insufficient even to attempt resistance; so that on leaving the capital in January the Emperor had entrusted the defence of Paris to the National Guard. The officers of that citizen militia had met at the Tuileries, and replied after their want by many oaths and warlike declarations to the Emperor's ardent discourse. He named the Empress regent, and appointed as lieutenant-general in chief command his brother Joseph, the ex-King of Spain, the best of men, and the most unmilitary.

Deluding himself with the belief that the safety of the capital was thus provided for, Napoleon thought that he might safely leave it to its own resources for a few days while he carried out his plan of attacking the enemy's rear, and started for Lorraine towards the end of March. But he had marched only a few days when he learnt that, instead of pursuing him, the allies were making for Paris, driving before them the weak remains of Marmont's and Mortier's corps; and that these, with but small aid from the National Guard, were trying to defend the heights of Montmartre. His eyes opened by this news, Napoleon led his columns back at once towards Paris.

By March 30, travelling rapidly and unescorted, he had passed Moret when he heard the sound of guns, and hoped then to enter the capital before the allies. His presence would have produced a great effect on the people, who were asking for arms; but though there were plenty in store, Clarke would not allow them to be served out. On reaching Fromenteau, five leagues only from Paris, Napoleon heard the guns no longer, and knew that the city was in the power of the enemy. At Villejuif this was confirmed; and, in fact, Marmont had just signed the capitulation. The Empress and her son, the King of Rome, had, on the approach of danger, been removed to Blois, and Joseph soon followed them. The troops evacuated Paris by the Fontainebleau gate, on the road by which the Emperor was expected.

It is impossible to give any idea of the agitation which prevailed. Few of the inhabitants had foreseen an invasion; and as for me, who had expected it, and had seen the horrors of war so near, I was in great trouble to know where I could place my wife and little child in safety. The kind old Marshal Sérurier offered them shelter at the Invalides, of which he was governor, and I was calmed by the thought that as the French had always respected the places where old soldiers lived, the enemy would do the same. So I took my family there, and left Paris before the allies entered. I reported myself to General Préval at Versailles, and he put me in command of a small column formed of troopers from my own regiment and from the 9th and 12th Chasseurs, with orders to rendezvous the same day at Rambouillet. There I found my horses and outfit, and took the command of my squadrons.

The road was covered with the carriages of persons leaving the capital. This did not surprise me; but I could not understand whence came the great number of troops of different arms who arrived from all sides in detachments large enough, if combined, to have formed a body capable of stopping the enemy before Montmartre, and gaining time for our army to come up from Champagne. But the Emperor, misled by his War Minister, had given no orders on this point, and probably did not know that he still had such means of defence remaining. The following statement of what these were is from official documents. At Vincennes, the École militaire, and the central artillery depôt were 400 guns and over 50,000 new muskets. Joseph and Clarke had at their disposal the troops brought by Marshals Mortier and Marmont, to the number of 19,000; 7,000 or 8,000 soldiers in the barracks of Paris; 3,000 at the depots of the imperial guard; 15,000 to 18,000 dismounted troopers in Versailles and the neighbourhood; 18,000 to 20,000 recruits intended for the line regiments, and National Guards in the barracks of the villages round Paris; more than 2,000 officers on leave or retired who came to offer their services; and lastly, 20,000 workmen, nearly all old soldiers, who begged to be allowed to aid in the defence of Paris: in all, an effective strength of 80,000 men, who could have been got together in a few hours and made use of to defend the capital till Napoleon and his army could come up.

Joseph and Clarke got warning of the approach of the enemy on the morning of March 28, and thus had forty-eight hours in which to make use of these resources, but took no steps to do so. Finally, to crown their bungling, they sent 4,000 of the best men in the imperial guard out of Paris to reinforce the already needlessly numerous escort of the Empress, at the moment when the enemy was attacking Romainville.

As soon as Napoleon learnt that Paris had capitulated, and that the two small corps of Marmont and Mortier were withdrawing to join him, he ordered them to take up a position at Essonnes, half-way between Paris and Fontainebleau, and went himself to the latter town as the heads of the columns returned from Saint-Dizier were reaching it, which shows that his intention was to march on Paris. The enemy's generals have since admitted that if the Emperor had attacked them, they would not have dared to accept battle. Behind them was the Seine, and Paris with its million inhabitants, who might rise during the battle, barricade the streets and bridges, and cut off their retreat. They had, therefore, determined to retire, and encamp on the heights of Belleville, Montmartre, and Chaumont, which command the right bank of the Seine and the road to Germany.

But fresh events detained them in Paris. M. de Talleyrand, once a bishop, now married, had been to all appearance most devotedly attached to the Emperor, who had made him Prince of Benevento, Grand Chamberlain, and so on. But his pride was hurt at being no longer Napoleon's first confidant and director of his policy, and he had, since the disastrous Russian campaign, put himself at the head of the smothered opposition set up by the malcontents of all parties, and especially the aristocracy of the Faubourg Saint-Germain. In the days of his prosperity they had submitted to and even served Napoleon; now they were his enemies, and without openly compromising themselves, attacked him by all available means. The chiefs were such men as the Abbé de Pradt, Archbishop of Malines, M. de Chateaubriand, M. Laisné, and others, all able men, who, directed by Talleyrand, the ablest intriguer of them all, had for some time been looking out for a chance of upsetting Napoleon. They saw that they would never have one more favourable than the present. But though Napoleon was at the moment greatly weakened, he was not quite beaten. Besides the army which had just done such wonders under him, there were Suchet's between the Pyrenees and the Garonne, numerous troops under Soult, and two fine divisions at Lyons. The Army of Italy was still formidable; and thus, though the English were in occupation of Bordeaux, Napoleon could still collect a large force and prolong the war indefinitely if he raised the population, whom the enemy's requisitions had exasperated.

M. de Talleyrand and his party saw that if they allowed the Emperor time to bring up all these troops to Paris, he might beat the allies in the streets, or retire to the loyal provinces and continue the war till he tired the enemy into making peace. The government must be changed. But there was the difficulty. They wanted to restore the Bourbons, while part of the nation wished to leave Napoleon on the throne, or call his son to it. There was the same difference of opinion among the allies; the Kings of England and Prussia being on the side of the Bourbons, while the Emperor of Russia, who never liked them, was disposed to support the interests of Napoleon's son.

In order to settle the question by taking the first step, and as it were to force the hand of the allied sovereigns, Talleyrand caused a score of young aristocrats to appear on horseback on the Place Louis XV. wearing white cockades. Led by Viscount Talon, an old comrade of mine, from whom I have the details, they made their way towards the Emperor Alexander's hotel, loudly shouting, 'Long live Louis XVIII.! Down with the tyrant!' At first the bystanders were merely stupefied; presently the crowd began to threaten, and the most resolute members of the cavalcade wavered. The first outburst of royalism had missed fire, but they repeated the scene at various points. Sometimes they were hooted, sometimes applauded. The Parisians required a cry to arouse them, and that which Talon and his friends had started resounded all day in the ears of the Emperor Alexander. In the evening Talleyrand was able to say to him, 'Your Majesty can judge for yourself with what unanimity the country desires the restoration of the Bourbons.' From that moment, though Napoleon's partisans, as the events of the next year showed, were many more than those of Louis XVIII., his cause was lost.


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