The town of Pultusk lies on the right bank of the river Narew, the general course of which here is nearly due north and south. [2] The greater part of the town is in the low ground, and is intersected by a small branch of the stream. It spreads, however, also on to the bank, which is somewhat steep and rises to a small elevation to the west. The river is passed by the road from Strzegoczin and Golymin below the infall of the small branch. That road runs to the north-west over the height already mentioned, then falls into a slight depression, again rises and mounts the height to the south-east of the village of Mosin, and, passing through the centre of a large wood, continues its course close to the south side of Mosin. The height on which stands the large wood is a plateau of some extent which, narrowing into a fairly wide ridge, [3] continues to the south-east nearly to the river bank, where it is bounded, towards the town, by a considerable ravine falling into the low ground about one thousand paces from the Golymin road. The plateau and ridge form a natural screen, hiding from the forest on their west and south, the town and all the lower portions of the Golymin road. In front of a person coming from Pultusk there appears, from the ridge of this screen, a shallow depression, bounded on its farther side by the forest, to which the ground again slightly rises, and covered in places, especially opposite the Mosin heights, by outlying thickets and woods.

The position chosen by Bennigsen for his main line of battle practically coincided with the line of the Golymin road, from Pultusk to the point where it enters the wood on the Mosin heights.

On this line, the left resting on the town and the right on the Mosin wood, he drew up his main body in three lines. In first line he placed 21 battalions of the 2nd and 3rd divisions. Behind these, at about 300 paces’ interval, stood, in second line, 18 battalions, and behind them again, in third line, towards the left, were 5 battalions of the 5th and 6th divisions. The artillery of the main body was disposed in advantageous positions along the front of the first line.

On the right, Barclay de Tolly was thrown forward into the south-western half of the great wood. With three jäger regiments he held the edge of the wood, whilst two battalions of another regiment stood in reserve in the wood on the Golymin road, thus forming a continuation through it of the first main line. The third battalion supported a battery placed outside the wood, astride of the road, commanding the approach from Golymin. In the space between the wood and Mosin was a regiment of Polish cavalry. There were more guns, masked by a hedge, facing the Nasielsk road.

The Russian general had a similar advanced position on his left wing, designed to cover the Narew bridge. Here Bagavout stood, beyond the deep ravine, with 10 battalions, 2 squadrons of dragoons, 600 cossacks, and one battery. His cavalry was pushed forward along the Warsaw road. These troops were all drawn from the 6th division. The advanced posts of Barclay and Bagavout [4] thus occupied the two extremities of the screening ridge, which has already been described. To link them to one another, there were posted along their ridge 28 squadrons of regular cavalry.

Owing to the conformation of the ground, and the position of the advanced wings with their connecting line of cavalry, the main lines, on the Golymin road, were concealed from the view of an enemy debouching from the forest by the Warsaw and Nasielsk roads. But, at the same time, the fire of the greater portion of the Russian artillery was masked by the cavalry line.

In the valley, beyond the cavalry and extending into the outlying woods in front of the forest, was a long line of cossacks, supported, in front of Barclay’s position, by to squadrons of hussars. Lastly, one battalion of Anrepp’s division (14th) stood to guard the bridge on the left bank of the Narew. Anrepp himself was on the march, under Kamenskoi’s orders, from Popowo, near the Bug, to Rozan and Ostrolenka.

Such was the position in which Bennigsen prepared to receive the French attack, which might fall upon him either from the direction of Warsaw and Nasielsk or from that of Golymin. He had taken special precautions to cover the bridge, not only by his strong detachment under Bagavout, but also by keeping his reserve behind his left flank, ready to support that commander. From the outskirts of Pultusk to Barclays battery on the Golymin road was a distance of about 4500 paces. The Russians had two lines of retreat, one by the right bank of the Narew, through Makow to Ostrolenka, the other over the bridge by the road on the left bank viâ Rozan. The latter was decidedly longer, as it passed round the outside of the great bend of the river. Therefore, Bennigsen’s right flank, covering the shorter line by the chord, was specially sensitive to attack. [5]

Lannes, with his two divisions, commanded by Suchet and Gazan, marched from Zbroski at 7 a.m. on the 26th December. The distance to Pultusk is but five miles; to the point where he must meet Bennigsen’s foremost troops scarcely four. Yet even this march, short in actual length was a tedious and difficult one. The weather had recently been an alternation of frost and thaw. During the last two days a decided thaw had set in. It had penetrated deep into the ground, aided in its action by constant showers of rain, of sleet, and of snow, which melted as it reached the surface of the earth. The ground had become more and more sodden, and the unmetalled roads had degenerated into lines of mud which, ground and churned by the passage of men and horses, acquired a depth that rendered all movement, not only irksome, but difficult in the extreme. For the artillery, it was still more difficult to forge a way through these terrible roads, even with the aid of double, treble, and quadruple teams. For the infantry, a rate of progression exceeding 1-1/4 miles an hour was not generally practicable. [6] The men were generally halfway up to their knees in sticky mud, often much farther. Davout officially records that several men, including an officer whom he names, spent the night after the battle on the field, simply because they were unable to move backwards or forwards in the mud. [7] Rapp makes a similar statement. [8] Lannes himself wrote: “The rain and the hail overwhelmed our soldiers”; and, again “ The field, on which we were about to do battle, had been converted into a sea of mud, through which soldiers and horses could with difficulty march.” [9]

By incredible exertions, the whole corps had been got forward on the 5th from Czarnowo, with its artillery complete, till the first division reached Zbroski, and Gazan’s, in second line, was a mile behind. The corps had marched 15 miles. The troops bivouacked in misery during a night of storms of snow, hail, and rain.

