The Ukra falls into the Bug a short way above the French bride at Okunin. At its mouth it branches right and left, forming a triangular island which is divided into two unequal portions by a channel. Davout had already crossed the right branch of the river, and occupied the island up to the channel. During the night of the 20th December, he seized the rest of the island, expelling the Russian detachment which occupied the part beyond the channel. There thus remained only one branch of the Ukra for him to pass.

On the morning of the 23rd, Napoleon proceeded to reconnoitre the position for the crossing which he proposed. Mounting by a ladder on to the roof of a cottage on the island, he soon decided on his plan, and dictated, on the spot, the necessary orders. [1]

From opposite Pomiechowo on the Ukra, to Czarnowo on the Bug, there runs a bank above flood-level of the rivers. Between this bank and the island occupied by Davout, the ground, like the island itself, is low, swampy, partially wooded, and liable to floods. From the left branch of the Ukra, across the broadest part of the low ground to the bank, is a distance of some 2500 yards. On and below the bank was posted Osterman Tolstoi’s force of 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 regiment of Cossacks, 14 field guns, 6 light guns. [2] Davout had Morand’s division in the island, Friant’s near Pomiechowo, Gudin’s at the Okunin bridge. Napoleon had decided on a night attack, and his orders were consequently given in great detail, and with the utmost care. [3] They were executed with wonderful exactitude by Davout’s corps, perhaps the best in the army.

At 7 p.m. Morand’s division was formed, with its advanced portion in three columns in the island, as far as possible from the enemy. Each of these leading columns had a strength of one battalion. A company of voltigeurs was detached from each column as escort to the guns which were, under cover of the voltigeurs’ fire, able to take position and open a fire of grape across the left branch of the river, on the Russians in the low ground. The river was then passed by the voltigeurs in boats brought up from the Bug, and three bridges, one at either extremity, and one in the centre of the branch, were constructed, the work being protected by the troops which had passed in boats. As the bridges were completed, the rest of the leading columns crossed and advanced into the low ground. Behind them came a regiment (the 17th) of light infantry and 3 squadrons of cavalry. Behind these the rest of Morand’s division.

Petit, with a detachment of Gudin’s division, crossed the upper bridge and pushed up the left bank of the river. To support his frontal attack on the Russian right, 6 guns enfiladed it from Pomiechowo. To alarm the enemy with the idea of a passage at Pomiechowo, a quantity of damp straw had been lighted in the bed of the river in that direction, creating a dense smoke. Cavalry had also been sent up the right bank to raise apprehensions, as well as to link Davout’s corps to Augereau’s. A detachment of 50 men, under Perrin, crossed 100 paces above the island, and helped to protect Petit’s left. Finally, 2 guns and 30 picked marksmen, moving up the right bank, slightly in advance of Perrin, flanked with their fire any attempt to attack his or Petit’s front on the left bank.

No great difficulty was found in expelling the Russians from the low ground, and Morand advanced against the left of the main position in echelons by his right.

The 17th Regiment, in advance of Morand’s main body, hurried forward, with more valour than wisdom, to the attack of Czarnowo. The fury of its onslaught, for the moment, staggered the defenders, and the French infantry burst triumphantly into the batteries in front of the village. Their triumph was short-lived, for the defenders, quickly rallying, drove their rash assailants back with the bayonet. Support was not at hand, and the advance was for the moment stayed. The main body, however, soon came up, and a fresh attack was organised. One battalion of the 30th turned Czarnowo by a ravine leading to the Bug, another advanced against the front of the village, and the third against the (French) left of it, through a pine wood. The rest of Morand’s division, with cavalry behind the centre, followed in support. Still, the first attacks were met and repulsed by Osterman’s infantry with a stubborn calmness which was proof against the élan of the enemy. Osterman, however, could not but perceive that, with fresh troops constantly feeding Morand’s fighting line, it was impossible for him long to hold out with his inferior force. Fearing the loss, with that of Czarnowo, of his heavy artillery, he despatched it in the direction of Nasielsk. The fight for Czarnowo continued long with the greatest fury. In the end, the superior numbers of the French enabled them to gain a firm footing in the víllage and, forcing the enemy out, they were able to deploy on the plateau beyond.

