It has already been said that the army which Napoleon led against Austria in the autumn of 1805 was the finest he ever commanded. From that year commenced its decline, slow at first, more rapid as the youth of the country was exhausted by his overdrafts. It was in 1805 that he first drew upon the resources of the future, by calling out, before their time, the conscripts of 1806. They, however, formed no part of the army which fought at Ulm and at Austerlitz. As in 1805, so in 1806, Napoleon overdrew his account by calling out, nearly a year before their time, the conscripts of 1807. At this period the conscription was expected to yield annually about 80,000 recruits. There would thus be in the French army, when the advance against the Russian armies commenced, 80,000 recruits called out and trained a year before their proper time of service, and shortly afterwards 80,000 more also anticipated by nearly a year, and only commencing their training. [1]

Even the recruits of the conscription of 1806 were not, apparently, provided with uniforms by the 22nd November; Napoleon on that date had to urge the completion of their eduipment, as well as that of the conscripts of 1807. [2] He proposed to call to the front the recruits of 1806, now fairly trained, though he would be prepared to leave 20,000 in reserve for the present. That would give him 60,000 for the front. [3]

He recognised, as has been related already, that the advance against Russia was the greatest enterprise he had ever, so far, entered upon. [4] Operating at so great a distance, he would necessarily require forces far in excess of those which had sufficed for the destruction of Prussia. To provide these additional men, he now employed various methods. He had to think not only of the army at the actual scene of operations, but also of that to be maintained in Italy as a threat to Austria on her southern border, of forces to repel any attempt from the sea on the Dutch or German coasts, and, finally, of the troops necessary to protect the ports of France against a possible descent.

The last was the least important; for a descent on the French coast by England was not probable and, if undertaken, would not be likely to be made in great force.

Napoleon calculated that early in December he had in Germany, with the Grand Army, 1400 companies of infantry averaging 123 men each. [5] He had 61 regiments; each regiment, as a rule, consisted of 3 battalions, one of which was left in France as a depot. But a few regiments had 4 battalions, 3 on service and one in depôt. Of these he had 18 in Germany. He designed to increase the companies to 140 men each, which would give a total of nearly 200,000 for the infantry in Germany.

The cavalry regiments he proposed to raise to 5 squadrons of 200 sabres each. [6]

Kellerman, who was in charge of the depots on the eastern frontier of France and in Western Germany, was ordered to send to the front 8,000 or 10,000 conscripts, whom he would have collected by the 15th November. [7]

Irrespective of these, he was to form eight provisional battalions, of which the nucleus was to be one company sent back from each of eight 3rd battalions serving with the Grand Army. To this nucleus were to be added conscripts who had only undergone eight or ten days’ training, who would be then sent to continue their training with the provisional battalions at Magdeburg or Cassel. As their training progressed, they were to be formed into companies, then into battalions, finally into provisional regiments for the march to the front. As they marched their training continued. Men who were left behind, sick or footsore, by one provisional battalion, at any of the halting-stages, were gathered up by the next to pass. [8] As these battalions passed through the principal places such as Wurtzburg, Erfurt, Wittenberg, and Spandau, they were required to be inspected by the local commandant, who reported on them to headquarters. Thus Napoleon had a continuous series of reports, enabling him to keep his eye on the progress of his recruits who were sent forward under officers from the depôts.

On arrival at the front, the provisional regiments were again broken up for distribution, according to requirements, to the various corps and regiments. [9]

For the defence of the French ports Cambacérès was directed to raise 9000 National Guards in the departments of the Somme and the Lower Seine. [10] These were to join the reserve in Paris, standing ready for movement to any part of the coast that might be threatened. There were in Paris three regular regiments for this purpose. Two of them were replaced by these National Guards, and moved towards the front in Poland. Napoleon later remarks [11] that 40,000 men will be available in the 3rd battalions left in France. 3000 National Guards were mobilised at Bordeaux. [12] From Brittany he drew to the front two regiments. To compensate for these, he sent there 6000 conscripts of 1805 and 4000 of 1807. He also raised 5000 men amongst the shipbuilders and artificers of the ports, who were thrown out of employ owing to the British supremacy at sea. [13]

The regiment of “vélites” of the Guard, not having been found to fulfil the objects for which it was intended, he proposed to form into a regiment of fusiliers of the guard 1500 or 1600 strong, [14] which was to leave Paris for Berlin on the 12th December. [15]
To his brother Louis he wrote [16] that he should expect him to provide at least 20,000 Dutch troops for the Grand Army, the number, if possible, to be raised to 25,000 in the spring. Three days earlier [17] he had ordered Louis to occupy Hanover with three French regiments and 7000 or 8000 Dutch troops.

He was even willing to accept the offer of a Breton gentleman to raise 500 or 600 volunteers, though he stipulated that they should not be men who would be otherwise taken by the conscription. [18] He directed the raising of regiments in Switzerland. [19] For the armament of regiments to be raised amongst the Poles, large numbers of muskets were sent to Davout for delivery to Dombrowski, who was charged with their organisation. [20] For a large cavalry force in the great plains of Poland Napoleon at once recognised the necessity. He was anxious to hurry up as many horsemen as possible before he should meet the Russians. He had already decided on adding a fifth squadron to his cavalry regiments, bringing them nominally to a strength of 1000 each, though he did not expect them to appear in the field with more than 700 sabres. He writes to Dejean that altogether he has 60,000 or 70,000 cavalry in different parts of Europe, and that he believes there are still 10,000 in the depots in France. [21] On the 5th January, 1807, he calculates there should be with the Grand Army 24 regiments of dragoons and cuirassiers, 18 of chasseurs, 9 of hussars, making 51,000 men, at the nominal strength of 1000 per regiment. They would not, however, amount to more than 36,000 actually present. A few days earlier he had said he expected reinforcements of 16,000 cavalry during the year. [22] So urgent was the need for cavalry that he ordered Kellerman to send the men forward in batches of even 15 or 16, as they were collected.

Cavalry was not required to any great extent in Italy. The south was too mountainous for it, the north too much intersected with canals and vineyards. Therefore, on the 4th November, 1806, he writes to Joseph that he has taken 8 French cavalry regiments from the army of Northern Italy, trusting to Joseph’s replacing them with 8 out of 12 regiments which he had in Naples.

The army in Northern Italy was to be reinforced by 20,000 men from France in the beginning of December. [23] From Spain the Emperor directed Talleyrand to demand 10,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, and the 6000 Spaniards in Italy were ordered to march up to Germany. [24]

Such were the principal methods by which the Emperor increased his armies in preparation for his first advance against the Russians. In the spring he was compelled to make still further demands on the military strength of France. They will be described later in their proper chronological order.

He was able by the end of November to count on 80,000 men towards Warsaw, whilst another 80,000 were following in second line.

