At the council of war, held by Buxhowden, at Nowogrod, on the 2nd January, a plan of operations had been decided on.

The 14th division, and the two divisions under Essen I., now approaching from Moldavia, were to be left between the Bug and the Narew to watch and occupy the French right wing. The remaining 7 divisions would assemble by the 5th January, between Biala and the right bank of the Narew, for an advance, behind the Johannisburg forest, into East Prussia against the French left wing.

But it did not at all suit Bennigsen's views to undertake these operations under the chief command of his senior, and rival, Buxhowden. Seizing, therefore, on the breaking, by floating ice, of the bridge at Nowogrod as a cover for his action, he marched, on the 6th, up the left bank of the Narew, by Lomza, to Tykoczin, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 14th divisions, arriving there on the 8th. Thence, crossing the Narew, he marched for Goniondz, where he received the Tsar’s orders conferring on him the Order of St. George, in recognition of his action at Pultusk, and, what he prized still more, the chief command of the army, from which Buxhowden was recalled. On the 12th January, he crossed the Bobra, now covered with thick ice by the frost, which had commenced on the 31st December. [1] On the 14th, he was at Biala, where Buxhowden surrendered the command to him and left the army.

At Goniondz was left Sedmaratzki’s division (6th), [2] to cover the movement of the main army, and to keep up its communications with Essen I. and the two Moldavian divisions.

Lestocq, meanwhile, had fallen back, after the action of Soldau, towards Gilgenburg, on the night of the 6th December. On the march he changed direction towards Neidenburg, with the result that there was considerable confusion, and it was not for several days that the Prussians were collected at the latter place. On the 7th January, Lestocq, after retreating from Neidenburg to Oertelsburg and Sensburg, reached Rastenburg. [3] On the 10th, he marched to Angerburg, north of the Lotzen lake. On the 11th he moved westward again to Drengfurth, failing in an attempt to recapture Schippenbeil from Ney, who had taken it the previous day. On the 16th, he was at Barthen. [4] On that date, Bennigsen had reached Arys, between the lakes of Spirding and Lotzen. He had marched from Biala, on the 15th, in four columns, the movement of which was completely concealed from Soult’s cavalry, on the Omulew, by the intervening forest of Johannisburg.

Napoleon’s marshals had faithfully carried out his wishes, with the sole exception of Ney. The keynote to the Emperor’s dispositions was the avoidance of all forward movements calculated to rouse the enemy to activity. He desired to leave the Russian bear to hibernate quietly, if he would do so, whilst he himself was busy making every preparation to awake him in the spring. Hibernation was, as has been seen, not the Russian scheme, but Ney did not know that. He had received a general indication of the Emperor’s plans on the 4th January, but his cantonments were not, in that order, precisely specified. [5]

The orders of the 4th January were surely clear enough in their spirit to indicate to Ney the undesirability of an offensive advance; yet, early in January, he began to move towards Koenigsberg. His motives, according to De Fezensac, [6] were the search for a country better supplied with provisions, and an advance against Koenigsberg itself. On the 2nd January, his light cavalry was marching on Guttstadt by Passenheim and Oertelsburg. On the 8th-11th, his headquarters were at Wartenburg; from the 12th to the 20th, they were at Allenstein, and he had his troops dispersed all over the country at Bischofsburg, Bischofstein, Seeburg, Wartenburg, Guttstadt, Queetz, Gottkendorf, Neidenburg, Bartenstein, Oertelsburg, Mensguth. He had even, as far forward as Schippenbeil, a battalion of grenadiers supporting his light cavalry still farther out. [7]

On the 9th, he proposed a strong reconnaissance to see if the enemy were still in Koenigsberg, but abandoned the idea in consequence of fresh news. On the 10th he took and occupied Schippenbeil, which Lestocq failed to recapture on the 11th. On the 14th, he estimated that he had in front of him Lestocq with 9000 men, and Ruchel, garrisoning Koenigsberg, with 4000. At the same time, he wrote that he had no positive news of Bernadotte and Soult, though he had incidentally heard of Sahuc’s and d’Hautpoult’s cavalry divisions passing Neidenburg. He adds that he is occupying a well-supplied country, and his men are living in abundance. [8] On the 15th, Bernadotte wrote warning Ney that he was exceeding his orders in advancing. [9] On the 16th January, Ney writes to Berthier [10] that he is negotiating with Lestocq and Ruchel for a delimitation of the hostile fronts, and an armistice requiring four days’ notice for termination.

It is hardly surprising that the Emperor, when he at last heard of Ney’s proceedings, was furious. He believed that Ney had long ago received the definite orders prescribing his cantonments. It was only on the 8th that the Emperor received information, and his despatches, for days after, show traces of his anger. [11] He was still ignorant, on the 26th, of Bennigsen’s march, with the bulk of his army, against the French left, though he saw that something was going on in that direction. [12] Despatches travelled slowly in the difficult country, and the wintry weather which now prevailed. A severe frost had set in about the 17th, after some broken weather. [13] The Emperor’s information was, therefore, several days behind time. Nevertheless, he had, from the 23rd, had suspicions, and he, at least, expected heavy reprisals for the irritation of Ney’s march on Koenigsberg. From the 25th, commences a series of orders calculated to meet any eventualities on the left. Only two days earlier, Lefebvre had been ordered to proceed with the new 10th Corps towards Danzig. He was now directed to hold fast at Thorn. [14] Espagne was to march on Thorn; [15] Augereau to pass the Vistula with his troops from the left bank, and concentrate at Plonsk; [16] Oudinot to leave Kalisch, and reach Lowicz by the 31st. [17]

Bernadotte was told [18] that, owing to Ney’s aggression, the enemy was moving to the right. He was to hold the line of the Passarge, and was even to go so far as to propose to the enemy to fix that river as a boundary, intimating to him that the Emperor had no intention of moving on Koenigsberg, and had recalled Ney. Should he attempt to force Elbing, the Emperor was prepared to break up his winter quarters, in order to prevent a passage of the Vistula by the enemy. Elbing was not to be seriously defended. If it was attacked determinedly, Bernadotte was to fall back so as to cover Thorn, raising the blockade of Graudenz if he felt it necessary, and drawing the troops before it partly to Thorn, and partly across the Vistula.

