I have to guard the line from Mouchin to Chéreng. It is not much trouble to do, for the English do not stir, and are as quiet at Tournay as if they were in London. I think that everything will pass of peaceably.

Writing from Saint-Amand in the following month, he still reports all quiet; the enemy's troops deserting in heaps; men flocking ‘thick as flies' to the French regiments. ‘People think there will be no fighting. Here we think that almost certain.'

By June 13 the complexion of affairs is changed, and he writes from Pont-sur-Sambre: ‘I do not think there will be a battle for another five days'—a very accurate forecast. After the affair of June 17 at Genappe, Marbot was promoted major-general; but this appointment did not take effect. The following letter, written on June 26 from Laon, gives Marbot's fresh impressions of Waterloo:

I cannot get over our defeat. We were manœuvred like so many pumpkins. I was with my regiment on the right flank of the army almost throughout the battle. They assured me that Marshal Grouchy would come up at that point; and it was guarded only by my regiment with three guns and a battalion of infantry—not nearly enough. Instead of Grouchy, what arrived was Blucher's corps. You can imagine how we were served. We were driven in, and in an instant the enemy was on our rear. The mischief might have been repaired, but no one gave any orders. The big generals were making bad speeches at Paris; the small ones lose their heads, and all goes wrong. I got a lance-wound in the side; it is pretty severe, but I thought I would stay to set a good example. If everyone had done the same we might yet get along; but the men are deserting, and no one stops them. Whatever people may say, there are 50,000 men in this neighbourhood who might be got together; but to do it we should have to make it a capital offence to quit your post, or to give leave of absence. Everybody gives leave, and the coaches are full of officers departing. You may judge if the soldiers stay. There will not be one left in a week, unless they are checked by the death penalty. The Chambers can save us if they like; but we must have severe measures and prompt action. No food is sent to us, and so the soldiers pillage our poor France as if they were in Russia. I am at the outposts, before Laon; we have been made to promise not to fire, and all is quiet.

In a letter written fifteen years later to General F. de Grouchy, Marbot enters more into detail. From this we learn that his regiment formed part of the force which was thrown back en potence on the extreme right, fronting the stream of the Dyle, as may be seen in any plan of the battle. The Emperor's instructions, conveyed to him by his old comrade Labédoyere, who was then acting as aide-de-camp to Napoleon, were, while keeping the bulk of his force in view of the field of battle, to push forward his outposts towards Saint-Lambert and Ottignies; leaving a line of cavalry pickets a quarter of a league apart one from the other, so that when Grouchy arrived the news might be passed along without delay. One of these detachments reached Moustier about 1 P.M., and the officer in command at once sent back word that the French troops posted on the right bank of the Dyle were crossing the river—i.e. falling back. This intelligence was forwarded to the Emperor, and an orderly officer soon came with orders to Marbot to push as far as possible in the direction of Wavre. Near Saint-Lambert one of his sections fell in with some Prussian cavalry, capturing an officer and a few men. These were promptly sent to the Emperor, and Marbot hastened with a squadron towards Saint-Lambert. There he saw a strong column advancing and again sent intelligence to headquarters. But the reply was that it could be nothing but Grouchy; that the prisoners were doubtless some Prussian stragglers flying before his advance, and that Marbot might go forward boldly. Of course he had to obey orders; but soon had proof positive as to the nature of the advancing column. After hard fighting he had to retire, again reporting the circumstances to the Emperor. So possessed, however, was Napoleon with his own view of the case, that he merely sent back the adjutant with orders to Marbot ‘to let Grouchy know.' By this time his outposts were all falling back, and soon he was closely engaged with the English left, near Frischermont, and received the wound which he mentions in the letter already quoted. A report which he drew up later in the year at the instance of Davout, then Minister of War, has unfortunately disappeared.

After Waterloo, Marbot had to leave France; and during the period of his exile, which he spent in Germany, he composed the work by which until the appearance of the present Memoirs he was best known—a criticism on General Rogniart's 'Considérations sur l'Art de la Guerre.' It was this which earned the flattering reference to him, accompanying a legacy of 100,000 francs, in Napoleon's will. 'I bid Colonel Marbot,' he says, 'continue to write in defence of the glory of the French armies, and to the confusion of calumniators and apostates.' (Rogniart had criticised the conduct of the Essling campaign, as Marbot mentions on pp. 438, 439, of the first volume.)

In 1818 Marbot was recalled to France and placed on half-pay. He occupied his leisure by writing another book, ‘On the Necessity of Increasing the Military Forces of France,' which was well thought of. Presently his services were again in request, and in 1829 he was placed in command of the 8th Chasseurs. In the following year he became aide-de-camp to the Duke of Orleans, and a second time attained the rank of major-general. From that time till the fall of the monarchy 'of July' he was constantly employed. He received one more wound; when he was nearly sixty years old. During the Medeah expedition in Algiers he was hit by a bullet in the left knee. As he was being carried to the rear, he remarked with a smile to the Duke: 'This is your fault, sir.' 'How so?' naturally said the Duke. 'Did I not hear you say, before the fighting began, that if any of your staff got wounded, you could bet it would be Marbot? You see you have won!' On the death of the Duke in 1842, he was attached to the staff of the Count of Paris, then a child of four years old; a post which at all events may have kept the veteran out of danger. In 1848 he was placed for the last time on the retired list; and in November 1854 his honourable life came to an end. Few men of that age seem to have left a more creditable record.GENERAL MARBOTS ‘Memoirs' end with the first abdication of Napoleon, so that we lose what we would gladly have had —his reminiscences of the Elba and Waterloo period; though a few letters exist giving some scanty details with regard to the Waterloo campaign. From an article by M. Cuvillier-Fleury, published in the 'Journal des Débats' shortly after the general's death, we learn that at the first Restoration he was maintained in the army, and placed in command of the 7th Hussars. As might be expected when Napoleon returned, Marbot and his regiment went back to their former allegiance, and at Waterloo they formed part of the corps under the Count of Erlon; being posted on the extreme right of the French line. On April 10 he had written:

I have to guard the line from Mouchin to Chéreng. It is not much trouble to do, for the English do not stir, and are as quiet at Tournay as if they were in London. I think that everything will pass of peaceably.