Where Lannes had started his corps on its march towards the enemy, of whose presence in force at Pultusk he was aware, he himself rode forward, with an escort of two squadrons, to reconnoitre the position. As he emerged from the forest on the Nasielsk-Pultusk road, he saw before him, on the ridge covering Pultusk, Bennigsen’s cavalry, and the front of his advanced wings, the whole covered by the line of cossacks in the intervening depression. He had already had to clear some of the cossacks out of the thickets on his side. The town of Pultusk, and Bennigsen’s main lines, were hidden from him by the rising ground. It was not till considerably later that he realised the magnitude of the force with which he had to do battle. Could he have known the odds in numbers against which he had to contend, perhaps even Lannes’ brave spirit would have quailed; for he knew of no succour likely to reach him from his left, [10] and he did know that there was nothing behind him.

Presently, Claparède, coming up with the 17th Light Infantry as advance guard, drove in the cossack outposts, and enabled Lannes to see better what was in front of him. His position was difficult and dangerous, but he had the Emperor’s clear orders for the capture of the Pultusk bridge, and he was not the man to hesitate, whatever the difficulties. It was now about 10 a.m., and he had just received the Emperor’s order. [11]

As his troops slowly came up, he marshalled them, under cover of the woods, in two lines, covering, as far as he could, the whole length of the Russian position. In first line he ranged the whole of Suchet’s division, less the 40th regiment. In second line was Gazan’s division, plus the 40th from Suchet’s. On the right of his first line, he placed Claparède with the 17th Light Infantry, and Treilhard’s Light Cavalry, in support, opposed to Bagavout’s detachment. The centre, under Wedell, consisted of the 64th regiment and one battalion of the 88th. On the left were the other battalion of the 88th, the 34th, and Becker’s dragoons, the whole led by Suchet in person. The left wing was covered, more completely than the centre and the right, by detached woods, and its strength was thus concealed from Barclay de Tolly, to whom it was opposed. The few guns which had, so far, arrived were disposed in front of the centre and the left. Gazan, with the second line, followed the first at about three hundred paces. The battalions were mostly deployed and their front covered by a swarm of skirmishers. The second line comprised only two regiments of Gazan’s and the 40th. In reserve there were the two battalions of the 21st regiment (Gazan’s division).

The strength of Lannes’ corps may be taken at about 20,000 men, whilst Bennigsen had between 40,000 and 45,000. [12]

The attack commenced about 11 a.m. on the right, with the advance of Claparède’s men against Bagavout. The French moved forward with enthusiasm to the attack. They felt that behind them lay the dripping woods and the sodden ground on which they had spent the preceding night, and through which they had been toiling since seven o’clock. In front of them was Pultusk, where, if they reached it, they might hope to spend a less wretched night. The enemy defending it they had already beaten at Austerlitz; they had not yet learnt what was his capacity for stolid, dogged resistance. Lastly, they were fighting under the eyes of a marshal whom they adored, and who was always ready to lead them in person where the battle raged most hotly.

Bagavout’s cavalry and cossacks, no match for the French infantry, were driven in without difficulty. The next opponents of the French were the 4th Jägers, whom Bagavout sent forward. Cheering, and regardless of the heavy artillery fire with which they were smitten by the Russian guns, [13] the French infantry drove the jägers backwards and leftwards, until they reached seven squadrons, under Koschin, on the left of the cavalry line joining Bagavout to Barclay. Seeing the attack on Bagavout, Bennigsen had despatched to his aid four battalions, under Osterman, from the reserve and first line. [14]

Simultaneously with Claparéde, Wedell, with the French centre, had moved forwards, and now changed direction to his right, intending to fall on Bagavout’s right flank, whilst Claparède attacked him in front. In doing so he, necessarily, exposed his own left flank to Koschin’s cavalry and the defeated jägers who had fallen back on it. Koschin, quick to see his chance, charged at once through a blinding snowstorm which concealed his approach until his men were actually in the midst of Wedell’s leading battalions, sabring them right and left. [15] But the storm, which had aided him so far, now, in turn, prevented Koschin’s seeing the advance, against his own right flank, of Wedell’s half of the 88th. That battalion was just in time to save those in front of it, attacked by Koschin in flank and by two battalions of jägers and Bagavout’s cavalry in front. In the confused, hand-to-hand struggle which ensued, each side claims to have annihilated the enemy. In the end, the Russians had to retire, and the fight came to a standstill, Bagavout falling back on his old position, and Koschin towards the rear of the left wing.

Treilhard’s cavalry now advanced. A Russian hussar regiment in front of it waited till it approached, and then, wheeling leftwards, exposed the French cavalry, on the ridge, to the fire of a battery in the main line, which had previously been masked. From it the French suffered severely.

It is now time to return to the movements which had been going on simultaneously on the French left. Lannes, having started his attack on the right, hurried off to look after Suchet’s column advancing to the storm of the Mosin heights. The 34th Regiment led the way with a swarm of skirmishers and chasseurs à cheval in front, accompanied by the intrepid Lannes, as well as by Suchet.

Fired by the example and encouragement of their leaders, the 34th, bursting into the front of the wood, carried all before them. Barclays men were driven in confusion back through the first half of the wood on to the reserve, [16] on the Golymin road. The Russian battery in the wood was momentarily captured, but the reserve turned the scale; the battery was recovered, and the 34th driven into the midst of the wood through which they had just triumphantly fought their way. They were saved from disaster by the arrival of the 2nd battalion of the 88th, which, it will be remembered, was attached to this wing. In the outer half of the wood, on the French side of the road, a furious personal conflict raged with varying success. Whilst the French first line had thus, on the whole, gained ground against the detachments of Bagavout and Barclay, the end line had followed steadily, and it now occupied the ridge which had, at the beginning of the battle, been held by the Russian regular cavalry joining the wings. The cavalry had retired behind the main lines, and Gazan’s men were thus exposed to the full stress of the artillery fire from the, now unmasked, batteries in front of Bennigsen’s main position. [17]

The battle had raged for several hours. The French had made but little progress. The right had failed to dislodge Bagavout completely from his original position, their centre had not got beyond the ridge occupied in the morning by the Russian cavalry. There replying, as best it might with a very inferior force of artillery, to Bennigsen’s guns in the main line, it was suffering severely from their fire. On the left, Lannes and Suchet were, with difficulty, maintaining themselves, in the nearer half of the great wood, against Barclays superior force. There seemed every prospect of Lannes’ whole corps being compelled to a disastrous retreat.