On the 26th, [19] again, Ney was told that Soult would now occupy Willemburg and Chorzel, with his point of concentration moved forward from Golymin to Prasznitz, whilst Ney’s own rallying-point was changed from Mlawa to Neidenburg. These orders, it was remarked, were issued on the assumption that the enemy proposed wintering in front of Ney; a remark which clearly shows that the Emperor had not yet grasped the full meaning and extent of the Russian movement.

On the 27th, he was convinced that Bennigsen aimed at nothing less than cutting off the extended French left, and, by a movement on the Lower Vistula, endeavouring to force the whole army to repass the ríver.

Such, indeed, was Bennigsen’s scheme – a well-conceived one, which had a good chance of success if well executed against a general of ordinary capacity. The objections to it were: first, the difficulties of execution in such country and such weather; and, secondly, the natural boldness of Napoleon, who could ill afford, after the checks at Pultusk and Golymin, to expose his prestige to another blow by yielding to the initiative of the enemy, and contenting himself with the line of the Vistula, even wíth its well-protected points of issue at Warsaw, Modlin, and Thorn. His great disinclination for a fresh campaign in this season is clearly shown by his despatch, of the 26th January, to Bernadotte, [20] which, at the same time, indicated that he was prepared, in the last resort, to undertake it.

Now that he saw it was inevitable, he prepared to make his blow a crushing one. His scheme was to pivot on his left at Thorn, and, wheeling forward his right and centre, to drive Bennigsen into the angle between the Lower Vistula and the Frisches-Haff, or against the latter. [21]

The movements which he had been ordering during the last few days were all calculated to facilitate such a plan.

Murat was to assemble d’Hautpoult’s, Klein’s, and Latour-Maubourg’s brigades at Raciaz, whilst the Emperor himself proceeded with his headquarters to Prasznitz and Willemburg. [22] Soult, raising his cantonments, to concentrate on Willemburg. [23] Ney to cover Soult’s left, and, with Augereau now marching on Mlawa, to unite him to Bernadotte. [24] Lefebvre was ordered to assemble his corps at Thorn for the protection of that all-important fortress. [25] Davout to keep his advanced posts in position, and, under cover of them, to concentrate towards Pultusk. [26] Bernadotte’s first object was to hold on at Osterode, and cover Thorn, till Lefebvre had assembled there, raising, if necessary, the siege of Graudenz. [27] Bessières, with the Guard, to pass the Narew on the 28th, and march on Pultusk on the 29th, leaving 15 guns for Oudinot at Warsaw. [28]

Lannes’ corps, and Becker’s dragoons, were left to cover the right of the army towards Ostrolenka, and in the peninsula between the Narew and the Bug. [29] As Lannes took up his position, Davout would move forward by Ostrolenka and Makow to Myszienec, where he would leave all his corps, except Gudin’s division, by the 31st. Becker’s dragoons would quietly replace the light cavalry, which, in turn, would, equally unobserved, replace Soult’s at Myszienec. Gudin’s division, for the present, not to go beyond Pultusk. [30]

By these movements, the Emperor expected to have his army, by the 31st, in the following positions:—

Lefebvre at Thorn, and down the left bank of the Vistula. Bernadotte on his right. Augereau and Ney uniting Bernadotte with Soult and Murat in the direction of Willemburg, with cavalry pushed towards Oertelsberg. Davout at Myszienec. Lannes’ corps and Becker’s dragoons towards Ostrolenka. The Guard and Gudin in second line, in the angle between Davout and Lannes.

Everything being thus in readiness for the French advance pivoting on Thorn, it is necessary to return to the movements of the Russians and Prussians during the latter half of January, which had induced the Emperor, much against his will, to resume active operations.

Lestocq, driven by Ney from Schippenbeil on the 10th January, failed in an attempt to retake it, and took post about Friedland. It was in this direction that a proposed armistice between the opposing forces had so aroused the anger of Napoleon against Ney.

Bennigsen, meanwhile, in furtherance of a promise to the King of Prussia that he would defend Koenigsberg, [31] had reached Arys on the 16th, and Rhein on the 18th, without his movement being discovered by Ney, or by Soult, across whose front he had marched behind the Johannisburg forest and the Spirding lake.

Ney, on the 19th, ignorant of the storm which was gathering on his right flank, and not yet having received Napoleon’s peremptory orders to withdraw, still had his cavalry at Schippenbeil. There it was encountered by Gallitzin, on the 9th, with 40 squadrons, the Russian advance guard, exploring the roads from Rhein towards Koenigsberg on the right, and Bischofstein on the left. [32] On this date Lestocq, standing fast, effected his union with the Russian right. Bennigsen marched with three advance guards under Markow, Barclay, and Bagavout. On the l0th his headquarters were at Roessel, midway between Rastenburg and Bischofstein, his cavalry driving in Ney’s with loss, and even surprising the cantonments of parts of the corps which had still not begun their march. Lestocq closed in towards the Güber, and, on the 21st, he and the Russians were abreast on the line from Schippenbeil to Bischofstein. At the latter place Colbert, with Ney’s light cavalry, retreating from Schippenbeil and Bartenstein, was attacked by the advance guard, and driven back with heavy loss on to Seeburg. Bennigsen’s advance guard penetrated, on the 21st, as far as Heilsberg. On the 22nd and 23rd, the Russian main body halted, whilst the advance guard moved on towards the Passarge. On the latter date, Ney had succeeded in making good his retreat, though not without loss, to Neidenburg, whence he extended his corps towards Soult on his right, and Bernadotte on his left.

Lestocq, on the 22nd, marched from Schippenbeil towards Bartenstein, pushing outposts towards Landsberg. On the 3rd, he marched on Landsberg, so as to keep clear of the Russian columns, and sent his advanced troops towards Mehlsack and Wonnditt. That morning Rouquette, on the Heiligenbeil-Braunsberg road, reported having been driven back by Bernadotte’s advance guard, which, for the moment, induced Lestocq to suppose the marshal was marching on Koenigsberg. However, when he reached Mehlsack on the 24th, he found that Bernadotte had abandoned Braunsberg, and fallen back on Preussisch Holland. On the 24th, the Russian headquarters were at Heilsberg. Markow’s advance guard surprised and, after a sharp fight in Liebstadt, captured about 300 French cavalry and infantry.