“Napoleon evinced, at all times, extraordinary care for the measures to be taken to provide for the sustenance of his armies. Certainly he did not adhere to any fixed system, but took the means of nourishing his hosts just wherever he found them. He knew how, by promising high payment, by his dexterous treatment of authorities and communities, as well as by threats and brute force, to furnish himself with supplies, even in exhausted districts. . . . But, before all things, he was a master of organising his lines of rear communication; and purchases, transport, requisitions, and compulsory provisioning by the population, all contributed to fill his soldiers’ bellies.” [25]

As soon as he found himself supreme in Prussia and the allied states, the Emperor proceeded to impose enormous war contributions on them all, especially on rich cities such as Hamburg. The total sum exceeded 160 millions of francs (£6,400,000). [26] A great proportion of this sum he could not hope to realise in cash. What he did was to levy supplies of various sorts from the cities and states. These were nominally on payment; the value was met, not in cash, but by a credit against the demand for war contribution.

Wherever there was a great local manufacture of articles required for an army, it was utilised in this way: uniforms were made up at Hamburg and Magdeburg, Leipzig and Berlin, saddles at Berlin and elsewhere, boots at numerous centres. If it is true that an army marches on its belly, Napoleon equally recognised the care required for its feet. Scarcely a day passes on which there is not some letter or order from him dealing with the supply of boots, the construction of bakeries, and the means of forwarding bread to the armies. No detail was below his notice. “ Every detachment,” he writes, “coming from Paris or Boulogne should start, each man with a pair of shoes, besides two pairs in his knapsack. At Mayence they will receive another pair to replace that worn on the march. At Magdeburg they will receive a new pair to replace that worn on the march from Mayence to Magdeburg, so that every man may reach his corps with a pair of shoes on his feet and a pair in his knapsack.” [27] Notwithstanding all this care for their food, their clothing and their boots, the French troops were often in dire distress for all three.

Napoleon, writing to Soult, for instance, on the 27th February, 1807, remarks that the Russians appear to be “like us,” and not to have eaten for several days.

The difficulty, even under much more favourable circumstances, of keeping men properly shod and clothed is illustrated by Von der Goltz : “In December, 1870, some German soldiers might have been seen plodding along the miry roads, in the depth of winter, barefoot, whilst many had only wooden shoes and linen trousers.” There were some weak German companies with so many as forty shoeless men. Every sort of garment was utilised, with the exception of the ominous French red breeches, the possible consequences of wearing which were obvious (Nation in Arms, pp. 375-376). De Fezensac (132) says that, in the winter of 1806-7, the French soldiers were living mainly on what they could find in the country, as the arrival of supplies was delayed by the horrible weather and the state of the roads.

The following quaint little note, written by Lasalle on the back of a despatch from Milhaud to Murat as it passed through his quarters, speaks volumes. It is in the daily correspondence, 5th December, 1806, in the Archives Historiques. “A force de cris et de menaces, j’ai obtenu un pain et une dame-jeanne de vin que je suis trop heureux d’offrir à vôtre Altesse. Notre noble hôte est un ladre qui nous laissera mourir de faim.” Figure the shortness of supplies when a general commanding a cavalry division has no hesitation in offering, as an acceptable gift to the Emperor’s brother-in-law, a loaf of bread and a bottle of wine! What, too, must have been the feelings of the unfortunate despatch-bearer, unexpectedly burdened with this precious and fragile load! Envy of the good things he was carrying, and anxiety lest breakage of the bottle should draw upon him the wrath of Murat, perhaps divided his sentiments equally.

For his sick and wounded the Emperor was equally solicitous. The provision of hospital and ambulance arrangements became more and more difficult as the armies advanced into a country where the roads were atrocious and local means of transport very scarce. The numbers, both of sick and wounded, to be dealt with were very great; the supply of hospital attendants and surgeons was deficient, especially at the advanced hospitals. Nevertheless, by the end of January, 1807, no less than 21 hospitals were open in Warsaw alone, with more than 10,000 occupants who had been brought back, on foot in the case of those slightly wounded or suffering from trifling ailments, on carts or sledges in the more serious cases. The pressure was still greater after the battle of Eylau. Hospitals were opened at Bromberg, Marienburg, Marienwerder, Elbing, and other places. To relieve the hospitals in Poland, later on, many wounded and sick, who could bear the journey, were transferred to Breslau and other places in Silesia, where spacious barracks afforded excellent accommodation. So great were the preparations made that though, on the 30th June, 1807, there were 27,376 men in hospital, it was calculated that there was still available accommodation for nearly 30,000 men. From the 1st October, 1806, to the 31st October, 1808, over 421,000 [28] cases of sickness or wounds occurred, with 32,000 deaths. The average stay in hospital was 29 days. It may be taken, therefore, that during this period the mean number in hospital was somewhere about 16,500; at times it was very much higher. [29] These figures do not include the enemy’s sick and wounded prisoners, or those of the allied troops, who ranged, during the period November, 1806, to July, 1807, from 1/12th to 1/7th of the number of French. For the service of the hospitals, the resources of the conquered countries were fully utilised, as they were in the case of supplies, clothing, boots, and saddlery. The captured Prussian tents were cut up, partly for bandages, partly for shirts, and partly for mattresses. Napoleon’s army carried no tents. If cantonments were out of the question, they bivouacked in the open, whatever the weather. Great numbers of cavalry and artillery horses, captured from the Prussians, were pressed into the French service. The cavalry from Italy and France were marched to Germany on foot, and there remounted at the great cavalry depôt which Napoleon established at Potsdam. Altogether he raised 40,555 horses in the conquered territories. [30]

Into the finance of the war this work cannot enter, beyond the remarks above, in the footnote (2) at p. 23. (Footnote [22] of this electronic presentation.)

The army was organised in corps, by no means of even strength, rarely reaching the modern standard of 30,000 men. The only corps which generally approached this figure were the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and l0th.

In addition to the corps of all arms, there were two cavalry reserves – the first under Murat, nearly 10,000 strong at the end of November, 1806. [31] The second, under Bessières, only existed during the first phase of the campaign. It was broken up before Eylau. The artillery was armed with a good gun, as guns were at that date. Both it and the cavalry drew their remounts largely from the captured Prussian troops and from the horses found in the country.

The rank and file of the army was but little, if at all, past its best. In the earlier part of the campaign, its youngest men were the conscripts of 1806 who had, owing to their premature enrolment, already undergone a year’s training. Many of the troops had been with Napoleon in his earlier campaigns and in Egypt, very many had been at Ulm and Austerlitz, the majority had just emerged from the brilliant campaign of Jena. They were now preparing for a renewed war against fresh enemies; the hardest task that an army can undertake. [32] Even these hardened and enthusiastic warriors contemplated with dread the prospect of a fresh winter campaign in an inhospitable and difficult country, and Napoleon was often remonstrated with, as he rode alongside of his men, for insisting on their advance into Poland. [33] To such complaints he would reply with the rough jests which his veterans loved to hear from him, and with promises to give them rest as soon as he possibly could. In action, the infantry was still splendid, and did not as yet require to be formed in deep columns of many battalions, such as was Macdonald’s at Wagram, three years later.