But now a change came over the scene. The short day, which would close by 4 p.m., had scarce two hours to run, a premature darkness was threatened, owing to the stormy, cloudy weather. At this juncture, Bennigsen was warned, by the cossacks on his right, of the approach, by the Golymin road, of a strong hostile column. Davout’s 3rd division, commanded temporarily by his chief of the staff d’Aultanne, had started at 6 a.m. from Kowalavice, about two miles short of Strzegoczin, in pursuit of a Russian column which appeared to be falling back on Pultusk, and which it was ordered to fend off from the left flank of Lannes’ corps.

Finding in front of him a considerable body of cavalry escorting guns and stores, d’Aultanne followed it without seriously engaging himself. The enemy, in his retreat, was forced, by the state of the roads, to abandon 14 guns and a large number of waggons. Satisfied with his progress, the French commander was about to bivouac for the night, when he heard, on his right, a heavy cannonade, showing him that Lannes was hotly engaged. The large number of guns indicated that the enemy must be superior in this arm at least; for d’Aultanne could infer that Lannes had had the same difficulty as himself in moving up artillery. With a just appreciation of the situation, he resolved to move at once to Lannes’ assistance. By the route which he had followed he had had to march about double the distance Lannes had, and he had, moreover, been delayed by fighting, and collecting the abandoned guns and waggons. [18] It must, therefore, have been somewhere towards 2 p.m. when he arrived in view of the Russian right on the Mosin heights. With a double team he had succeeded in dragging up one gun; with that he satisfied himself that Mosin was only occupied by cossacks. He had no time to concert measures with Lannes, to whom he sent notice of his advance, in echelon from his right, in the direction of the Golymin to Pultusk road. He had 9 battalions. [19] His right echelon, in front, skirted the woods opposite Barclays right; the left echelon rested on the little brook which flows past Mosin to the Narew. He was first attacked by the Polish cavalry regiment from between Barclays position and Mosin; that was easily beaten off.

Meanwhile, Bennigsen, alarmed for his right, had wheeled back the whole right of his main lines so as to face the Mosin wood. He thus greatly lessened the volume of artillery fire which Lannes’ centre had to bear.

When d’Aultanne’s right echelon arrived opposite the angle of the Mosin wood, he changed direction to the left, forming for attack, in columns of half battalions at 50 paces’ interval, and at once advanced in the midst of a heavy snowstorm. The new direction which he had assumed brought him obliquely on the right of Barclays position, his right directed on the extreme left of Lannes’ left wing, still fighting in the wood.

As the attack advanced, Barclay fell back towards the now refused right wing of the main line. From this, there hurried to his assistance two infantry regiments and 20 squadrons. At the same time, Bennigsen directed the fire of a powerful battery, from the Golymin road, against the French in the outer half of the wood. Thus strengthened, Barclay once more advanced into the wood beyond the road. At last, the French 34th, which had so long and so gallantly maintained itself in the wood, was forced back out of it. The result of its retreat was to create a great gap between it and the right of d’Aultanne’s force, whose flank was thus exposed. Into the opening so made poured the 20 squadrons of Russian cavalry. Both Lannes and d’Aultanne, separated by this mass of cavalry, were in imminent danger when the situation was saved by the firm conduct of the 85th Regiment of d’Aultanne’s division. Disorder was already spreading in his ranks, as well as in those of Lannes. It was increased by the darkness which had now settled down. The Russian cavalry was received with a steady fire from the 85th, formed in squares and facing the right flank of the intruding enemy. That cavalry was compelled to fall back, though it several times charged d’Aultanne’s lines. Order had, however, been restored by the exertions of Piré and Gauthier, and the charges failed. The last of them was made about 8 p.m. in the midst of another violent snowstorm.

Shortly before this, d’Aultanne had received a message from Lannes, begging him to stand firm, as the marshal was about to renew his attack. After waiting for an hour, and seeing no signs of the promised attack, d’Aultanne decided to retire to the woods along whose edge his right had advanced.

The further doings of the French centre and right have still to be related. When Bennigsen turned most of his guns to the support of Barclay, [20] Gazan, in the centre, was able to direct his artillery against the right flank of Bagavout’s detachment, and to support a fresh attack on him by Claparède and Wedell. Bagavout was overpowered, and driven back across the ravine in front of which he stood. His guns were captured, but he was promptly reinforced by five fresh battalions. To support him, Osterman established a strong battery behind his right. Bagavout once more urged forward his troops across the ravine. After a long and desperate fight, the French, unable to maintain their forward position, were borne back across the ravine in confusion. A bayonet charge, by a regiment under Somow, had completed their overthrow. [21] They were unable to retain the guns which they had taken, and which now again fell into Bagavout’s hands.

Exhausted by many hours’ fighting, following on a severe march, Lannes’ corps was not fit to continue the battle, in which they had for four hours fought against double their numbers. Even with d’Aultanne’s division they had scarcely equalled three-fourths of the Russian strength.

Weary and sullen, they fell back in good order, unpursued, to the positions which they had occupied before the action commenced. Beyond that they did not retreat. Bennigsen’s story, that his cossacks, next morning, found no French within eight miles of the field, may be dismissed as a fable. Possibly the story may have been carried by cossacks scouting in the direction of d’Aultanne, who, thinking Lannes could now take care of himself, since Bennigsen had retreated, marched off, before dawn on the 27th, to rejoin his own corps, leaving the ground unoccupied in the direction of the Golymin road.