Bernadotte had scarcely reached the Frisches-Haff with his left wing when he received news from his chief of the staff, Maison, at Osterode, of the Russian offensive movement, and Ney’s retreat.[33]

Maison, without waiting for orders from his chief, with admirable promptitude warned Pacthod, who was at Mohrungen, with one infantry regiment, and directed the concentration of Rivaud’s division at Osterode, of Drouet’s at Saalfeld, and the retirement of the dragoon brigade from Hohenstein.[34] Bernadotte, on the left, ordered the assembly of Dupont’s division, Laplanche’s dragoons, and the light cavalry at Pr. Holland, and directed Rivaud to hold Osterode, blocking the defiles leading to it, whilst Drouet should advance, on the 25th, from Saalfeld to Mohrungen, in order to support Pacthod’s regiment there, and to give security to the march of Dupont from Pr. Holland to Osterode.

On the 25th, Bennigsen’s headquarters reached Arensdorf, his left column, passing the Alle at Guttstadt, reached the Passarge at Deppen, the advance guard going forward to Alt-Reichau on the road to Mohrungen. The right column marched through Arensdorf to Liebstadt.

Lestocq, who had turned towards Mehlsack when he thought Bernadotte was moving on Koenigsberg, had to make a very long march to reach, with his headquarters, Schlodien, on the 25th. His outposts were towards Mulhausen, Pr. Holland, and Mohrungen – 4 battalions still behind the Passarge. In this position he was joined by Rouquette, now released, by Bernadotte’s retreat, from guarding the road to Koenigsberg near the Frisches-Haff.
 
 

It was at Mohrungen, on the 25th, that there occurred the first serious action between the advancing Russians and the retreating French. Markow, with the advance guard of the right wing, had learnt from the prisoners taken at Liebstadt, that Bernadotte was on the march for Mohrungen. Pushing on, he arrived near Mohrungen about noon on the 25th. [35] There he found Bernadotte with 9 battalions and 11 squadrons made up partly from Pacthod’s regiment, partly from Dupont’s division arriving from Pr. Holland, and partly from Drouet’s from Saalfeld. [36] Seeing the Russian advance, Bernadotte sent to hurry up Dupont to his assistance, and prepared, with what troops he had, to attack Markow. That general took up a position on the heights in front of Georgenthal, north of Mohrungen. In first line he placed two regiments of infantry, in second line one regiment. Two battalions of another regiment, with the third in reserve, advanced towards the defile of Pfarrersfeldchen. In front of them, towards Mohrungen, was a regiment of hussars. To the right front of Georgenthal were 2 battalions of jägers, and in the village itself 3 more battalions – altogether 17 battalions and one regiment of hussars, besides cossacks. [37]

Scarcely had these dispositions been made when, about 1 p.m., Bernadotte’s cavalry attacked the hussars. The latter, at first victorious, were forced by the French artillery to retire, and take post to the left of Georgenthal. The French cavalry, in turn, were brought to a standstill by the Russian guns.

Bernadotte now sent urgent orders to Dupont to make for the Russian right flank, marching from Hagenau by Koenigsdorf and Wiese, whilst he himself attacked in front. He carried Pfarrersfeldchen with a rush, and advanced against the main Russian position. [38] Darkness was already falling on the field, when the two jäger battalions began to fall back before his attack. They were supported by their reserve, but Dupont’s flank attack, from Wiese on Georgenthal, new began to make itself felt. Notwithstanding the brave resistance of 6 battalions detached against Dupont, Markow felt himself outmatched, and compelled to retreat. At this moment Anrepp arrived on the field, announcing that he was hurrying up the cavalry of the Russian right wing. He was mortally wounded as he moved to the front. Following up the retreating Russians, the French lost heavily. Dupont had now succeeded in defeating the two regiments opposed to him, and was nearing Georgenthal. In this moment of victory, Bernadotte heard firing behind him at Mohrungen, but was unable to judge of the strength of the force which had, apparently, taken him in rear. Abandoning, therefore, the pursuit, he marched his men back on Mohrungen. [39]

The cause of the noise was an inroad of Russian cavalry upon the baggage in Mohrungen. Gallitzin, with the cavalry of the left wing, had reached Alt-Reichau, and sent forward 3 squadrons, under Dolgoruki, supported by 6 more under Pahlen, to reconnoitre through the defile between the Narien and Mahrung lakes. [40] This force, reaching the western side of the lakes at nightfall, moved on Mohrungen, which they found almost denuded of troops, but full of baggage, and supply columns. The place was promptly attacked, its defenders captured, and the baggage plundered. Beyond it, the cavalry met Bernadotte, retracing his steps with his troops, and was compelled to retreat, carrying with them some 360 French prisoners, 200 released Russian and Prussian prisoners, and a quantity of plunder. [41] They lost, however, part of their force, which had been surrounded when it rashly advanced too far towards Pfarrersfeldchen.

The action in front of Mohrungen might have involved Bernadotte in a serious disaster, had Markow promptly sent for assistance, from Gallitzin on his left, and from Anrepp on his right. The Prussians were, perhaps, too far off to be able to render much assistance; yet they had, at Hagenau, to some extent hindered Dupont’s junction with Bernadotte. Bernadotte should have taken measures to guard the defile between the lakes on his right rear. [42] Probably he felt that he had not sufficient troops available to be able to spare any for this purpose. [43] Had he been able to do so, his right flank and rear, to a distance of some miles, would have been admirably protected. Till Dupont’s arrival, he was in a considerable inferiority in numbers, and by that time the mischief was done. The loss in this action was heavy, probably about 2000 on either side. [44]

Lestocq on this day (25th) reached Hagenau as day closed, after an engagement with part of Dupont’s division on its retreat from Pr. Holland. [45] Proposing to free Elbing from the enemy, the Prussians started on the 26th for Pr. Holland, but were ordered by Bennigsen to advance on Liebstadt. When they had got halfway there, a fresh order directed them on Hagenau again, to be prepared to support an attack on Mohrungen next morning. After some twenty miles of marching and counter-marching, they were much where they had been in the morning.

Bernadotte, on the 26th, fell back on Liebemühl, avoiding the direct road to Osterode, which was rendered dangerous by its proximity to Gallitzin’s force at Alt-Reichau. [46]

Bennigsen occupied Mohrungen with part of his main army on the 26th, the rest coming up on the morning of the 27th. His right advance guard moved on Liebemühl, the left on Allenstein, the former place having been evacuated by Bernadotte who had continued his march on Löbau, where he was joined by d’Hautpoult’s cuirassiers on the 29th, from the neighbourhood of Gollub. He thus commanded 17,000 infantry, and 5000 or 6000 cavalry, on the 30th. On the 28th, Bennigsen found himself at Mohrungen with his troops wearied by 10 days of marching. He decided to rest and replenish his stores.