The cavalry were excellent and well mounted, though, in the latter respect, they fell short of many of the Russian cavalry regiments.

The artillery was highly trained and invariably made good practice.

Of the French soldier generally, Jomini makes Napoleon say, “My soldiers are as brave as it is possible to be, but they argue too much. If they had the impassible firmness and the docility of the Russians the world would not be great enough for me. The French soldiers love their country too much to act the part of the Macedonians.” [34]

To the chief generals a separate section will be devoted; but there are many regimental, brigade, and divisional commanders whom it will be impossible to notice separately. Several of them rose to the highest rank. Generally speaking, the officers and non-commissioned officers were of excellent quality and great experience in war.

The discipline of the army was certainly not such as would be approved at the present time, either in the case of the officers or in that of the men. De Fezensac mentions [35] that Marchand changed the cantonments of his division three times without vouchsafing any information to Ney, the commander of the corps Marauding, chiefly in search of food, was common amongst the men. Even Thiers puts the number of men “absent” after Eylau at 60,000.
 
 

Of the Russian army of 1806 [36] we have an account by Sir Robert Wilson, avowedly written with a favourable bias. Still, being written by an eye-witness, at a time when England was at war with Russia, it sums reasonable to accept it as, on the whole, correct, at any rate as regards facts.

The infantry consisted of men between the ages of 18 and 40, generally of small stature, but endowed with considerable physical strength and inured to hardships of all sorts. They could bear the stress of the worst weather, and, at the same time, could subsist on the scantiest fare. The keynote to their character was implicit obedience to superior authority and absolute reliance on it. This submissive obedience was not corrected by intelligence in the interpretation of orders. Whatever commands he received, the Russian soldier would do his best to carry out. It mattered not to him that, in the meanwhile, circumstances had so changed as to render the orders incapable of execution. Once he had received them, and until they were cancelled by their authority, it was his sole aim to perform them. The lengths to which his sense of duty, in this respect, would carry him are well illustrated by the account given by Marbot of the battle of Golymin. He describes how a stray body of Russians, hoping to conceal, by their silence, their nationality from the French who surrounded them in the darkness, restrained their cries. Neither the excitement of action, nor the agony of wounds, could draw from them the slightest sound. The wounded and the dying fell and lay in perfect silence; to their opponents it seemed as if they were firing at shadows. [37]

The courage of men who could do such deeds was unquestionable; their intelligence was of a very different order. Absolutely uneducated, they fought like animals rather than like intelligent beings. The idea of seeking cover was foreign to their nature and disdained by their courage. Death had no terrors for them, no carnage appalled them. The one thing which they could ill brook was a continued retreat. In such circumstances only did their feelings express themselves in murmurs, so audible as, at times, to compel their commanders to stand and fight when retreat was the wiser course.

Their powers of marching were marvellous. For days at a time they would march regularly every night and yet fight all day with the very minimum of rest and food. Even the terrible night of the 7th-8th February, spent without shelter and without food, exposed to the full rigour of almost arctic weather, with the scantiest clothing and almost without boots, failed to damp their ardour for the awful battle which was to succeed it.

The Russian soldier could be trained to march and drill with precision and rapidity, to fight steadily in square or column; but he was lost under circumstances where separation from his companions, and perhaps from his officers, required the exercise of that individual intelligence and that natural aptitude for war which has always characterised the French soldier. Their uniforms were bad in quality of material, and they were armed with a musket so heavy and cumbersome that the supplies of arms received from England, not being sufficient for all, were reserved as a reward for meritorious men. When it is remembered how clumsy a weapon was the “Brown Bess” of those days, it is possible to form some conception of the burden which must have been imposed by the carriage and use of the Russian musket.

The troops fought in 1807 in a country whence the terror of war and famine had driven every inhabitant who could by any possibility quit it. In their flight the peasants carried with them all that was portable. What they had to leave behind they had done their best to bury beyond the reach of the approaching armies. With a commissariat of the most wretched description, unable often to supply any food, the sufferings from hunger of the Russian soldiery are easier to imagine than to describe. They could live only on what was provided by their own diligence in unearthing and robbing the hidden stores of the inhabitants. Long habituation to the plainest and scantiest food could alone enable an army, under such circumstances, to maintain life and strength. Yet the Russians were always ready and able to fight with undiminished fury and obstinacy.

The army was recruited on no fixed principle. A certain number of men being required, the magistrates selected the best of the young men up to that limit. Their pay was infinitesimal – about half a guinea a year.

As might be expected, the arm in the use of which they excelled was the bayonet. Their generally superior physique gave them an advantage over the French in personal combat. With the bayonet, Sir R. Wilson considers that the British alone could dispute the supremacy of the Russian.

The Russian soldier’s sense of moral obligations was that of the barbarian. His religion was mixed with superstition, but he was not a bigot. His sovereign he invested with an almost godlike supremacy, and, whilst his untold privations at times overcame his sense of discipline in regard to his officers, nothing could diminish his reverence for the Tsar, the father of his people. A curious story is told by Sir R. Wilson, illustrative of this trait in the character of the Russian soldier. At a time when privation had driven many Russians, as well as French, to form bands marauding in search of food, a party of Russian officers, prisoners on parole, accompanied by some French officers, was marching towards Warsaw. Falling in with a body of Russian marauders, commanded by a sergeant, the French officers were, in spite of the protest of their Russian companions, massacred. Then came the turn of the Russians. As honourable men, they refused to listen to the demand of the soldiers that they should break their parole and return to the army at the head of their captors. They were told that their country’s right to their allegiance over-rode all obligations of honour towards their enemy. They still refused, and were thereupon done to death, with the exception of one officer who, left for dead, eventually recovered and escaped to tell the story. Yet the soldiers who could commit an atrocity such as this, would share their last crust with a starving peasant whose all had begin unearthed and robbed.

The Light Infantry (Jägers), recruited mainly in Siberia, were superior as marksmen to the line regiments. The Imperial Guard was a picked body of about 17,000 men, of magnificent physique, far superior in this respect do Napoleon’s guard, and even to the corresponding Prussian force. [38] The Russian regular cavalry had the great advantage over their enemies of being mounted on horses, “matchless,” says Sir R. Wilson, “for an union of sire, strength, activity, and hardiness ; whilst formed with the bulk of the British cart horse, they have so much blood as never to be coarse, and withal are so supple as naturally to adapt themselves to the manége, and receive the highest degree of dressing.”

When the Guard cavalry proceeded from St. Petersburg to the front, the 700 miles was accomplished, as far as Riga, at the rate of 50 miles a day, the men riding in waggons. For the remainder of the journey the horses were ridden 35 miles a day. Yet they reached their destination in the finest condition. The hardships which the Russian cavalry underwent, in a snow-covered country, were beyond bounds. Forage, save the old thatch stripped from the roofs, was unprocurable, and shelter, of course, was unknown.