On the opposite wing, Petit’s attack had, in the meanwhile, been equally successful. At first he had only 400 men, besides Perrin’s detachment on his left. Aided by a vigorous cannonade from the 2-gun battery at Pomiechowo, he was able to carry the Russian redoubts, from which the artillery was withdrawn towards Czarnowo, only just in time to save it from capture. The absence of pursuit soon showed the Russians how weak the French left was, and they launched a strong force of cavalry against Petit. His men, calmly holding their fire till the cavalry were close upon them, repulsed this and several other attacks by infantry upon the captured redoubts. Davout was able to reinforce Petit with more troops of the 3rd division, and every attack made upon him was open to the flanking artillery fire from Pomiechowo.

Osterman’s troops had now, at 4 a.m., been for 12 hours under arms, for 9 under fire. The general, seriously alarmed by the loss of Czarnowo, determined on retreat. To cover it, he still continued his attacks on Petit, and kept up a vigorous fire in front. At this juncture, being reinforced by 3 battalions and 4 squadrons, he was able to draw off his troops, still in good order, towards Nasielsk.

It is probable that the loss on the French side exceeded that of the Russians, who had 1392 [4] killed and wounded.

Napoleon’s decision to attempt the passage by night was remarkable, and unusual with him. He was using for it the best troops in his army, and the accuracy with which they carried out his programme fully justified his confidence in them. Any deviation from his orders, any hesitation, on the part of the officers in leading, or of the men in following, might have led to disaster. On the other hand, the passage by daylight would have been attended with immense risk and difficulty. The bridges would have had to be constructed under the fire of the Russian guns commanding all the low ground, the advance across which could not fail to be attended with much greater loss than was incurred at night.

Friant’s division, which had bivouacked between Pomiechowo and Koszewo, marched at 4 a.m. on the 4th, and following the same route as Morand’s, was on the battlefield by daybreak. It at once took over the pursuit from the victorious troops, now exhausted by a long night of continuous fighting. Passing through Psucin, Friant arrived near Nasielsk soon after midday. Rapp, with Marulaz’s cavalry, and Lemarroy, with a regiment of dragoons, were already engaged with the Russians, whom they had driven out of the village, and who had now taken up a position on the rising ground beyond, their cavalry resisting the French in the meadows on the left and in front. Dorochow from Borkowo had by this time joined Osterman.

Friant, himself attacking in front, sent his voltigeurs to threaten the Russian retreat by their left. So successful was the flank attack that three guns were taken and the Russians driven back to the wood. Friant had not been able yet to bring up his guns over the muddy roads. The Russians still held to the woods, and it was not till night had fallen that they were compelled, by constant attacks of superior forces, to continue their retreat to Strzegoczin, abandoning some of their guns in the mud. Davout’s 1st and 2nd divisions bivouacked, during the night of the 24th-25th December, in and beyond Nasielsk. The 3rd, which had marched up from the Okunin bridge, was behind.

On the 25th, all the divisions marched in the direction of Novemiasto; but, finding a strong Russian column in position at Kaleczin, where the Novemiasto-Golymin and Nasielsk-Ciechanow roads cross, Davout changed his direction to that of Strzegoczin, whence he dislodged the enemy without difficulty. The corps bivouacked that night in and behind Strzegoczin. Lannes’ corps, following from Okunin, was on Davout’s right rear on the 24th, and at Zbroski on the night of the 25th.

Whilst Davout’s corps had been effecting the passage of the Ukra at its mouth, the next corps on the left, Augereau’s, had moved from Plonsk [5] early on the 24th, reinforced by Wattier’s and Milhaud’s cavalry. Its march was directed against Barclay de Tolly, holding the upper passages of the river at Kolozomb and Sochoczin. Both bridges had been burnt, and there was an earthwork beyond that of Kolozomb defended by artillery, and by three battalions and two squadrons. At Sochoczin, three battalions, and three squadrons held the left bank. The two forces were linked by three battalions in a wood
between them.