Lestocq he again sent off farther to the right. On the 29th, that general reached Rosenberg, with outposts towards Freystadt, Bischofswerder, and Deutsch Eylau. Rouquette’s detachment had marched on Marienwerder. The Prussian advance had resulted in the raising of the blockade of Graudenz by the Hessians. Bennigsen’s right advance guard extended to Saalfeld, his left to Guttstadt. On the 30th, he sent Bagration to Deutsch Eylau to strengthen his link with the Prussians, whilst he proposed to march himself towards Allenstein. On the 31st, Lestocq was at Freystadt, with outposts at Lessen, Schönau, and Schwarzenau, and 100 cavalry between him and Graudenz, which was being rapidly provisioned. Bagration, with the right advance guard of the Russian army, was at Deutsch Eylau with detachments on the Drewenz. The left advance guard, and the 2nd division, were in and behind Allenstein, with a detachment, under Barclay, at Osterode. The 5th, 7th, and 8th divisions under Tutchkow were at Samrodt, between Mohrungen and Pr. Holland; the 13th and 14th divisions, commanded by Sacken, with headquarters at Gotteswalde, were on the march south of Osterode; reserve, 4th division under Somow, at Guttstadt; Bennigsen himself was in Mohrungen; cavalry of the left wing was as far forward as Hohenstein and Passenheim.

On the same date, the French positions were:— Lefebvre on the extreme left, at and about Thorn, and down the left bank of the Vistula; Bernadotte at Strasburg; Ney at Gilgenburg; Augereau at Neidenburg and Janow; Guard (Bessières) at Chorzel; Davout, with two divisions, at Myszienec, and Gudin’s at Prasznitz; cavalry reserve (Murat) and Soult, about Oertelsburg and Willemburg; Savary, with the corps of Lannes (who was ill at Warsaw), at Brok on the Bug.

Bennigsen was under the impression that he had succeeded in his enterprise, almost without a blow, and that Napoleon was about to recross the Vistula between Thorn and Warsaw. On the 1st February, the scales fell from his eyes, and he saw, not only the full disposition of the French army, but also the whole of Napoleon’s great scheme for his destruction.

Whatever might have been the effect of Bennigsen’s move in inducing a general of ordinary capacity to abandon the country beyond the Vistula, Napoleon was the last person to follow such a course. Bennigsen had not yet appreciated his boldness, and he was, therefore, surprised when the Emperor himself conveyed to him, unintentionally, a full statement of his scheme. Bennigsen’s flank march against the French left is a good example of the futility of a good design if not supported by equally good execution. His first fault was his waste of time, and force, in marching up the Narew, and not joining Buxhowden directly. His second was the direction of his march from Rhein towards the head of Ney’s column, instead of towards its rear. Had he turned boldly to the south-west, he must, almost infallibly, have separated Ney from Soult, and destroyed the greater part of the former’s corps. He would also have anticipated Bernadotte at Mohrungen and Osterode, and separated Dupont’s and Drouet’s divisions from Rivaud’s, forcing them, probably, to cross the Vistula.

With Ney’s corps, and two-thirds of that of Bernadotte, cut off, Napoleon’s position beyond the Upper Vistula would have been one of extreme peril. It is difficult to see how he could have maintained himself on the right bank.

Bennigsen lost two days by halting on the 22nd and 23rd – the fatigue of his troops probably rendered this inevitable. His halt at Mohrungen was, nevertheless, fortunate for him, for it was then too late to cut off Ney or Bernadotte, and a further advance would have plunged him more deeply into the trap which Napoleon had now prepared for him.

Napoleon, too, had underestimated his adversary’s capacity for designing a bold move. [47] It was not till the 27th January that he was convinced that the movement against his left was anything more than a reply to Ney’s aggression. As a matter of fact, Ney had no part in influencing the Russian scheme, for it was decided on before the marshal began to move northwards.

The Emperor, convinced at last that he must, unwilling though he was, enter on a fresh campaign, lost no time in pressing it to what he hoped might be a final decision.

On the 30th January, Berthier sent orders to Bernadotte to concentrate wherever he might be, but to be careful to cover Thorn, until he was certain Lefebvre was there. Once there, the latter would be able to hold it, if necessary, for a week, which was more than would be required of him. [48] The place was of infinite importance, as the hinge on which the whole French movement was to turn. [49]

Napoleon had left Warsaw on the night of the 29th January. On the evening of the 30th, he was at Prasznitz, on the 31st, at Willemburg. The marshals had been warned that the advance would commence on the 1st February.

From Willemburg a despatch was sent to Bernadotte by Berthier. It ordered the 1st Corps to join the left of the army under the immediate command of the Emperor. The march was to be concealed from the enemy by being made at night; a light cavalry regiment was to be left behind to keep up the bivouac fires all night, and then, in the morning, to retire slowly on Thorn, turning back any French convoys it might meet, and warning Lefebvre that he was now dependent on his own resources. If possible, Bernadotte was to reach Gilgenburg, though, if he found serious difficulty, he might continue to cover Thorn. The despatch gave details of the positions of the other corps, and contained the significant words, “It is unnecessary for me to tell you that the Emperor, desiring to cut off the enemy, would prefer your joining his left; but he must trust, in this, to your zeal and your knowledge of the actual circumstances in which you are.” [50]

Here was Napoleon’s whole plan of campaign, stated with the lucidity which characterised his despatches. This all-important paper was given by Berthier to the first officer who came to hand. A young officer, fresh from one of the military schools, was on his way to join his regiment in Bernadotte’s corps. He might as well be utilised to carry the despatch. Naturally, he knew nothing of the country he had to cross, nothing of the enemy’s positions, and he probably was only able to get a very sorry mount.[51] This unfortunate young man fell in with a party of cossacks sent forward by Bagration towards Strasburg. He was captured before he could destroy the papers, and the inestimable prize reached Bennigsen, after being read by Bagration, on the 1st of February. Only one copy having been sent, Bernadotte received no orders, and, therefore, stayed where he was.