As a horseman, the Russian regular cavalryman had no experience, except in the schools. He was not born to the use of horses, and he had to learn both how to ride and how to care for them. Yet the Russian cavalry distinguished itself throughout the campaign and was often victorious over the French with all its training. They had no great cavalry leader, no one who knew when to use them to the greatest advantage. [39]

If good horses were a great advantage to the cavalry, they were still more so to the artillery, which had to drag its guns through the new element of mud, which Napoleon alleged he had discovered in Poland.

The Russian guns, according to Sir R. Wilson, were good – better, apparently, than the infantry musket. The carriage was strong, without being heavy, the harness and tackle of the best quality. The horses were small, but powerful and well bred. The ordinary teams were four for the light guns, and eight or ten for the 12-pounders. With these teams, guns were forced through drifts of soft snow deep enough to cover them, and, at Friedland, they were first got across a ford so deep that the horses were almost swimming, and then up a nearly perpendicular bank. The drivers, gunners, and non-commissioned officers were good, but the officers were often ignorant of their arm. The number of guns was excessive; at Eylau, there were 460 on the battlefield, which gives nearly 6 per 1000 men. This great number was at times a disadvantage, and delayed the movements of the army. Before Eylau, Bennigsen had to send his heavy artillery by a circuitous route, to avoid encumbering his columns. The possibility of its capture, whilst detached, was a cause of serious anxiety to him.

The comparatively small number of guns lost in the campaign (the numbers were greatly exaggerated by Napoleon) speaks volumes for the exertions of men and horses. Some 70 or 80 guns had to be abandoned in deep mud, during the retirement to Pultusk and Golymin, in December. The French were not more successful at that time in carrying along their guns; but, as they were advancing, they were able to recover those they left behind, whilst the Russian guns necessarily fell into the enemy’s hands, when abandoned in retreat.

In addition to their regular cavalry, the Russians depended largely on their cossacks. This irregular cavalry, mounted on “very little ill-conditioned but well-bred horses,” [40] was, throughout, a terror to the French. Against the heavy cavalry they could not, in ordinary circumstances, stand; but at Eylau, when the French cuirassiers, exhausted and with blown horses, encountered, after passing through the Russian infantry, the fresh and fearless cossacks, they went down before them and suffered terribly. At the outposts, when the armies were in cantonments, these hardy warriors, inured, like their horses, from their birth to hardships of all sorts, were a continual thorn in the side of the French light cavalry, whose training and previous experience had failed to fit them or their horses to bear the starvation and cold, which the cossacks felt but little. Platow, the Ataman of the cossacks, had immense personal influence with them, and it was only necessary for him to dismount and appeal to them in order to steady them against overwhelming odds. Accustomed from childhood to the use of the lance, the cossack was more than a match for the horseman armed only with a sword, or for any but a very expert lancer.

The last class of troops employed by Russia consisted of 1500 baskiers, clad in chain mail, and armed with bows and arrows. These men appeared on the field at the close of the campaign. They were, of course, useless, and merely excited the derision of Napoleon.

The officers who led the infantry of the Tsar were not worthy, as a rule, of the magnificent raw material which they should have been able to mould into shape. The lower grades were especially ill qualified. Scarcely better educated than their ignorant men, they could neither inspire respect nor teach an art of which they knew nothing. Poorly paid, and looked down upon by the officers of the cavalry and the Guard, the position of an infantry officer had no attractions for the upper classes. The Guard, on the other hand, was commanded mainly by men of these classes, and even the ordinary cavalry officers were of a better class than those of the infantry. There was no scientific class of native officers for the artillery. The pick of the officers of the whole army were foreigners; but they were too few, and too much confined to the more important commands, to have much influence in leavening the native mass. Gambling was very prevalent, and the Russian officers were much inclined to indolence, generally preferring to drive rather than ride or walk.

The staff was clogged with red tape, and overburdened with reports, which had to be submitted by every officer, down to the commandant of a cossack outpost. With all this reporting, there was no real method such as prevailed in Napoleon’s army. [41] Leaders of ability were lamentably scarce; the commissariat was wretched; the treasury was exhausted; without money, magazines and transport could not be organised, even if there had been any one with the ability required to do so. At first, as the army was advancing, it was possible to live on the country; but its never very great resources were soon exhausted by the passage and return of two great armies, and then the existence, even of the French army, became precarious; for the Russian, life became possible at all only owing to the hardihood and patience of its men.

The hospital and medical arrangements were, if possible, worse than the commissariat and transport. The medical officers, uneducated and wretchedly paid, were worse than useless. Platow, when asked by the Tsar if he would have an increase to his medical staff, then consisting of a single officer, replied, “God and your Majesty forbid; the fire of the enemy is not half so fatal as one drug.” [42]

What was good in the medical arrangements at Koenigsberg was supplied by Prussia. At the battle of Friedland, for the first time, some attempt was made to succour the Russian wounded on the field. What more pathetic picture can there be of the suffering of the Russian soldiery than these words of one of them who forced himself into the presence of the Tsar? “For nine months 1 and my comrades have endured, without a murmur, all the ills of the most severe campaign. We wished to serve our Emperor faithfully, and not augment his difficulties. I call God to witness that, for seven days, these soldiers and myself had nothing to eat but a piece of hide, steeped in water that we might be enabled to chew it when softened; and yet, for eighteen hours, we remained on the field of battle, until, at the same instant, we were struck by grape. Now that we have passed our frontiers, and are returned to our country, we know that the Emperor cannot profit by our ill treatment. Look at this arm; undressed for seventeen days, and a burrow for worms! Look at our bodies, worn down, and wasting for food. The Emperor may want us again. We are ready to serve him, but he shall know our condition that we may have his redress.” [43]

In numbers the army was inadequate. Russia had prepared only to support Prussia as an ally. By the collapse of that power, she suddenly found herself compelled to face the mighty armies of Napoleon, receiving from Prussia but one weak corps, the remnant of the great host which had been destroyed at Jena and Auerstädt.

The Russian army was, in 1806, organised in 18 divisions, each consisting of—

          6 regiments of 3 battalions each
         10 squadrons heavy cavalry
         10 squadrons light cavalry
          2 batteries of guns of position
          3 light batteries
          1 horse battery

The batteries were of 14 pieces each for field, and 12 for horse artillery. [44] Thus the division had a nominal strength of 18 battalions, 20 squadrons, and 82 guns.