Against Sochoczin marched Heudelet’s division, with Milhaud’s cavalry attached; against Kolozomb Desjardin’s division, and Wattíer’s cavalry.

Whilst the 16th Light Infantry lined the right bank on either side of the Kolozomb bridge, Savary, [6] with the grenadiers of the 14th, forced his way across by utilising some planks which the Russians had not burnt, [7] and which served to span the gaps in the partially destroyed bridge. The French were met at Kolozomb by the Russian infantry and hussars, but, being quickly reinforced, compelled the enemy to retreat towards Novemiasto, leaving in their hands six guns in the earthworks. Lapisse, meanwhile, had been sent some 3000 yards down the river to surprise, at Pruski, the enemy, who had no guns there. The Russian position at Kolozomb was a very strong one, with the river in front and a wood behind, and they had twelve guns. Lapisse passed successfully, but an attempt to pass 1000 yards above Kolozomb failed. [8] Heudelet had been less successful. There was no ford in front of him. Attempting to restore the bridge, under cover of his infantry and artillery replying to the Russian fire, his first attack was beaten off with heavy loss. In a fit of temper, for which he is severely blamed by Marbot, [9] he again sent forward his men, who were once more repulsed. Any serious attack at Sochoczin was unnecessary, seeing that a crossing at Kolozomb, farther east, must infallibly result in the retreat of the Russians at Sochoczin. It was only necessary to hold them at the latter place by a demonstration preventing them from assisting their comrades at Kolozomb. Accordingly, as soon as Desjardins was across at Kolozomb, two of Heudelet’s brigades were summoned thither by Augereau. The passage at Sochoczin was soon after left open by the retreat of its defenders. Milhaud, pursuing the retreating Russians, captured the baggage of their 2nd division. The French loss at these crossings is given by Augereau at 66 killed and 452 wounded, about equally distributed between the two divisions. Savary was killed at Kolozomb.

Augereau now reassembled his corps. His light cavalry, (Durosnel) moved up the Sonna towards Ciechanow, to expedite the Russian retreat, and the main body pursued the Russians towards Novemiasto till stopped, short of that place, by darkness. [10] On the 25th, Augereau occupied Novemiasto and his advanced guard got as far as Bondkowo, his 1st division to Gatkowo, and his 2nd to Gostymin. [11] On Augereau’s left was Soult’s corps. It reached Gora, west of Plonsk, on the 4th, and marching in the direction of Sochoczin and Ciechanow, was at the former on the night of the 5th, with light cavalry at Oirzen. The Guard was with the Emperor that night at Lopaczin. Murat, with all of the 1st cavalry reserve which had not been detached, was, on the night of the 25th, at Sochoczin. He had, on the 24th, attacked Sacken at Lopaczin. With his retreat already threatened by the forward movement of the French against Barclay on his right, and Osterman on his left, Sacken gave way before Murat, who, in the pursuit, forced the Russian 1st Division to make the best of its way towards Pultusk. Part of it, under Pahlen, was driven towards Ciechanow.

To bring up the story to the night of this dismal Christmas Day, it remains to describe what was happening towards Thorn, between the Prussians on the one hand, and Bessières, Ney, and Bernadotte on the other.

On the t 8th December, Lestocq had retreated from Strasburg to Lautenburg, leaving Bulow to defend the defile at Gurzno. [12] On the 9th, Grouchy, with Bessières’ advance guard, [13] seized Biezun. The point was of great importance to Lestocq; through it he communicated directly with the Russian right at Sochoczin, from which it was distant less than two marches. On the 21st, Lestocq sent a detachment through Soldau and Kuczbork to attempt the recapture of Biezun. It was at Kuczbork on the 22nd, and consisted of two infantry regiments, a regiment of dragoons, two of hussars, and a battery of horse artillery. On the 23rd, it appeared before Biezun, where Grouchy had now been joined by Bessières, with infantry and artillery. The attempt was a complete failure. The Prussians, charged by Grouchy, were driven back two miles beyond Kuczbork, with the loss of 500 prisoners and 5 guns, besides killed and wounded. [14] On the 24th, the detachment continued its retreat to Soldau. Ney, whilst this detachment was in front of Biezun, marching from Strasburg, came upon Bulow’s rearguard at Gurzno. On the 24th he drove it before him to Kuczbork, where it joined the Biezun detachment in its retreat to Soldau. From Kuczbork, Ney sent Marchand’s division to operate against the Prussians at Mlawa and Soldau. [15] With his other division he remained in support behind Marchand’s left.