For Bennigsen, obviously, an early retreat was the only possible course. He “had fallen headlong into the trap; his attention was fixed on Bernadotte, whom he was pursuing. He was rushing blindly on his destruction,” [52] when his eyes were suddenly opened by the captured despatch, whilst there was still time to avoid the noose. [53] Yet he was unwilling to seek safety in rapid retreat; moreover, he had, if possible, to gain some time for Lestocq and Bagration to join him. The former knew nothing of the French movement. The latter had read the despatch to Bernadotte before forwarding it, and acted on the information. On the 1st February, the advance of the French right wing commenced by the movement of Murat with the light cavalry, and of Soult’s corps on Passenheim, from which Dolgoruki was driven back on Allenstein. Soult’s light cavalry was sent to Mensguth to safeguard the right.

Ney reached Hohenstein the same day. Davout, from Myszienec, sent Marulaz with his light cavalry, 2 infantry regiments, and 2 guns, to reconnoitre towards Johannisburg. Gudin’s division was at Chorzel. Lefebvre was ordered to pursue the Prussians, as they retired between Marienwerder and Osterode, and to reinvest Graudenz. [54]

On this day, Bennigsen ordered his army to concentrate on Jonkowo. The reserve, from Guttstadt, and Sacken, from Seeburg, were called up. Barclay was to wait at Allenstein for Dolgoruki, retiring from Passenheim. Bagration had, of his own accord,[55] started for Liebemühl and Allenstein, leaving his Cossacks to attack Bernadotte’s outposts, and induce him to believe in an advance against himself. On the 2nd February, Murat and Soult occupied Allenstein, which was evacuated by Barclay’s advance guard. It retired to Gottkendorf, whilst Bennigsen assembled the greater part of his army behind the heights of Jonkowo. There he took post, his right resting on a marshy wooded valley, his left on the Alle at Mondtken, his front covered by a small brook – now, of course, frozen over.

Ney nearly reached Allenstein, Augereau was half a day’s march from it, Davout was moving on Oertelsburg, after leaving a strong rear-guard [56] at Myszienec to keep up the communication with Savary. The Guard reached Passenheim. On the 3rd February, Ney and Augereau, arriving at Allenstein, drove the Russian outposts on their main body. Napoleon, hearing of the Russian position at Jonkowo [57] ordered the Guard to Allenstein, and himself reached Gottkendorf about mid-day. [58]

Under cover of Ney’s horse artillery, he threatened Bennigsen’s front with Ney’s and Augereau’s corps and St. Hilaire’s division of Soult’s. Soult himself, with his two other divisions, went down the right bank of the Alle to seek a crossing at Bergfried, which would bring him out on the left rear of the Russian army. Davout, who had been attacked as he was on his way from Oertelsburg to Wartenburg, received orders to turn towards Spiegelberg and join Soult’s right. Guyot’s light cavalry, of Soult’s corps, was directed on Guttstadt; Gudin’s division, on the march from Prasznitz, was ordered to Oertelsburg by Mensguth.
 
 

For the protection of the bridge over the Alle at Bergfried, Bennigsen had posted the 14th division (Kamenskoi) and 3 Prussian batteries. Four battalions undertook the defence of the defile, whilst the rest remained in reserve. One battalion held the village of Bergfried, on the right bank. [59] The Prussian guns, on the heights of the left bank, commanded the approaches to the bridge and flanked the village, but the left bank above and below Bergfried, and the heights behind, do not appear to have been occupied by Russian infantry, so that the defence was confined to the defile itself.

It was 3 p.m. [60] when the head of Leval’s division appeared before Bergfried. Two batteries were brought into action against the Prussian guns, a third enfiladed the defile from the heights to the left of Bergfried. The 24th Light Infantry was directed to the attack of the village and bridge, whilst Vivier, with the 4th of the Line and a battalion of the 28th, attempted to cross the Alle below Bergfried. [61]

The frontal attack on Bergfried was repulsed by the artillery and infantry fire of the defenders. A second, enveloping attack was more successful, but a heavy fire of case prevented the French from promptly following up the Russian infantry, as it crossed the bridge in retreat.

Pressing the attack with great vigour, Leval’s infantry broke over the bridge, forcing the guns to retire. Presently rallying, the Russian infantry charged again with the bayonet. Carrying the enemy before them, they retook the hotly contested bridge, in a desperate hand-to-hand fight on it and the causeway. One Russian company, in the heat of the moment following across the bridge, was almost destroyed, and forced to retire.

Vivier, during this period, had not made much progress, though some French accounts pretend that he succeeded in taking the heights on the left bank, thus leaving the passage open to Leval, and inflicting heavy loss on the enemy. The Russians, on the other hand, say a fresh attack on the bridge was repulsed. Soult himself says that, though he drove the enemy across the bridge, and Vivier’s flank attack compelled him to retire, yet the division of Leval bivouacked that night on the heights above Bergfried, on the right bank, keeping only outposts on the left bank. Legrand was at Spiegelberg and Braunswalde, one brigade at each place. St. Hilaire, who in the morning had had a successful brush with the enemy, was at Kaltflies.

Soult’s account vouches for the finding of 800 dead Russians on the field, and puts his own loss at 300. The losses were probably more equal. [62]

Bergfried was certainly not the decided success that Napoleon represented it to be. Even accepting the account most favourable to the French, they had done no more than get across the river, and could not risk occupying the farther bank in force at night. The attack, commencing only an hour and a half before sunset, was too late to enable Soult to take part, on that day, in the fight at Jonkowo. As, however, he had reached a position threatening Bennigsen’s left rear, the position at Jonkowo was no longer tenable.

In front of Bennigsen, Napoleon confined his operations to a delaying action, awaiting the expected turning movement of Soult and Davout. Nothing beyond a desultory exchange of artillery fire occurred in this part of the field.

The Emperor still hoped that Bennigsen would remain to fight next day, in which case, with Davout and Soult descending on his rear, he must almost certainly have been destroyed.

At daybreak on the 4th, the Emperor moved forward, Murat in front of the centre, Ney on the right of Jonkowo, Augereau on the left, Soult, from Bergfried, towards Mondtken. It soon appeared that Bennigsen, aware not only of Soult’s presence at Bergfried, but also of the capture of Guttstadt by Guyot on the previous evening, had retreated during the night, leaving only a strong rear-guard to waste Napoleon’s time by inducing him to deploy for battle. The course which he followed, in retreating northwards, was Bennigsen’s only chance of assuring his communications with Koenigsberg, which were seriously compromised by the loss of Bergfried, and by Davout’s advance on Guttstadt.