At the end of 1806, the whole army was distributed thus:—

                                                 Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
  I. Imperial Guard under the Grande Duke
     Constantine, at St. Petersburg,
     1st Division.                                   33          35       84
 II. The army in Poland under Marshal
     Kamenskoi, viz.:–
  (a) 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Divisions under
      Ostermann Tolstoi, Sacken, Gallitzin
      and Sedmaratzki, forming the 1st army,
      Commanded by Bennigsen.
  (b) 5th, 7th, 8th and 14th Divisions, under
      Tutchkow, Dochtorow, Essen., and Anrrepp
      respectively, forming the 2nd army,
      commanded by Buxhowden.                       147         170      504
III. The army of Moldavia, under Michelson:
     Divisions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13; of which
     9 and 10 were commanded by Wolkonski and
     Müller respectively. These two divisions
     returned from the Turkish frontier, when
     the Prussian power collapsed, and joined
     Bennigsen’s left on the Narew, in the
     middle of January, 1807.                        90         100      306
 IV. Intermediary corps under Count Apraxim
     in Russia, comprising 15th, 16th, 17th,
     18th Divisions.                                 54          30      144
                                    Totals          324         335     1038

Besides these, were the corps in Finland and Georgia, which constituted an entirely separate army. [45]

The force at first opposed to Napoleon consisted of the two armies comprised under No. II. Their strength may be taken, according to Hœpfner, as follows:–

    (a)  Bennigsen’s—
               49,000 infantry
               11,000 regular cavalry
                4,000 cossacks
                2,700 artillery
                  900 pioneers
               68,000 and 276 guns.

Perhaps Hœpfner thinks, considering various authorities, 60,000 combatants is a full estimate. [46]

    (b)  Buxhowden’s:–
               29,000 infantry
                7,000 cavalry
                1,200 artillery
               37,200 and 216 guns. [47]
 

Dumas estimates the strength somewhat lower at — Bennigsen 55,000, and Buxhowden 36,000. [48] The divisions of the latter general had been at Austerlitz, and had not replaced the losses which they had suffered there. An army of reserve was being organised in the interior of Russia.

Kamenskoi’s army thus, in November, 1806, consisted approximately of 90,000 men. [49]

The Prussian army was but a small remnant of the mighty force which had been destroyed at Jena, gradually reinforced and its losses repaired by such recruits as could be raised in what remained to Prussia of her territory, or as could escape from the conquered provinces. Excluding the garrisons of Graudenz and Danzig, the Prussian corps in Poland seems to have amounted to not more than 6000 men in December, 1806, and at no time up to the end of July to have exceeded 25,000. It consisted largely of recruits and young troops, with only a nucleus of better-trained soldiers.
 

(c) THE GENERALS

Of the great master of war who “fills a space in the world’s history far greater than that occupied by all the men of action, all the thinkers, poets, or writers of every age . . . who is still regarded by myriads as the greatest of human beings,” [50] it would be presumption to speak in the few lines which space will allow to be devoted to some of the principal leaders in this war. His achievements have filled the world, during more than a century, with wonder and admiration. This history of one of them cannot pretend to give an account of Napoleon himself.

He was, in many ways, his own chief of the staff: He went into details which no ordinary commander-in-chief could find time for, especially one burdened with the cares of supervising the Government and the foreign relations of a great state. But there was a limit to the powers even of Napoleon, and he required a subordinate to amplify and issue the orders which he dictated in outline.

For his purpose, Marshal Berthier was an ideal chief of the staff. He was no general, and he could never have filled the place of a Von Moltke; but he knew Napoleon, his ways and his wishes, and could elaborate, to the liking of his master, the brief orders which were what he usually received. “In short words he (Napoleon) thus enumerated his measures. Berthier separated them from each other, drew up each order separately, and addressed them to the several addressees.” [51] “Berthier’s position was more that of a chief of the cabinet with high functions, than that of a chief of the general staff.” [52] These two quotations, from a modern writer, express tersely the duties which Napoleon demanded, and which, for many years, Berthier executed, generally to his satisfaction. There were occasions when he failed, as will be seen later; and when Napoleon once [53] ventured to leave him temporarily in a position similar to that of the modern German chief of the staff, before his own arrival at the front, the result was very nearly being disaster. He was a superlative, confidential secretary — nothing more.

Joachim Murat, at this period Grand Duke of Berg, is perhaps the most picturesque figure among Napoleon’s generals. He was nominally in command of the right wing of the army; but it is extremely improbable that his Imperial brother-in-law would ever have trusted him to act alone, once operations had fairly begun. He owed his position more to his connexion by marriage with Napoleon, and to the impossibility of getting him to serve loyally under any other command but that of the Emperor, than to his military merits. Brave to a fault, vain and ambitious, with but limited intelligence, he was the beau ideal of the leader of a cavalry charge. Yet he was not, in any sense, a great cavalry general. His ideas of reconnaissance were vague, his information often defective and misleading. Even on the battlefield he sometimes handled his cavalry very indifferently. With his gaudy uniform and his theatrical displays at the head of his cavalry, with his habit of playing for the admiration of the enemy as well as of his own men, one cannot help regarding him as a poseur. Yet there was in him something chivalrous, hardly to be expected in a man of his humble origin. His last letter to his wife, before his miserable death in 1815, [54] shows that he was not devoid of feeling. As King of Naples, he was far from being a failure, and it may be doubted whether the Neapolitans would not have flourished more under his dynasty than under the Bourbons.

In command of the left wing was Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, afterwards King of Sweden, a man of a very different stamp. Calm, selfish, calculating, and astute, of much more polished manners than most of Napoleon’s marshals, [55] he was endowed with considerable powers of command. Him the Emperor could, as far as ability was concerned, trust in a semi-independent command. He had, or his master professed to think so, fallen short of his duty at Austerlitz, and, again, when he failed to support Davout at Auerstädt. [56] There was no love lost between him and the Emperor; Bernadotte had even been at times in opposition to Napoleon, notably in the case of the Imperial title. Did Napoleon employ him in the field because he feared him, and thought it dangerous to leave him behind in France? The question seems worth consideration.

Marshal Davout, [57] commanding the 3rd Corps, had distinguished himself lately by his magnificent conduct of the battle of Auerstädt. It was he who had really ruined the Prussian army on the fatal 14th October, though it would not have been like Napoleon had he publicly allowed the full credit to his lieutenant. With the exception only of Masséna, he was probably the ablest of the marshals, both as a strategist and a tactician. He was a stern disciplinarian, but, apparently, popular with his men, and subordinates. [58] He was ever solicitous for their sustenance and shelter.

In the army generally, Marshal Ney occupied a position in some ways analogous to that which Murat held in the cavalry. The “bravest of the brave,” he was the equal of Murat in personal courage, his superior in intelligence and comprehension of the requirements of war. His general good nature made him a favourite with his subordinates; his sudden outbursts of temper frightened them, and often involved him in quarrels with his equals or superiors. [59] As a soldier, he was at his best commanding the rearguard of a retreating army. Before Friedland, in the north of Portugal, in the retreat of 1812, Ney seemed to be a great soldier. None knew better how long it was possible to hold in safety a covering position, more precisely the moment when it was necessary to evacuate it and seek the next favourable locality in which, by a bold stand, to check the advancing enemy and afford time to the main body of his own army. In the front, or detached, he seemed to lose his head, would be carried away by ambitious projects, and sometimes run great and unnecessary risk, almost in defiance of orders. There is something very pathetic and natural in the man which blots out the faults and compels admiration. Ney, “his third horse killed under him, alone near an abandoned battery, striking, in his rage, the bronze muzzle of an English gun,” [60] — Ney, baring his breast to the bullets of the soldïers he had so often led, in that last tragic scene near the garden of the Luxemburg, appeals to us, not unsuccessfully, to forget his weaknesses and his faults.