Lestocq’s corps, in the hope of ascertaining the intentions of the enemy and of maintaining communications with the Russian right, was scattered over a front of some 10 or 11 miles, from near Lautenburg, on the right, to Neidenburg and Mlawa, on the left. The whole strength of the Prussian corps was not above 6000 men.

At Soldau, there appear to have been no more than one battalion and 8 or 10 guns. [16] Marchand had, according to his own statement, only two regiments of infantry, supported later by the rest of his division from Mlawa. Ney was at Gurzno with his 2nd division.

Notwithstanding the strength of the position, the weak Prussian force was unable to make a serious resistance. Marchand was master of Soldau soon after 2 p.m. Having ascertained the direction of Ney’s advance, Lestocq had concentrated his troops and returned to recapture S?ldau. The attack on it was made from the Neidenburg road, about 5 p.m. Despite the valour with which the Prussian troops fought, they were unable to get beyond the outer edge of the village, whence, after desperate hand-to-hand fighting, they were driven back. Lestocq, whose left had meanwhile been driven in from Mlawa, retreated during the night on Neidenburg, whither he was slowly followed by Ney. [17]

The same night, Bernadotte was marching to support and replace Ney at Mlawa and Soldau. Bessières, with headquarters at Bobarzin, occupied the country about Mlawa, Raciaz, etc. [18]

Thus the Prussians, on the night of the 25th-26th December, were completely severed from the Russian right, and retreating, away from it, towards Koenigsberg. Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières were interposed between the allies; Soult was also marching to turn the Russian right; the rest of the French army, opposed to their front, was towards Golymin and Pultusk.

The Russian position at the same time was as follows:  Kamenskoi had ordered a general retirement on Ostrolenka, artillery being freely abandoned to avoid hampering the movement. Bennigsen, with the divisions of Osterman Tolstoi, Sedmaratzki, and part of those of Gallitzin and Sacken, was at Pultusk; Gallitzin, with the rest of his own division, was retiring on Golymin; the rest of Sacken’s was moving on the same place from Ciechanow, but, owing to its having been driven by Murat northwards, was farther from Golymin than Gallitzin was. Of Buxhowden’s army, Dochtorow’s division was east of Gallitzin, on the road through Golymin to Makow; Essen’s and Anrepp’s were at Popowo, on the Bug, preparing to retire direct to Rozan and Ostrolenka up the peninsula between the Bug and the Narew.

Bennigsen resolved, disobeying Kamenskoi’s orders, to stand and fight at Pultusk. The marshal was himself with Bennigsen, but broken in body and mind, he left the army early next morning for Grodno where his eccentric conduct showed that he was no longer fit for command. [19] At this point the gallant but worn-out old lieutenant of Suwarrow disappears, except for a brief moment, from the scene.

[1]  For this account of the passage of the Ukra, compare Hœpfner, iii. 88-94; Dumas, xvii. 135-147; Davout, 115-127. [Back to chapter text]

[2]  Plotho, p. 16. [Back to chapter text]

[3]  For the orders in full, see Dumas, xvii. 136-138. [Back to chapter text]

[4]  Davout states his loss at 807, but this is probably below the mark, and appears to exclude Petit and part of the cavalry. The loss in officers was specially heavy, as was to be expected in a night attack where bold leading was essential to success (Davout, p. 127). Plotho (p. 24) says Osterman Tolstoi reported his loss as only 500. Hœpfner (iii. 93) gives 1392, including three generals wounded. [Back to chapter text]