The Russians marched in three columns, under Sacken, Gallitzin, and Tutchkow, on Wolfsdorf and Arensdorf.

The rear-guard followed, also in three columns, under the general command of Bagration; Bagavout on the right, Markow in the centre, Barclay de Tolly on the left. They were followed and harassed all day by Ney, Murat, and Soult.

A sharp cavalry fight occurred between Ney and Bagavout at Waltersmühl. Bagavout, reinforced by Bagration, and touching Markow’s column, kept up a running fight till nightfall put an end to it. Murat pushed on to Deppen, whence he drove the enemy after a cavalry combat. Soult, closely following the Russian left column, and frequently attacking it, reached at nightfall, Heiligenthal, Ankendorf, and Alt Garschen. Davout, with Friant’s division and his light cavalry (Marulaz’s), reached Rosengarten in rear of Soult; Morand’s division at Wartenburg, Gudin’s, towards Oertelsberg. [63] Augereau bivouacked at Pupkaim, behind Murat.

Bennigsen, still anxious for the junction of Lestocq, who, with the longer distance he had to traverse, had only reached Liebstadt [64] on the evening of the 4th, once more took up a position, as if for battle on the morrow, at Wolfsdorf, on the road from Liebstadt to Guttstadt. The news of the French occupation of Guttstadt, and his consequent anxiety for his communications, decided him once more to make a night march, leaving Lestocq to his fate. Early on the morning of the 5th he marched through Arensdorf on Frauendorf, halting 1-1/2 miles short of it, at Burgerswalde.

Napoleon, convinced that Bennigsen was making for Landsberg, continued to manœuvre by his right with the corps of Soult and Davout, whilst Ney and Murat delayed the Russian rear-guard. The two wings were connected by the Guard and Augereau’s corps, under the Emperor’s immediate command. Davout was ordered to march direct on Guttstadt; Soult to pursue between Guttstadt and Liebstadt, towards Arensdorf, but in touch with Davout’s left; Murat to reconnoitre towards Liebstadt and Wolfsdorf, attacking the enemy with his main body should he find him in position. Ney would push the enemy towards Wolfsdorf and Arensdorf.

Ney had scarcely started, when it was reported that there was a strong hostile force on his left, south of Liebstadt, seeking to cross the Passarge. The Emperor at once ordered him, with his two divisions and Lasalle’s light cavalry, to the left bank of the Passarge, towards Liebstadt.  At 11 a.m. he was attacked by Lestocq’s advanced troops, [65] and driven back into the Waltersdorf defile. A wood, in which was the French advance guard, was stormed and taken. Ney, arriving with his whole force in three columns, attacked the wood, and drove the Prussians from it with heavy loss. Continuing the pursuit till dusk,  he forced the enemy [66] to retreat between the lakes of Mohrungen.

Ney had only defeated an advance guard which was trying to cross towards Bennigsen’s supposed position. Lestocq, with the main body, succeeded in reaching Wusen, on the right bank of the Passarge. Ney arrived at Liebstadt, thus cutting off the advance guard which he had driven on Mohrungen.[67]

Whilst these events were occurring on the French left, Bennigesn, detaching a force [68] to hold Heilsberg and protect his left flank, continued his retreat on Landsberg, his rear-guard constantly stopping to fight. He took position for the night at Frauendorf, his rear-guard strongly posted at the entrance to the woods 1-1/2 miles short of it.

Soult, reaching Freymarkt, through Wolfsdorf and Arensdorf, had an advance guard of 2 battalions, and his light cavalry, a mile or two farther on. Murat, after aiding in Ney’s fight, also reached Freymarkt.

Davout sent Marulaz, with a handful of cavalry, to Heilsberg, which he occupied without oppositon, but was presently driven out and back on Reichenberg. Morand’s division and Gudin’s reached Guttstadt; Friant’s with Davout himself, arrived at Benern and Freymarkt, where it joined Soult. On its march, news reached it of Bennigsen’s detachment moving to Heilsberg.

Continuing his retreat during the night of the 5th-6th February, Bennigsen reached Landsberg.

On the morning of the 6th, Napoleon detached Davout with Morand’s division against Heilsberg; Friant’s following on Launau. Just as Davout had succeeded in ejecting the enemy from Heilsberg, Friant appeared from Launau and took up the pursuit, with Marulaz, towards Eylau, inflicting some injury on the enemy on the road. Gudin only reached Heilsberg after it was captured. On Davout’s left, Durosnel’s light cavalry brigade maintained his communication with the corps moving on Landsberg. The latter marched in a single column, Murat in advance, followed by Soult and Augereau, through Frauendorf.
 
 

Bennigsen, himself going on to Landsberg, had left his rear-guard between Glandau and Hof. Barclay de Tolly there commanded 4 infantry regiments, 3 of cavalry, 2 of cossacks, and a horse artillery battery. In his front he stationed 1 battalion of jägers, with 2 squadrons of hussars, and 2 guns. About 3 p.m. the head of the French column appeared, led by Murat. The Russian advanced force, now reinforced by 2 more squadrons, was quickly driven in. Barclay, finding that he would have to sacrifice himself for the benefit of the army, drew up his little force in front of Hof, behind a marshy stream. Immediately behind the bridge, he placed a hussar regiment, supported in rear by 2 regiments of infantry, and another of hussars. On the wooded heights to his right, he posted a jäger regiment with some hussars; on his left, another jäger regiment, also in a wood.

The French skirmishers, advancing about 3 p.m., [69] against the Russian left, were driven back when their opponents had been strengthened by one of the jäger regiments from the centre. Murat next, leading the dragoons he had with him and followed by d’Hautpoult’s cuirassiers, hurried across the bridge. Their formation constricted by the narrow defile, the dragoons were overwhelmed, before they could reform beyond it, by the onslaught of the Russian hussars and cossacks, and were carried back in confusion across the bridge. The reserve Russian regiment, following over the bridge without orders, was in turn overthrown beyond it, and pushed back across it by the French. The flight of this regiment broke the other also, and both were bhotly pursued until their horse artillery brought the French cavalry to a halt, and compelled them to retire.[70] Again reinforced, Murat once more advanced, but was checked by an infantry regiment in squares. This afforded time for the rally of the Russian hussars who yet again drove off the dragoons. At last, the cuirassiers, led by d’Hautpoult, came to their rescue, and by sheer weight bore down the Russian dragoons, driving them in wild confusion on the infantry squares, killing, wounding, and capturing many of the Russian horsemen. Two standards and 4 guns also fell into the hands of the victors.[71]

Barclay hastened through Hof to take a fresh position on the other side. On his right the jäger battalion on the wooded height had been surrounded, and was compelled to force its way with the bayonet to another wood in rear.