Napoleon boasted that he had no friends. His feelings towards Jean Lannes were perhaps nearer akin to friendship than he would admit. This marshal was one of the few old comrades to whom Napoleon, even as Emperor, allowed the familiarity implied by the use of the second person singular in speech. At his deathbed the stern Emperor relaxed, and gave vent to his grief. He had watched Lannes’ progress as a commander, and had seen him steadily improving. [61] Impetuous, and ever ready to throw himself into the thickest of the fray, Lannes was yet not rash, and on more than one occasion in the Polish campaign he fought a good and patient battle against very superior numbers. He feared neither the enemy nor the Emperor; to the latter he would, at times, unbosom himself, even regarding Murat, in terms which would not have been tolerated from another.

Soult, a man more of the stamp of Bernadotte than of Ney, was, beyond doubt, a capable commander. He was unpopular with his subordinates. [62] Of his capacity as a general, Wellington said that he respected him, but that, “though his plans seemed always to be admirable, he never knew when to strike.” [63]

Masséna, the “darling child of victory,” of whom Wellington said that he was the best of the marshals, and “I always found him where I least desired that he should be” [64] played but a minor part in the campaign. Yet it might well have been one of infinite importance, calling for the exercise of all the patience and endurance which he displayed in the defence of Genoa, combined with the vigour and fire of the victor of Zurich. [65] He was, it can hardly be denied, the most brilliant of the marshals, and the best fitted for the command of an army.

Mortier calls for little remark. He was a general of average capacity, good enough for the command of a corps, hardly suited for independent command of an army.

The name of Bessières will always be associated with the command of Napoleon’s Guard. He was not in the first rank amongst the marshals, and acting, as he generally did, under the personal command of Napoleon, he had no special opportunity for establishing a reputation for originality or independence.

Augereau was a curious mixture. His style of dress and his manner gave the impression of a braggart, which he was not. He was wanting, said Napoleon, in steadfastness and perseverance. Even a day of victory seemed to discourage him. His intelligence was not great, his education very little; yet he maintained order and discipline among his men, and was beloved by them. [66]

Lefebvre had served Napoleon a good turn on the 18th Brumaire, when he marched his grenadiers into the chamber of the Five Hundred, and cleared it at the most critical moment. His master repaid him with the marshal’s bâton, and the Dukedom of Danzig. The latter was probably better deserved by his chief engineer, Chasseloup. A hard-headed, courageous old soldier, Lefebvre was not a general of any capacity. To his artillery officers at Danzig, he said, “Je n’entends rien de votre affaire: mais fichez moi un trou et j’y passerai.” [67] The words illustrate his character.

Amongst the commanders of French divisions were many men who attained, in later years, great distinction — Victor, Oudinot, Grouchy, and Suchet, all later made marshals, the last already greatly distinguished in the wars of the Republic in Italy; Morand, Friant, and Gudin, the excellent leaders of the three divisions of Davout’s splendid 3rd Corps; [68] Vandamme, Rapp, Savary, Dupont, St. Hilaire, Lasalle, Milhaud, Carra St.-Cyr, Kellerman, Chasseloup, Latour Maubourg, were all names well known in the history of Napoleon’s campaigns; but it is impossible, in the limits of this volume, to dwell on them.

The French generals were remarkable for their comparative youth. Napoleon himself was 37, Lannes and Soult were born in the same year as the Emperor, Davout was 37, Mortier 39, Murat 36, Bernadotte 43. The veterans were Augereau at 50, Berthier 54, and Lefebvre 52.

Of Marshal Kamenskoi, who commenced the campaign as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, little need be said. A veteran lieutenant of Suwarow, he was now too old for war. His early measures in Poland were a mixture of impetuosity and hesitation. His violent character, which eventually led to his assassination by a peasant, rendered him unsuitable for supreme command.

Count Bennigsen, w1? succeeded him, was a Hanoverian. Born in 1745, he retired from his native army, and entered the Russian service in 1773. In that army he had a distinguished career in the cavalry. [69] He can hardly be described as a great general. If his plans of campaign were sometimes not wanting in originality and design, they failed in execution, or from Bennigsen’s inability to modify them to suit changing circumstances. At times his conduct exhibited “a mixture of rash imprudence and of irresolution quite irreconcilable.” [70] For the partial successes which he obtained ín this campaign against the French, the valour and obstinacy of his troops, rather than his tactics, account.

Barclay de Tolly greatly distinguished himself in this campaign, in command of a division, especially at Eylau. His great claim to distinction, however, rests on his plan of campaign of 1812, when, as minister of war, he was responsible for the design, executed in part by himself, of drawing Napoleon to his destruction in the heart of Russia. Better had it been for Russia had that system been followed in 1807.

Prince Bagration, who was usually in command of Bennigsen’s advance or rear guard, as the case might be, showed himself to be to the Russians what Ney was to the French. The excellence of his rearguard actions will appear in the course of this history. He quarrelled, later, with Barclay, to whose scheme for the campaign of 1812 he was vehemently opposed.

The Ataman Platow, leader of the cossacks, occupied a peculiar semi-paternal position amongst his wild troops. His personal influence with them was enormous, and his example would rally them against fearful odds. He had only to dismount and call upon his horsemen in order to stop the spread of disorder.

Of Prince Gallitzin, who led the Russian cavalry with ability, of Dochtorow, of the two Essens, of Anrepp, Müller, and Markow, it is unnecessary to make detailed mention.

One man, on the side of the allies, acquired a great reputation – Lestocq, the Prussian commander. His conduct was distinguished throughout by energy, firmness, and ability. It was more than once his fate to be exposed in a position where he could be cut from the Russians. On each occasion he extricated himself, from an almost hopeless situation, with the greatest ability. His march on Eylau was a masterpiece of patience and resolution, as well as of resistance to the temptation of a general action.

Marshal Kalkreuth, who acquired great glory by his defence of Danzig, had seen much of war, and was best known, before 1807, for his siege of Mayence in 1793. He was, however, at times wanting in resolution and perseverance. He more than once wanted to surrender, with a large body of troops, in the retreat after Jena, but was kept straight by Blücher and others.

[1]  Napoleon called for the conscripts of 1807, in January of that year, instead of September.  Corr. 11,282, dated 21st November, to Senate. [Back to paragraph text.]

[2]  Corr. 11,291. [Back to paragraph text.]