During the night, Bennigsen decided on retreat. The greater part of his army, passing to the left bank of the Narew, marched by the circuitous road on that side to Rozan on the 27th, and on to Ostrolenka on the 28th. [22] The night of the 26th-27th had been one of calm, succeeding the tempest of the day. Lannes was in no state to pursue on the 27th. His losses had been very heavy in the savage hand-to-hand fighting throughout the 26th. His and d’Aultanne’s losses are greatly understated by the French. On the whole, it is probable that they were not less than 7000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Russians, too, had lost heavily; 5000 is, perhaps, not too high a figure at which to estimate their casualties. [23]

Both sides lay claim to the victory in this well-contested battle. It is difficult to award the palm to either. What ground Lannes gained he lost again, and he had been so severely handled that he could not molest Bennigsen’s retreat. Bennigsen, on the other hand, though he had repulsed the attack of a very inferior force, had not been able, or had not dared, to pursue it. He was, rightly, nervous lest the advance of Napoleon’s centre on Makow should cut his line across the bend of the river to Rozan and Ostrolenka. He could not feel sure that Lannes’ attack would not be renewed next day by a stronger force. Then, if he lost the Pultusk bridge, almost inevitable a ruin would stare him in the face. So badly did he think of his position, that he preferred reaching Rozan by a 22 mile march on the left bank of the river to risking the direct march of only 15 or 16 by the right.

Having decided, contrary to Kamenskoi’s orders, [24] to stand and fight at Pultusk, Bennigsen might well have used his position to better advantage, and, at least, have inflicted a decisive defeat on Lannes. Had he fallen vigorously on the French corps at the beginning of the battle, and advanced with his right, he would probably have rolled it up and driven it into the river before d’Aultanne could come up. He could still have kept a strong reserve behind his right wing to ward off any attack from the Golymin direction. But his disposition of his troops was not calculated to favour any such bold action. Instead of meeting the French advance with over 100 guns posted on the ridge, he masked the greater part of his artillery by the curtain of cavalry which he drew between the advanced wings under Barclay and Bagavout. Consequently, the French, whilst encountering strenuous resistance from these two commanders on either wing, had nothing, at first, opposed to their centre but cavalry and cossacks. It was only when these retired that the Russian batteries behind could open on the enemy’s centre. What their effect would have been had they, with a considerable force of infantry, been where the cavalry were, can be judged from the way in which they arrested Gazan’s advance, until their fire was diverted by d’Aultanne’s appearance. But for the weakness of the Russian centre in front, Wedell’s move to the right, to support Claparède against Bagavout, would have been impossible.

Bennigsen could well have placed 10,000 infantry and 50 or 60 guns where his cavalry were, still keeping a strong reserve of infantry. The cavalry, standing behind his right wing, could have issued on the French left flank and rear as soon as the first attack had failed, as it must inevitably have done. Then, with 25,000 infantry against him in front, as well as a powerful artillery, with 38 [25] squadrons and a strong force of cossacks attacking his left and rear, and, finally, with practically no reserve at his command, it is difficult to see how Lannes could have escaped total destruction. The battle would have been over in two or three hours, well before d’Aultanne could arrive, and that officer would, naturally, not have risked an attack without the support of Lannes.

Bennigsen reported that he had been attacked by 60,000 French under Napoleon in person. If he was, in good faith, under this delusion it will account for his want of vigour. But surely his intelligence should have been better!

He reported to the Tsar that “the succours, so much desired by General Buxhowden, did not arrive in time, although it was scarcely distant from me two miles, [26] in the neighbourhood of Makow, and that it had halted halfway to afford me all the advantages of my victory.” [27]

Buxhowden is unjustly blamed here; for he had Kamenskoi’s orders to retreat on Ostrolenka, and he was doing so with Dochtorow’s and Tutchkow’s divisions by Makow, and with Essen’s and Anrepp’s from Popowo. Kamenskoi was with Bennigsen the night before the battle, and Buxhowden had no fresh orders from him. It is true that Dochtorow did recall part of his division to support Gallitzin at Golymin, but the cases were not altogether parallel. He was merely supporting a rearguard retreating by the same road as himself.

Lannes seems to have made the best of an extremely unpleasant position. He was put in it owing to the Emperor’s false intelligence as to the enemy’s lines of retreat. His orders to Lannes, already quoted, [28] indicate clearly his belief that there was no considerable force at Pultusk. They do not even provide for Lannes’ action in the event of his finding himself outnumbered. Napoleon, in fact, believed that the enemy was marching on Makow, and all his efforts were directed against the right of the Russian army and its rear, now that it was separated by Ney, Bernadette, Bessières, and Soult from the Prussians. Lannes received his orders only as he reached the field of battle. They were so positive that he could hardly have justified failure to follow them to the letter. Moreover, he had already commenced the action before he was fully aware of the immense superiority of Bennigsen’s numbers.

He was hampered in his attack by the necessity for keeping a strong second line to fall back on. If there was one thing he was certain of it was that there was no strong supporting force between him and Czarnowo. At 2 p.m. his position was more than ever hazardous, and he must have felt that a strong offensive return against his left flank could not but involve him in disaster. That it would eventually have come, but for the unexpected arrival of d’Aultanne, can hardly be doubted. The promptitude of the latter commander in marching to the sound of the guns is highly commendable.