In Hof, Barclay found 5 fresh battalions, which Bennigsen had sent with Dolgoruki to his assistance. Leaving him there, Barclay went to his left wing, where the French, strongly attacking the wood, were endeavouring to cut off from Landsberg the battalion stationed in it.

At the same time Dolgoruki was attacked in the centre. Reinforced by Gallitzin [72] with two cuirassier regiments, he succeeded in holding his ground till nightfall, when the whole rear-guard fell back over the little brook which crosses the road between Hof and Landsberg. On either side of this, the contending armies faced one another, during the night, in close contact.

The Russian loss in this engagement was 5 guns, 2 standards, and more than 2000 men. [73] That of the French was rather higher.

On this day, Ney was still opposed to Lestocq, who marched on Engelswalde, near the Mehlasck-Zinten road, with his rear-guard at Körpen and Bornitt, towards the Passarge. He was not molested on the 6th by New, who, fro Liebstadt, reached Wormditt, where he received an order from Napoleon to march on Landsberg, and form the left of the army in the battle which the obstinate resistance at Hof had led the Emperor to believe would be fought next day at Landsberg. Davout was, at first, ordered to march on Landsberg on the 7th for the expected battle, but was later diverted towards Eylau.[74] Napoleon still believed that Bernadotte was following, and would account for, the Prussians. As a matter of fact, Bernadotte, owning to the capture of the despatch of the 31st January, had only received orders on the 3rd February, and was still two marches behind, at Mohrungen. [75]

But Bennigsen had no intention of fighting at Landsberg. During the night he marched for Pr. Eylau. The rear-guard, under Bagration, did not leave Landsberg till 8 a.m., when, after an hour’s fighting, it was driven out by Murat and Soult. Bennigsen, marching, during the latter part of the night, in a single column on the Landsberg-Eylau road, was compelled to clear it by sending his heavy artillery round to the left to rejoin him at Eylau.

Napoleon promptly followed with Murat, Soult, and Augereau, countermanding the orders to Davout and Ney to join his right and left flanks at Landsberg. Ney was ordered to march from Landsberg on Kreuzburg. [76]

[1]  This date is taken from Larrey, iii. 22. [Back to paragraph text]

[2]  Instead of the 14th, which had originally been ordered to stay behind, and was now carried forward. [Back to paragraph text]

[3]  Ffor this account of Lestocq’s movements, see Prussian official account in Wilson, pp. 253-254. [Back to paragraph text]

[4]  Not Bartenstein. [Back to paragraph text]

[5]  On the 4th January, Berthier had written to Ney: “The Emperor, not wishing to make any offensive movements with his armies during the winter, desires you to take such cantonments as will protect Marshal Soult’s left and Marshal Bernadotte’s right.” The distinct specification of Soldau, etc., was on the 7th. [Back to paragraph text]

[6]  Souvenirs Militaires, p. 134. [Back to paragraph text]

[7]  “Journaux de Marche,” 6th Corps, Arch. Hist. [Back to paragraph text]

[8]  Ney to Berthier, 14th January, Arch. Hist. [Back to paragraph text]

[9]  Copy enclosed in a despatch from Bernadotte to Berthier, on 15th January, Arch. Hist. [Back to paragraph text]

[10]  Arch. Hist., daily correspondence, 16th January. [Back to paragraph text]

[11]  On the 18th, Berthier writes to Ney: “I have submitted to the Emperor your letter, and one from Marshal Bernadotte informing him of the movements you have made without his orders. He desires me to convey to you his displeasure. . . . His intentions are not to go to Koenigsberg; had he so proposed he would have issued orders. The Emperor, in his general projects, requires neither advice nor plans of campaign; no one else knows his designs, and it is our duty to obey. His Majesty is all the more surprised at the movements you have made, inasmuch as he had already explained to you the circumstances under which you were not to act without orders. . . . The Emperor knew the Prussians were retreating; that was no reason for you to spread your corps over 20 leagues. He orders you to take up the prescribed cantonments: do so gradually, for this is the first retrograde step the Emperor makes. The adjutant-commandant Jomini will explain to you how much the Emperor is annoyed at the movements you have made without orders.”
     Again he wrote, next day: “The Emperor has been extremely astonished to see by a despatch received from Marshal Soult, as well as from your own, that, not only have you disobeyed his Majesty’s orders relative to your winter quarters, but that you have even counselled Marshal Souls to do the same. I reiterate the order to return to the positions indicated to you for winter quarters; the Emperor is unchangeable in his plans, and, but for political considerations, would have made mention in the orders of the day of the non-execution of his orders by your corps.”
     On the 19th, Berthier, writing to Sou1t, says: “His Majesty hopes that this is the last occasion on which Marshal Ney, by his flighty dispositions, will expose himself to the danger of compromising the fate of the army by such grave faults.”
     De Fezensac (p. 136) had been sent to carry a despatch from Ney, and he returned with Jomini and the reply. From Jomini he heard that the Emperor was specially enraged by the armistice which Ney was negotiating with the Prussians, and had remarked that other generals had been tried by court martial for less grave offences. Yet Ney’s conduct was not quite so bad as the Emperor pictured it. In the Archives Historiques there is a despatch from Ney to Berthier, dated 18th January, in which the writer says: “I received yesterday (17th) the duplicate copy of the dispositions ordered on the 7th for the definite quarters of all the corps, and have given orders for my troops to return in succession to the neighbourhood of Chorzel, Soldau, and Mlawa.” How Berthier’s despatch took 10 days to reach Ney is not explained. Still, with Berthier’s letter of the 4th before him (supra, p. 129, note), Ney clearly did not act in the spirit of his instructions. Even now, he protested against the country he was ordered to occupy as being void of supplies, and a “veritably cemetery” (Arch. Hist., daily correspondence). [Back to paragraph text]

[12]  On the 26th, Berthier wrote to Soult: “The ill-considered point made by Marshal Ney appears to have determined the enemy to make a movement to his right.” [Back to paragraph text]

[13]  See De Fezensac’s account of his journey with Ney’s despatch (Souvenirs Militaires, p. 136). [Back to paragraph text]