[3]  Corr. 11,292, to Lacuée, dated 22 November, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[4]  Corr. 11,292, as above. [Back to paragraph text.]

[5]  Corr. 11,478, to Lacuée. [Back to paragraph text.]

[6]  Corr. 11,238, dated 12th November, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[7]  Corr. 11,146, dated 2nd November, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[8]  Kellerrnan’s report of his proceedings as commander of the Army of Reserve is a document full of interest. He says that at first he was left with only enough officers and non-commissioned officers to carry on the administration, and the men were nothing but sick, wounded, and convalescents. He was dependent on the conscripts of 1806, who began to reach him in October. He considered that in one mouth he could turn out a fair soldier, understanding his musket, how to use it, take it to pieces, to put it together, and exercised first with blank cartridge, then at target practice. He complains bitterly of his difficulties with clothing and transport contractors. For instance, the 28th regiment marched from France with its baggage, but reached Kellerman several months before it. As he despatched each detachment of 150 infantry or 50 cavalry, another was ready to follow it closely. During the whole campaign he despatched 20 provisional regiments of infantry, and 11 of cavalry, numbering 50,683 men, and 7112 horses. As the regiments were sent off, there was such a dearth of officers that the marshal had to promote, subject to the Emperor’s confirmation, many non-commissioned officers.
     Amongst his many troubles were sore backs among the horses, the result of neglect. He proposes to cashier one sub-lieutenant who produced 32 horses with sore backs out of a detachment of 47.
     Besides these troops, Kellerman formed Mortier’s corps at Mayence, and the Legion of the North at Landau. The latter corps exercised him much, as it was to be, under the Emperor's orders, composed of deserters from the enemy-largely Poles. It had, owing to the neglect of contractors, to be sent off almost without clothes and supplies. Yet, though, as was not unnatural, there were many desertions from it, the Legion did good service before Danzig.
     Kelleman also organised several corps of gendarmes, artillery, etc. Altogether, he says, there passed the Rhine at Mayence and Wesel, as reinforcements for the Grand Army, 152,456 men, and 19,306 horses, of which 73,624 men, and 9559 Horses were from the Army of Reserve. These numbers of course do not include the troops marching from Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, or the German contingents (Kellerman’s report, Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text.]

[9]  “The bad method,” says Von der Goltz, “of reinforcing armies by new units, instead of by fresh drafts, bringing the old ones up to their normal numbers, has long since been discarded by all great armies” (Nation in Arms, p. 378). Napoleon, it will be observed, followed generally the principles here advocated. [Back to paragraph text.]

[10]  Corr. 11,130.  To Cambacérès, 31st October, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[11]  Corr. 11,262.  To Cambacérès, 16 November, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[12]  Corr. 11,066, dated 24th October, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[13]  Corr. 11,477, 15th December, 1806, to Dejean, and Corr. 11.479 of the same date to Admiral Decrés. [Back to paragraph text.]

[14]  Corr. 11,292, dated 22nd November, 1806, to Lacuée. [Back to paragraph text.]

[15]  Corr. 11,330, dated 30th November, 1806, to Junot. [Back to paragraph text.]

[16]  Corr. 11,192, dated 7th November, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[17]  Corr. 11,171, dated 4th November, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[18]  Corr. 11, 164, dated 4th November, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[19]  Corr. 11,237, dated 12th November, and 11,302, dated 24th November. [Back to paragraph text.]

[20]  Corr. 11,237, dated 12th November, and 11,258, dated 14th November, to Davout. The latter dispatch remarks that 6 battalions might be expected from Posen and 12 more from Warsaw, should it rise against the Prussians. [Back to paragraph text.]

[21]  Corr. 11,556, to Dejean. [Back to paragraph text.]

[22]  Corr. 11,554, to Dejean. [Back to paragraph text.]  [Back to unnumbered footnote.]

[23]  Corr. 11,172, to Eugène Beauharnais, dated 4th November, 1806. [Back to paragraph text.]

[24]  Corr. 11,476, dated 15th December, 1806, to Talleyrand. [Back to paragraph text.]

[25]  Von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, p. 354. [Back to paragraph text.]

[26]  The contributions varied from 25 millions of francs in the case of Saxony (which was subsequently modified by his alliance with that state) to 100,000 francs in the case of the smallest states (see Corr. 11,010, decree dated 15th October, 1806, the day after the battle of Jena). By the same decree, all English merchandise in the northern cities, in whatsoever hands it might be, was declared forfeit to the use of the French army.
     The sums given here as contributions, do not include the ordinary financial resources of the countries which were applied by the French to their own uses.
     Altogether, there passed into Napoleon’s hands, in money and goods collected from Germany, more than 560 millions of francs (£22,400,000), whilst the net cost of the war against Prussia and Russia was put at only 213 millions (see summary of Daru’s report, Dumas, xix. 489). Truly, in this instance, war was made to support itself. [Back to paragraph text.]

[27]  Corr. 11,413.  During the campaign there were supplied to the army, from first to last, 587,008 pairs of shoes, 16,948 of boots, and 37,386 of gaiters, all made up in Germany, besides 397,000 pairs of shoes sent from France (summary of Daru’s report, Dumas, xix. 490). [Back to paragraph text.]

[28]  The number sounds enormous, yet it is worth remembering that in 1870 (with, of course, a much larger army), the Germans had 400,000 sick, and 100,000 wounded (Nation in Arms, p. 331). [Back to paragraph text.]

[29]  For this brief account of the hospitals, see abstract of Daru’s report at end of vol. xix., Dumas. The number of wounded out of the total in hospitals was 47, and of fever cases 105 out of every 190. The largest number in hospital was, in June 1807, 27,376. [Back to paragraph text.]

[30]  Daru’s report, Dumas, end of vol. xix. [Back to paragraph text.]

[31]  Corr. 11,305, to Murat, dated 24th November, 1806. It comprised:–
                      Beaumont’s and Klein’s dragoons . . . . . . . . . 4800
                      Decker’s dragoons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
                      Nansouty’s brigade  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2400
                      Milhaud’s brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  800
                                                                 Total, 9200 [Back to paragraph text.]

[32]  "The most difficult task that can be imposed upon an army is to enter on a second campaign, against fresh enemies, immediately after one in which its moral energies have been partially consumed. Fortunate as Napoleon’s operations against the Prussians and the Saxons in the autumn of 1806 had been, they all the same came to a standstill when, in the winter, he encountered the Russians and the corps of General von Lestocq, which had not preciously been in action” (Nation in Arms, p. 335). [Back to paragraph text.]

[33]  "Our soldiers were less satisfied; they showed a lively repugnance to cross the Vistula. Misery, the winter, the bad weather, had inspired them with an extreme aversion for this country” (Rapp, p. 118). [Back to paragraph text.]