Writing from Saint-Amand in the following month, he still reports all quiet; the enemy's troops deserting in heaps; men flocking ‘thick as flies' to the French regiments. ‘People think there will be no fighting. Here we think that almost certain.'

By June 13 the complexion of affairs is changed, and he writes from Pont-sur-Sambre: ‘I do not think there will be a battle for another five days'—a very accurate forecast. After the affair of June 17 at Genappe, Marbot was promoted major-general; but this appointment did not take effect. The following letter, written on June 26 from Laon, gives Marbot's fresh impressions of Waterloo:

I cannot get over our defeat. We were manœuvred like so many pumpkins. I was with my regiment on the right flank of the army almost throughout the battle. They assured me that Marshal Grouchy would come up at that point; and it was guarded only by my regiment with three guns and a battalion of infantry—not nearly enough. Instead of Grouchy, what arrived was Blucher's corps. You can imagine how we were served. We were driven in, and in an instant the enemy was on our rear. The mischief might have been repaired, but no one gave any orders. The big generals were making bad speeches at Paris; the small ones lose their heads, and all goes wrong. I got a lance-wound in the side; it is pretty severe, but I thought I would stay to set a good example. If everyone had done the same we might yet get along; but the men are deserting, and no one stops them. Whatever people may say, there are 50,000 men in this neighbourhood who might be got together; but to do it we should have to make it a capital offence to quit your post, or to give leave of absence. Everybody gives leave, and the coaches are full of officers departing. You may judge if the soldiers stay. There will not be one left in a week, unless they are checked by the death penalty. The Chambers can save us if they like; but we must have severe measures and prompt action. No food is sent to us, and so the soldiers pillage our poor France as if they were in Russia. I am at the outposts, before Laon; we have been made to promise not to fire, and all is quiet.

In a letter written fifteen years later to General F. de Grouchy, Marbot enters more into detail. From this we learn that his regiment formed part of the force which was thrown back en potence on the extreme right, fronting the stream of the Dyle, as may be seen in any plan of the battle. The Emperor's instructions, conveyed to him by his old comrade Labédoyere, who was then acting as aide-de-camp to Napoleon, were, while keeping the bulk of his force in view of the field of battle, to push forward his outposts towards Saint-Lambert and Ottignies; leaving a line of cavalry pickets a quarter of a league apart one from the other, so that when Grouchy arrived the news might be passed along without delay. One of these detachments reached Moustier about 1 P.M., and the officer in command at once sent back word that the French troops posted on the right bank of the Dyle were crossing the river—i.e. falling back. This intelligence was forwarded to the Emperor, and an orderly officer soon came with orders to Marbot to push as far as possible in the direction of Wavre. Near Saint-Lambert one of his sections fell in with some Prussian cavalry, capturing an officer and a few men. These were promptly sent to the Emperor, and Marbot hastened with a squadron towards Saint-Lambert. There he saw a strong column advancing and again sent intelligence to headquarters. But the reply was that it could be nothing but Grouchy; that the prisoners were doubtless some Prussian stragglers flying before his advance, and that Marbot might go forward boldly. Of course he had to obey orders; but soon had proof positive as to the nature of the advancing column. After hard fighting he had to retire, again reporting the circumstances to the Emperor. So possessed, however, was Napoleon with his own view of the case, that he merely sent back the adjutant with orders to Marbot ‘to let Grouchy know.' By this time his outposts were all falling back, and soon he was closely engaged with the English left, near Frischermont, and received the wound which he mentions in the letter already quoted. A report which he drew up later in the year at the instance of Davout, then Minister of War, has unfortunately disappeared.

After Waterloo, Marbot had to leave France; and during the period of his exile, which he spent in Germany, he composed the work by which until the appearance of the present Memoirs he was best known—a criticism on General Rogniart's 'Considérations sur l'Art de la Guerre.' It was this which earned the flattering reference to him, accompanying a legacy of 100,000 francs, in Napoleon's will. 'I bid Colonel Marbot,' he says, 'continue to write in defence of the glory of the French armies, and to the confusion of calumniators and apostates.' (Rogniart had criticised the conduct of the Essling campaign, as Marbot mentions on pp. 438, 439, of the first volume.)

In 1818 Marbot was recalled to France and placed on half-pay. He occupied his leisure by writing another book, ‘On the Necessity of Increasing the Military Forces of France,' which was well thought of. Presently his services were again in request, and in 1829 he was placed in command of the 8th Chasseurs. In the following year he became aide-de-camp to the Duke of Orleans, and a second time attained the rank of major-general. From that time till the fall of the monarchy 'of July' he was constantly employed. He received one more wound; when he was nearly sixty years old. During the Medeah expedition in Algiers he was hit by a bullet in the left knee. As he was being carried to the rear, he remarked with a smile to the Duke: 'This is your fault, sir.' 'How so?' naturally said the Duke. 'Did I not hear you say, before the fighting began, that if any of your staff got wounded, you could bet it would be Marbot? You see you have won!' On the death of the Duke in 1842, he was attached to the staff of the Count of Paris, then a child of four years old; a post which at all events may have kept the veteran out of danger. In 1848 he was placed for the last time on the retired list; and in November 1854 his honourable life came to an end. Few men of that age seem to have left a more creditable record.