Whilst Lannes was fighting, at Pultusk, his uphill battle against very superior numbers, another action was in progress in front of Golymin, 12 miles to the northwest. [29]

At that village, Gallitzin had collected parts of his own division. The portion of Sacken’s which had been driven northwards by Murat was also on its road to Golymin. The rest of these divisions had retreated on Pultusk and formed part of the army under the personal command of Bennigsen on the 26th December. When Gallitzin reached Golymin, about 8 a.m., his troops were too exhausted by their difficult march to continue it farther towards Makow. He had, moreover, to wait for Sacken’s men. The same morning, under orders from the Emperor, [30] Augereau marched off Desjardins’ division, at 7.30 a.m., from Kaleczin. [31] The other division (Heudelet’s) was ordered to start at 9 a.m. They were to march viâ Sonsk, whilst Durosnel, with the light cavalry, was to cut the road between Ciechanow and Golymin, collecting on it baggage abandoned by the enemy. Murat, with part of the reserve cavalry, followed, marching by Garnowo. [32] Gallitzin had, overnight, informed Dochtorow, who was marching in advance of him on Makow, of his own march to Golymin, and had warned him that the French were advancing to the attack from all directions. This message Dochtorow received simultaneously with Kamenskoi’s orders for his retreat on Makow. Nevertheless, leaving his division to continue its retreat meanwhile, he himself, with a musketeer regiment and one of dragoons, remained at Golymin to receive Gallitzin. [33]

Scarcely had the latter collected and organised his wearied troops at Golymin when the rear-guard, of 2 squadrons, was attacked by Murat’s advance guard. Gallitzin sent 3 squadrons of cuirassiers to endeavour to arrest the French advance, and so to give him some time to rest his men, before again proceeding towards Makow. The rear-guard, thus strengthened, succeeded in repulsing Lasalle, who led Murat’s advance, to the woods from which he had issued.

Presently there appeared, at Ruskowo, the head of Augereau’s column.

Seeing that, in the exhausted condition of his troops, retreat without fighting was no longer possible, Gallitzin proceeded to make the best arrangements he could to meet the French.

The position of Golymin, though almost absolutely flat, was one of great strength for a defensive action against an enemy advancing from the west. The ground is slightly elevated to the north and north-west of the village, but the rise is very gentle. Except on the north, it is almost entirely surrounded by woods interspersed with marshes, which, owing to the weather prevailing on the 26th December, were in their most impracticable condition. The outer edge of these woods abutted, at a distance averaging 3500 paces from Golymin, on the open marshy plain over which the French line of approach passed. The side most open to attack was the rising ground, towards Wadkowo and Wola-Golyminska; but even here there was a large wood, between Wadkowo and Golymin.

Into the woods and ground about Kaleczin [34] Gallitzin sent Tcherbatow with a regiment of infantry, and 4 light guns. With the rest of his troops, he posted himself in front of Golymin. His first line comprised 6 battalions of infantry, and what remained of two cavalry regiments, from which he had already made detachments. In reserve he held a regiment of cuirassiers, 2 squadrons of hussars, and the troops of the 7th (Dochtorow’s) division.

On arrival at Ruskowo, [35] Augereau sent Heudelet, when he arrived some time after Desjardins, to the left to attack by Wadkowo, which he occupied without difficulty. Desjardins moved forward, from Ruskowo, towards Golymin. At this moment, Murat arrived with Milhaud’s and Klein’s [36] cavalry divisions and was joined by Marulaz with Davout’s light cavalry, moving by the Strzegoczin road. They advanced, in two lines, against the Russian cavalry, which gave way before them, retiring into the woods, where the French horsemen were unable to follow.

Meanwhile, Augereau’s two divisions, which had been unable to bring up their artillery, moved forward, Desjardins from Ruskowo, Heudelet from Wadkowo. [37] Heudelet had but poor success. The resistance of the Russian cavalry and infantry was so strenuous that, wanting the support of guns, he could advance but a short way. Desjardins’ division, which, unlike Heudelet’s, had been completely successful at the passage of the Ukra, attacking with more impetuosity, at first drove back Tcherbatow’s infantry regiment. Reinforced by a battalion sent him by Gallitzin from the reserve, Tcherbatow placed himself, sword in hand, at the head of his men, and again led them forward to the attack. Desjardins lost the ground which he had gained, but rallied, and once more advance against the foe. His men, when within 50 paces of the Russians, were brought to a standstill by grape fire. [38]

After this, the fight in front of Augereau degenerated into a combat of skirmishers, which lasted, with varying success, well into the evening. On the whole, the French left (Heudelet) slowly progressed towards turning the Russian right. So far, Gallitzin’s small force had held its own with success. There was yet another strong French column with which he had to deal on his left.

Davout had started, with his 1st and 2nd divisions (Morand’s and Friant’s), from Klukowo and Strzegoczin at daybreak. [39] Marulaz, with the cavalry, was in advance, and, as already described, had joined Murat in driving the Russian cavalry back from Garnowo on the woods towards Golymin. On his way, he had captured 20 guns, 80 ammunition waggons and 200 others, abandoned by the retreating Russians in the mud. He and Murat were now awaiting the arrival of the infantry for the attack of the wood. The Russian infantry were preparing for its defence. Gallitzin, warned of the approach of Morand, had sent 3 fresh battalions into the woods and marshes on Tcherbatow’s left, and 2 squadrons on to the Pultusk road. At 3 p.m. the Russian right had been reinforced by 2 cavalry regiments of the 7th and 8th divisions, arriving from Ciechanow. This force had succeeded in getting past Durosnel, by whose cavalry it was attacked on the road. Davout’s 1st division (Morand) had to march 7 miles from Strzegoczin to Garnowo, and the 2nd (Friant) 8-1/2 from Klukowo.

On arrival, Morand formed his 1st brigade in battalion columns for the attack of the wood. The 2nd brigade (d’Honnières) was behind him. It was 3.30 before the 1st brigade was ready. Darkness had fallen, though the scene was illuminated by the burning village of Garnowo, which had been fired by the cossacks as they left it. This light facilitated the direction of the fire of the Russian guns. [40] As the brigade charged into the wood, with its voltigeurs in front, the Russian infantry, to free their limbs for the struggle, threw off their knapsacks. Their resistance was obstinate, but the vigour of the French attack overcame all opposition. Fighting hand to hand with their favourite weapon, the bayonet, the infantry of Gallitzin was slowly driven back through and out of the wood, leaving it strewn with their dead and wounded, and with 4000 knapsacks, which, in the agony of the struggle, the soldiers had no opportunity to recover. As in Augereau’s case, Davout could attack only with infantry, for his guns had fallen behind. Perceiving that the enemy was attempting to retreat to the right by the Makow road, Davout despatched d’Honnières’ brigade, in that direction, to attempt to turn the wood and to advance on Golymin by the Pultusk road. The 51st Regiment moved into the wood in front of Osiek, on the near side of the Pultusk road, whilst Rapp with his dragoons charged, on the road, the Russian cavalry. Himself at the head of his men, Rapp, ever in the forefront of the battle, bore back the Russian horsemen in confusion towards Golymin. But, in doing so, he fell into a trap. The marshes on either side were filled with Russian infantry, standing up to their waists in the bog, safe from any attack by cavalry. [41] From their fire, Rapp’s men suffered heavily. The general himself was wounded, and his dragoons were compelled to fall back into line with their own infantry. To avoid what appeared to be probable useless loss, Morand did not attempt to advance beyond the border of the woods towards Golymin. There he took post, with Rapp’s dragoons in reserve, for the night. Friant’s division had not come into action at all.