[5]  It had arrived there from Zakroczin on the 23rd (Hœpfner, iii. 96). [Back to chapter text]

[6]  Brother of the future Duc de Rovigo. [Back to chapter text]

[7]  Marbot, i. 245. [Back to chapter text]

[8]  Augereau (Archives Historiques). [Back to chapter text]

[9]  Marbot, i. 246. [Back to chapter text]

[10]  Archives Historiques. [Back to chapter text]

[11]  Augereau (Archives Historiques) says he only reached Novemiasto on the 25th, which is less than Hœpfner (iii. 68) gives him credit for. [Back to chapter text]

[12]  Prussian official account quoted by Wilson (p. 253). [Back to chapter text]

[13]  Bessières 2nd cavalry reserve was about 6000 strong (Berthier to Bessières, 17 December, Dumas, xvii. 456.
     It’s constitution was—
              Light Cavalry division  ... Tilly
              2d Dragoon division     ... Grouchy
              4th   ”       ”         ... Sahuc
              2nd Cuirassier division ... d’Hautpoult
                             (Soult’s report, Archives Historiques).
     It was constituted on the 16th December 1806, and again broken up on the 12th January, 1807, when the constituent troops were thus distributed—
              Tilly’s and Sahuc’s divisions were made over to Bernadotte;
              Grouchy’s to Ney;
              D’Hautpoult’s was sent to Thorn and the neighbourhood.
                             (“Journax de Marche,” Archives Historiques). [Back to chapter text]

[14]  Hœpfner, iii, 138-140, where a full account of the action is given. [Back to chapter text]

[15]  This is not quite Dumas’s version, but see the next note for evidence in support of this account. [Back to chapter text]

[16]  Dumas (xvii. 189), basing his statement, apparently, on Marchand’s report, says there were 6000 Prussians entrenched at Soldau. Hœpfner denies this, and gives full details of the distribution of the corps (iii. 145, etc. ). His account is the more probable on the face of it. Against 6000 men in a strong position covered by a stream, a canal, and a lake on its left, Marchand could hardly have succeeded so easily as he did in capturing the town. Had he done so, Lestocq would scarcely have led back to the storm of the captured position a force which had yielded so easily when it had the advantage of the defensive.
     It is curiously difficult to fix with certainty the date of the action at Soldau. Hœpfner gives the 25th; Dumas also. De Fezensac (131) says it was on the same day as Pultusk, the 26th. Jomini does not specify the date clearly. Bernadotte (Archives Historiques) gives the 5th. The “Journaux de Marche,” of Ney’s corps (in the Archives Historiques), unlike those of Davout, Soult, Augereau, and Bernadotte, are very brief, mere diaries, giving the positions occupied by the corps on each day. There are two versions of the manuscript; the one which is rather fuller as regards details of positions, makes no mention whatever of days of battle. The other merely states, in a column of remarks, that there was an action on a particular date at a place gamed. Against the 25th December it has the entry “combat de Mlawa,” against the 26th, “combat de Soldau.”
     The matter, however, seems to be set at rest by a letter from Marchand to Ney (Daily Correspondence, 26th December, in Archives Historiques), in which he says, “Yesterday (i.e. 25th) I occupied Mlawa and Soldau. At Mlawa I had no serious difficulty, but it was different at Soldau, as I had only two regiments with which to attack 6000 men.” This seems to show that Ney was not in person at Soldau. The “Journaux de Marche” show his headquarters as Gurzno on the 24th, 25th, and 26th December. [Back to chapter text]

[17]  Ney did not move his headquarters beyond Soldau till the 29th, when they were at Neidenburg (“Journaux de Marche,” 6th Corps, Archives Historiques). [Back to chapter text]

[18]  “Journaux de Marche,” Archives Historiques. [Back to chapter text]

[19]  “On his return to Grodno he went, without his shirt, into the streets, and then, sending for a surgeon, pointed out all his wounds, groaned as he passed his hand over them, and insìsted on a certificate of his incapacity to serve” (Wilson, 83, note). Truly a pitiful ending to the career of a gallant old soldier. [Back to chapter text]