[34] Vie de Napoleon, ii. 434. This work is in the form of a narrative supposed to be addressed by the spirit of Napoleon in the next world to an audience of all the great commanders who preceded him. The words quoted here Napoleon is made to represent as used by himself to a connoisseur. They would, therefore, appear to have been His own actual views. [Back to paragraph text.]

[35]  Souvenirs Milítaires, p. 139. [Back to paragraph text.]

[36]  For this account of the Russian army, see chiefly Wilson, pp. 1-70. [Back to paragraph text.]

[37]  Marbot, i. 246-249. [Back to paragraph text.]

[38]  Jomini puts into Napoleon’s mouth these words, “I saw at Tilsit a regiment of Russian guards; and I have not forgotten the sensation which I felt at its appearance. Many only saw in it a disagreeable stiffness. I have never loved armies of automatons, I required soldiers of intelligence; however, I was surprised at the precision and assurance of this infantry. I understood that an army so well disciplined and of such extraordinary firmness would be the first in the world if, to these qualities, it united a little of the electric enthusiasm of the French.” The words were, perhaps, not used by Napoleon himself, but the criticism, as that of Jomini, is valuable. [Back to paragraph text.]

[39]  The cavalry, which had been very inferior under Suvarow, had been vastly improved since his time (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii, ?36, note). [Back to paragraph text.]

[40]  Wilson, p. 27. [Back to paragraph text.]

[41]  Napoleon was not a stickler for rigid adherence to set forms of report. He required reports of the operations of the various corps in a campaign, yet he accepted documents varying so widely as Davout’s elaborate report and the skeleton reports of Ney and Murat. Ney’s report is a mere “journal de marche,” giving the positions of his troops on each day; Murat’s is much the same. Lannes’ appears never to have been written – perhaps in consequence of his death at Essling in 1809. [Back to paragraph text.]

[42]  Wilson, p. 53. [Back to paragraph text.]

[43]  Wilson, pp. 53, 54. [Back to paragraph text.]

[44]  Heavy field batteries – 8  12-pndrs.
                              4  1/2 pud howitzers (licornes)
                              2  light howitzers (licornes)
                             14
      Light field batteries   8  6-pndrs.
                              4  1/4-pud howitzers (licornes)
                              2  small howitzers (licornes)
                             14
        Horse batteries      12  6-pndrs. [Back to paragraph text.]

[45]  Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 334, note, from which figures down to this point are taken. [Back to paragraph text.]

[46]  Hœpfner, iii. 26, 27. [Back to paragraph text.]

[47]  Ibid., iii. 29. [Back to paragraph text.]

[48]  Dumas, xvii. 99 and 101. [Back to paragraph text.]

[49]  This is the estimate given by Wilson (p. 84, note.) [Back to paragraph text.]

[50]  Wolsley, Decline and Fall of Napoleon, p. 193. [Back to paragraph text.]

[51]  Nation in Arms, p. 73. [Back to paragraph text.]

[52]  Ibid., p. 74. [Back to paragraph text.]

[53]  At the commencement of the campaign of 1809. [Back to paragraph text.]

[54]  Biogr. Gen., art. “Murat.” [Back to paragraph text.]

[55]  De Fezensac (p. 132) describes his only meeting with Bernadotte, and extols the superiority of his manners and behaviour to that of the other marshals. Bernadotte even carried his consideration so far as to offer to keep De Fezensac for a night’s rest, instead of sending him back to Ney at once. The offer was declined on the score of duty.
     “His own people said that he (Bernadette) would have been a hero in his own cause, but his disposition was thoroughly exclusive. He only opened his heart when everything depended on him alone; then it became full of ardour, generosity, and devotion for his own people, who found in him all the seductions and fascinations of a great soul. But to endure an equal or a superior; to help on the glory of another, whoever he might be; such an effort was always either impossible or intolerable to him” (De Ségur, p. 296). [Back to paragraph text.]

[56]  Napoleon says that, after Jena, he had ordered Bernadotte’s trial by court martial for his conduct on that day, but abandoned the idea on personal grounds (Mémoires pour servir, vii. 215, note on Bernadotte’s Mémoires). [Back to paragraph text.]

[57]  The name of this marshal is frequently spelt Davoust, sometimes Davoût. Both seem to be incorrect. The form Davout is used in Napoleon’s correspondence, in Berthier’s, by the marshal’s nephew, the present Duc d’Auerstädt; finally, there is no misreading possible of his own very legible signature on numerous despatches and order, in the Archives Historiques in Paris. [Back to paragraph text.]

[58]  He was “a man of probity, of order, and of duty above all” (De Ségur, p. 296). After Eylau we find him complaining, in an order to Morand commanding the 1st Division, that many men had skulked out of the battle on the pretext of assisting the wounded to the rear (Archives Historiques, daily correspondence, 10th February, 1807). The remedy he recommends for this state of affairs is “la savate avec du gras.” This was a summary form of punishment inflicted by the men themselves on their defaulting comrades. The delinquent was tied up, and each man of his company, passing by, administered a sound blow or two on the bare flesh with a shoe. This system of barrack-room justice is, or recently was, in force in the French army in the case of petty thefts, etc. [Back to paragraph text.]

[59]  “He knew not how to administer a calm reprimand. He either said nothing or else exceeded all bounds. Despite this violence of character, his heart was good, his spirit perfectly just, his judgment sound; very precious qualities in a soldier” (De Fezensac, p. 133). [Back to paragraph text.]

[60]  Houssaye, Waterloo, p. 374. [Back to paragraph text.]

[61]  “Je l’avais pris pigmée, je l’ai perdu géant,” said Napoleon (Mém. de Ste. H., vol. i., pt. 2, p. 10). [Back to paragraph text.]

[62]  “Exécré par le corps entier des officiers” (Houssaye, Waterloo, p. 58). [Back to paragraph text.]

[63]  Brialmont, Life of Wellington, Gleig’s translation, iv. 155. [Back to paragraph text.]

[64]  Ibid, iv. 155. [Back to paragraph text.]

[65]  Unlike Augereau, “Masséna vaincu était toujours prêt à recommencer,” said Napoleon (Mém. de Ste. H., vol. i., pt. 1, p. 313). [Back to paragraph text.]

[66]  Napoleon’s character of him (Mém. de Ste. H., vol. i., pt. 1, p. 313). [Back to paragraph text.]

[67]  Biogr. Gen., art. “Marshal Lefebvre.” [Back to paragraph text.]

[68]  “Davout in a transport of joy replied, ‘Sire, we are your Tenth Legion; the 3rd Corps will be to you, everywhere and always, what that legion was to Cæsar “ (De Ségur, An A. D. C, of Napoleon, p. 311). The boast had been justified at Auerstädt, and was to be so again at Eylau. [Back to paragraph text.]

[69]  The personal appearance of the Russian commander is thus sketched by De Ségur: “A pale, withered personage of high stature and cold appearance, with a scar across his face” (An A.D.C. of Napoleon, p. 328). [Back to paragraph text.]

[70]  Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 421. [Back to paragraph text.]