Gallitzin and Dochtorow had now begun their retreat on Makow. Their troops, instead of obtaining some rest at Golymin, had had a full day of fighting. Perhaps, even that was less exhausting than plodding along the miry roads: at least, it was less disheartening. Dochtorow was the first to move off, as the storm of combat lulled. It was not till 9 p.m. that Gallitzin was able to move the last of his troops from the battlefield. He first withdrew his guns, which marched slowest and with most difficulty. Next followed his cavalry. Behind them was the main body of the infantry. Last of all came the outposts, covering the rear of the infantry. When the battle gradually died away, the Russians in Golymin were almost surrounded; the Makow road was the only one open to them. It was midnight before the head of Dochtorow’s detachment joined Tutchkow, and the remainder of his own division, at Makow, 10 miles from Golymin.

As regards the proportion between the numbers engaged on either side, the case of Pultusk was reversed at Golymin. Gallitzin’s own force was 15 battalions and 20 squadrons, [42] a regiment (3 battalions) of infantry from Dochtorow and a regiment of cavalry. At 3 p.m. he was joined by two cavalry regiments retiring from Ciechanow, as well as some of Sacken’s infantry. [43] It would seem probable, therefore, that he at no time had available more than 16,000 or 18,000 men.

The French had Augereau’s two divisions, two of Davout’s (one of which was only in reserve), and part of the cavalry reserve; altogether about 37,000 or 38,000 men.

The Russian losses are put at 795, [44] but were probably somewhat higher.

Davout states the loss of the 1st division at 222, [45] and Dumas says the French total losses were about the same as those of the Russians. [46]

The action was a much smaller affair, in every way, than that at Pultusk; the duration and vigour of the combat were less. Gallitzin was at a great disadvantage as regards numbers. To make up for this, he had two batteries of artillery (28 guns), while the French had failed to bring to the front any of theirs. The Russian position was an extremely strong one naturally, especially when the enemy were unable to bring artillery to bear on the woods and on the Russian lines. Again, Gallitzin had an advantage in being attacked piecemeal by the different columns as they arrived in succession. Augereau’s effort had practically collapsed before Davout arrived on the scene at all. Murat, too, was unable to do anything beyond driving the hostile cavalry before him back into the woods occupied by infantry. The action was a disjointed one on the French side. Davout’s assertion [47] that “an hour after nightfall the corps of Marshal Augereau was engaged with the enemy, nearly a league to the left of the 3rd Corps; the darkness, and the uncertainty as to the point of this attack, rendered impossible any concerted action,” shows this clearly. Davout, advancing in front of Garnowo, was exhibited to the view of the defending force by the light behind him of the burning village, whilst his opponents were hidden from him by the darkness and the woods.

When all is said, these advantages were but a poor compensation to Gallitzin for his numerical inferiority; it cannot be denied that his resistance, with exhausted troops, is deserving of the highest praise. So brave was his defence that Murat wrote to the Emperor, “We thought the enemy had 50,000 men.” [48]

It appears doubtful if Augereau’s corps occupied Golymin before the early morning of the 27th, when no unwounded Russians remained there. [49] The exact time of its entry is not of great importance, as it is certain that it was, in the end, unopposed.

Napoleon, if we may accept the testimony of Jomini speaking in his name, was more disappointed with the indecisive result of the action of Golymin than with that of the battle of Pultusk. [50] His failure to get beyond Golymin on the 26th, still more Soult’s failure to pass Ciechanow, [51] destroyed the hope of cutting the Russian line of retreat with his left, and driving them against the Narew.

[1]  This account of the battle of Pultusk is based on a comparison of those given by (a) Dumas, vol. xvii., pp. 164-171; (b) Sir R. Wilson; (c) Hœpfner, vol. iii., pp. l09-119; (d) Davout, pp. 131-137; (e) Lannes’ report, Arch. Hist. [Back to paragraph text]

[2]  The river at the bridge appears to have a breadth of about 100 yards. At the date of the battle it was running very high, owing to the thaw, and was covered with blocks of floating ice. [Back to paragraph text]

[3]  The wood measured about 1800 paces at right angles to the Golymin road, and about 1200 at its greatest width along the road. [Back to paragraph text]

[4]  Bagavout began the battle with 5000 men before he was reinforced (Bennigsen’s despatch, Wilson, p. 235). He was between the river bank and the extremity of the ridge, extending on to the slope heading up to it. [Back to paragraph text]

[5]  Hœpfner, iii., 111. Behind his left wing lay both the road to Makow by the right bank, and that over the bridge. The former, however, shortly turned to the north-west, so that it was liable to be severed, farther on, behind the right wing. [Back to paragraph text]

[6]  “The country was clayey and cut up by marshes; the roads were frightful. The cavalry, infantry, and artillery, were lost in the depths of mud. None could get out of them save by untold labour” (Rapp, p. 127). “It took two hours to cover a short league” (Davout, p, 132).
     One league = 4 kilometres = 2-1/2 miles. [Back to paragraph text]

[7]  Davout, p. 136. [Back to paragraph text]

[8]  Rapp, p. 127. [Back to paragraph text]

[9]  Lannes’ report on the battle to Berthier, dated 27th December, in daily correspondence (Arch. Hist.). The report is written by Victor, then Lannes’ chief of the staff. [Back to paragraph text]

[10]  Lannes had no information of the approach of Davout’s 3rd division. Indeed, Davout had no orders to send it to Lannes’ support. He merely directed it to keep from that marshal’s left flank a Russian column retreating, apparently, on Pultusk from Strzegoczin (Davout, p. 132). Berthier’s despatch to Lannes (dated 26th December), which reached him about 10 a.m., says: “Marshal Davout is about to advance on Strzegoczin and Golymin.” The orders of the same date to Davout merely direct him on the last-named places, and in no way indicate that he was to assist Lannes. [Back to paragraph text]

[11]  These are the orders referred to in the last note. They inform Lannes that the enemy’s centre is pierced, that one or two regiments may have remained at Sierock, if so, they will certainly be captured. The marshal is to advance on Pultusk, to pass the Narew there, and at once to construct a bridge head. Clearly the Emperor had no thought of any serious resistance to his advance at Pultusk (cf. despatch quoted in full, Dumas, vol. xvii., pp. 485-487). [Back to paragraph text]

[12]  Hœpfner gives Lannes 20,000 men in the morning, and 30,000 at the end of the battle, though it is difficult to suppose he is right in estimating Gudin’s division of Davout’s corps at 10,000. The estimate seems at least 3000 too high. The same authority (iii, 10) gives Bennigsen’s strength, allowing for sick, detachments, etc., as 40,600 men, viz. 66 battalions, 55 squadrons, 7 field batteries, and 2-1/2 horse batteries (128 guns).
     Sir R. Wilson (p. 273) gives 45,000.
     Lanes’ strength was 24 battalions and 27 squadrons. If, as Hœpfner reckons, he had 20,000 men, the battalions may be reckoned at 750, and the squadrons at 80 men. Assuming Davout’s battalions to have had an equal average strength, d’Aultanne’s force could not have exceeded 7000, and the whole French force engaged would not amount to over 27,000.
     Napoleon (Corr. 11,305), sending orders to Murat, mentions the strength of Lannes’ corps as 16,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry. Becker’s dragoons he puts at 1200, which would give Lannes 18,400 in the morning. To this must be added, in the afternoon, one-third of Davout’s infantry, which Napoleon states in all to be 22,000. Lannes’ total in the afternoon would then be only 25,300. [Back to paragraph text]

[13]  Bagavout‘s battery (14 guns) was on his left, close to the river bank. [Back to paragraph text]

[14]  Two from the extreme left of the 1st line, and two from the reserve in 3d line (Wilson, p. 272). [Back to paragraph text]

[15]  This combat occurred in the angle, on the French side, between the Nasielsk and Warsaw roads, about 250 yards from either. [Back to paragraph text]

[16]  Two battalions, vide supra, p. 91. [Back to paragraph text]

[17]  Of the total of over 120 guns, Barclay had 28, and Bagavout 14. There were another 14 in Osterman’s reserve. Thus, Gazan was exposed to the fire of nearly 70 guns. [Back to paragraph text]

[18]  For this account of d’Aultanne’s march, see Davout, pp. 132-134. [Back to paragraph text]

[19]  His whole cavalry force consisted of 70 chasseurs, and 100 of Rapp’s dragoons. His artillery was not up except the one gun just mentioned (Davout, pp. 132 and 134). [Back to paragraph text]

[20]  About 2 p.m. [Back to paragraph text]

[21]  Lanes (Arch. Hist.) states that a fresh attempt (apparently the one here described) was made against his right about 3 p.m., but was arrested by Gazan. [Back to paragraph text]

[22]  Writing on the 28th December to Murat, Napoleon says that part of the troops from Pultusk had retired by the right bank. Murat is ordered to ascertain whether they had gone direct to Rozan or by Makow. If the enemy were standing at Makow, they were not to be attacked until an overwhelming force was collected (Corr. 11,512). [Back to paragraph text]

[23]  Wilson puts the French loss at 10,000 killed and wounded, the Russians at 3000 killed without mentioning wounded (Wilson, p. 273). Elsewhere (p. 81), he puts the Russian loss at less than 5000 men, and the French at 8000 at least.
     Hœpfner (iii. 118) says that, though the Russian official accounts state the French loss at 10,000, other Russian authorities say 7000 killed and wounded, and 700 prisoners. The French admit only 600 or 700 killed, and 1500 wounded. This is the figure given by Dumas (vol, xvii., p. 174), and by Lannes (Arch. Hist. ). The marshal puts the Russian loss at 2000 killed, 3000 wounded, 1800 prisoners. Dumas says more than 2000 dead Russians were found on the field, and 1500 wounded, incapable of being moved.
     The French, as the attackers, might be expected to lose more heavily than the defenders. They were exposed to a terrible artillery fire, telling heavily on the close formations. On the other hand, in the personal conflict which constituted so large a part of the battle, losses would probably not differ greatly.
     Plotho (p. 36) calculates the Russian loss at only 3000 or 4000 killed and wounded. [Back to paragraph text]

[24]  Wilson, p. 80. [Back to paragraph text]

[25]  28 from the ridge, and 10 from in front of Barclay (vide supra, p, 91). [Back to paragraph text]

[26]  German miles of 4-1/2 English. Distance, therefore, was about 9 miles, English. [Back to paragraph text]

[27]  Bennigsen’s despatch, quoted by Wilson, p. 336. The translation is not very clear, nor well punctuated, but the meaning can be gathered. The proper translation would appear to be “the succour so much desired by me from General Buxhowden, although distant from me scarcely 2 miles, in the neighbourhood of Makow, did not arrive in time to afford me all the advantages of my victory; it had halted halfway.” [Back to paragraph text]

[28]  Vide supra, p. 94. [Back to paragraph text]

[29]  The chief authorities consulted for this battle are: (a) Hœpfner, iii. 122, etc.; (b) Dumas, vol. xvii., p. 180, etc.; (c) Davout, pp. 137-140; (d) Marbot, i. 246, 247; (e) Rapp, p. 128. etc.; (f) Augereau’s report in the Archives Historiques. [Back to paragraph text]

[30]  Orders from Berthier to Augereau, dated Lopaczin, 26th December. (Printed in Dumas, xvii. 487, 488.) In the same order he was warned that, should he hear heavy firing on his right, it would mean that Davout was seriously engaged and must be assisted by Augereau moving towards Strzegoczin. [Back to paragraph text]

[31]  He went round by Sonsk on the Sonna. By this route the distance to Ruskowo is about 10 miles. [Back to paragraph text]

[32]  This is the direct route. From Kaleczin to Garnowo, about 6 miles. He had to start from Sochoczin, and was somewhat delayed until the Emperor was satisfied that the force in front of Davout at Strzegoczin was retreating on Golymin. See three despatches from Berthier to Murat, dated Lopaczin, 26th December, printed by Dumas, xvii., pp. 488-491. [Back to paragraph text]

[33]  Hœpfner, iii. 123. [Back to paragraph text]

[34]  A hamlet 400 or 500 paces west of Golymin, not to be confounded with the place of the same name from which Augereau started. [Back to paragraph text]

[35]  Looking to the state of the roads, and the distance they had to march, this could hardly have been before 2 or 2.30 p.m., the time which Marbot (pp. 246, 247) gives. He was himself with Augereau’s cavalry. It was already getting dark, owing to the shortness of the day and the gloom of the sky. [Back to paragraph text]

[36]  Including Lasalles’ advance guard and Marulaz, there must have been between 6000 and 7000 cavalry at Garnowo. [Back to paragraph text]

[37]  Desjanlins’ division was the first on the field. On its left, on arrival at Ruskowo, it found many hostile troops. Augereau therefore sent orders to hurry up Heudelet, and left one of Desjardins’ brigades in Ruskowo, to protect the rear of the other moving on Golymin, till Heudelet’s arrival on the left.
     Heudelet, advancing between Wadkowo and Golymin, was attacked in flank by cavalry, but had time to form squares and repulse it. He was so constantly attacked by the cavalry that he had to keep his troops permanently in squares. (Augereau, Arch. Hist.) [Back to paragraph text]

[38]  Desjardins’ 2nd brigade, in its advance, was overwhelmed by grape when within 50 paces of the enemy. It was forced to retire 200 yards, and to form squares in front of Kaleczin (Augereau, Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[39]  Davout, p, 131. [Back to paragraph text]

[40]  Marbot, i. 248. He also mentions that the uniform of Murat’s white cuirassiers made them a prominent object for the direction of the Russian fire. Many of the villages, says Marbot, were on fire. Probably Ruskowo and Wadkowo were so. Augereau (Arch. Hist.) mentions, as burning, the village between Kuskowo and Golymin, i.e. Kaleczin. [Back to paragraph text]

[41]  Rapp, p. 128. [Back to paragraph text]

[42]  Wilson, p. 82. That authority asserts that Gallitzin was reinforced by part of Dochtorow’s and Tutchkow’s divisions towards evening. It does not appear probable that any of Tutchkow’s troops took part in the battle. Dumas (xvii. 176, 177) says Gallitzin had parts of his own and Sacker’s divisions and the whole of Dochtorow’s – in all, 28 battalions, 45 squadrons.
     On this question the authority of Hœpfner seems preferable, as to only part of Dochtorow’s being present. Napoleon (Corr. 11,305, dated 24th November, 1806), writing to Murat, recapitulates the strength of that portion of his wing of the army which was afterwards present at Golymin. Setting off losses (Davout and Augereau had both suffered considerably in the recent actions) against recruitments in December, it is probable the strength was slightly below what is given by the Emperor, viz.:–

I.  Cavalry Reserve–
           Dragoons–Beaumont (with Rapp) . . . .
                                               .   4,800
                    Klein (with Murat) . . . . .
           Milhaud’s light cavalry . . . . . . .     800

II.  Corps Cavalry–
                    Davout’s . . . . . . . . . .   1,200
                    Augereau’s . . . . . . . . .     800
                                                   7,600
III.  Infantry–
                    Davout (2/3 only)  . . . . .  14,600
                    Augereau   . . . . . . . . .  16,000

            Total cavalry and infantry . . . . .  38,200 [Back to paragraph text]

[43]  Augereau had sent Durosnel’s light cavalry towards Pamirs to cut off the enemy’s baggage. Coming on Sacken in force, retreating on Golymin, he turned in that direction, pressing the retreat. Reaching the field about nightfall, he endeavoured to effect a diversion by attacking the Russian right (Augereau’s report, Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[44]  Hœpfner, iii. 126. [Back to paragraph text]

[45]  Davout, 140. [Back to paragraph text]

[46]  Dumas, xvii. 126. It is difficult to believe that the losses on either side were not somewhat higher than 800. Plotho makes the Russian loss 553 killed and wounded, and 203 prisoners. [Back to paragraph text]

[47]  Davout, p. 139. [Back to paragraph text]

[48]  Hœpfner, iii. 126. [Back to paragraph text]

[49]  Dumas (xvii, 185), who says it was the 27th. Marbot (i. 247), who was with Augereau, says they got into Golymin on the night of the 26th, and found it littered with dead and dying. Augereau’s own account (Arch. Hist.) is not dear on the subject. [Back to paragraph text]

[50]  Vie de Napoleon, ii. 342. [Back to paragraph text]

[51]  His light cavalry reached Ciechanow on the 26th, just after the enemy had left it. That night the 1st and 2nd divisions were in front of Ciechanow, the 3rd at Paluki, some 5 miles farther on (Soult’s report, Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]