[14]  Berthier to Lefebvre, dated 25th January (printed in Dumas, xviii. 3381. [Back to paragraph text]

[15]  Berthier to Espagne, 25th January (Dumas, xviii. 341). [Back to paragraph text]

[16]  Berthier to Augereau, 25th January (Dumas, xviii. 339). [Back to paragraph text]

[17]  Berthier to Oudinot, 25th January (Dumas, xviii, 341). [Back to paragraph text]

[18]  Berthier to Bernadotte, 26th January (Dumas, xviii. 341). [Back to paragraph text]

[19]  Berthier to Ney and Soult, both dated 26th January (Dumas, xviii. 343, 344). [Back to paragraph text]

[20]  Vide supra, p. 134, note (1). [Back to paragraph text]

[21]  What Napoleon’s intentions were is clearly indicated in Berthier’s despatch of the 28th January to Bernadotte. “Te intention of the Emperor is to pierce the enemy’s centre, and to drive to his right and left such of the enemy’s troops as may not have retired in time; but, holding fast to his system, which is to cover Thorn, that should be the object of  your movements. You would then rejoin the left of the army, regaining, even by the rear if necessary, your communications with Marshal Ney . . . the more deeply the enemy is involved the better" (printed in Dumas, xviii. 366). We may well believe that the Emperor’s secret hopes went further than this. If Bennigsen, unaware of his impending fate, should push on south-westwards in pursuit of Bernadotte, it might well happen that he would become so deeply involved as to find himself in front of Thorn with the Lower Vistula barring his way westwards, watched as it was by part of Lefebvre’s corps spread down the left bank. In his front he would find Lefebvre entrenched in Thorn. Wheeling to their left, and driving Bennigsen on to the river, would be the corps of Bernadotte, Ney, Soult, Augereau, Murat, and the Guard. In that case destruction, or at the best a precarious retreat on Danzig, would stare him in the face.
     A letter from the Emperor to Lefebvre (Corr. 11,711, dated 28th January), warns him that the enemy, finding his left turned by Napoleon’s wheel, might march on Thorn, or across the Vistula.
     Lanfrey (Hist. de Napoleon, iv. 45-46) thinks Napoleon only hoped to cut off 15,000 or 20,000 Russians. It is true that, in his proclamation of the 30th January (Corr. 11,739), he talks of driving the enemy across the Niemen, and that in writing to Clarke at Berlin (Corr., dated 27th January, 1807) he warns him to be on the look-out for 15,000 or 20,000 of the enemy, who might be driven across the Vistula. That, however, by no means implies that this was the limit of the Emperor’s hopes, or that he did not expect to cut off a great many more east of the Vistula, before they could reach it. See also the concluding words of note 24 below. [Back to paragraph text]

[22]  Berthier to Murat (2 despatches), dated 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 348, 349). [Back to paragraph text]

[23]  Berthier to Soult, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 352). [Back to paragraph text]

[24]  Berthier to Ney, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 352). Whether Bernadotte should be able to maintain himself at Osterode, or whether he should be compelled to retreat on Thorn, Ney and Augereau were to maintain the line between his right and Soult’s left. If, however, there should appear to be danger of Bernadotte’s being anticipated at Thorn by the enemy, Ney was to cover that place. “The Emperor does not wish to re-occupy his winter quarters before he has destroyed the enemy.” [Back to paragraph text]

[25]  Berthier to Lefebvre, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 350). Lefebvre was to collect (a) his French brigade; (b) 12 guns now on their way from Warsaw; (c) Espagne’s cavalry; (d) if the siege of Graudenz had been raised, the Hessian division; he was to keep his Poles on the left bank, watching it as far down as possible. His objects were defined to be (a) the defence of Thorn, and the restoration of the bridge, damaged by floating ice: (b) the watching of the left bank of the Lower Vistula as far as possible; (c) the protection of Bromberg; (d) the formation of a reserve to the left of the army, and, possibly, an advance on Danzig. [Back to paragraph text]

[26]  Berthier to Davout, 7th January (Dumas, xviii. 353). [Back to paragraph text]

[27]  Berthier to Bernadotte, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 354). [Back to paragraph text]

[28]  Berthier to Bessières, 27th January (Dumas, xviii. 355). [Back to paragraph text]

[29]  Berthier to Lannes, 28th January (Dumas, xviii. 359). [Back to paragraph text]

[30]  Berthier to Davout, 28th January (Dumas, xviii. 361). [Back to paragraph text]

[31]  Wilson, p. 242. [Back to paragraph text]

[32]  Hœpfner (iii., 172) gives, on the authority of the original reports, the allied strength thus:—
             7 Russian divisions under Bennigsen:            66,000
             Sedmaratzki’s 6th division at Goniondz:         8,000
             Corps of Essen I. at Bransk:                        18,000
             Lewstocq’s Prussians about Friedland:        13,000
                                                                   Total:  105,000
     Deducting (ibid., p. 177, note) about 3000 men connecting Benningsen with Sedmaratzki, he puts the force advancing from Rhein against Ney at 76,000 Russians and Prussians. [Back to paragraph text]

[33]  Maison received the news from Ney (operations of 1st Corps, Arch. Hist.). Ney has been accused of not sending warning of the Russian advance to Bernadotte. This passage clears him. [Back to paragraph text]

[34]  Bernadotte’s orders had prescribed the following cantonments for his corps:—
     Dupont’s Division:  Pr. Holland, Elbing, Frauenberg, Braunsberg.
     Rivaud’s Division:  Osterode, Mohrungen, Deutsch Eylau.
     Drouet’s Division:  Saalfeld, Christburg, Riesmuhl with detachments at Marienburg and Marienwerder.
     Light Cavalry:  To occupy the whole length of the Passarge.
     4th Division of Dragoons:  One brigade at Hohenstein, communicating with Ney; the other in reserve between Pr. Holland and Elbing (Bernadotte’s report, Arch. Hist.) [Back to paragraph text]

[35]  Bernadotte (Arch. Hist.) thinks that Ney had abandoned Alleistein with too much precipitation, thus leaving Bernadotte exposed on his right flank. After the series of rebukes and peremptory orders he had received, it seems scarcely fair to blame Ney for following to the letter his orders from headquarters. [Back to paragraph text]

[36]  Bernadotte reached the field, just as Markow appeared, with one battalion 9th Infantry, the 27th and 94th Regiments, and Laplanche’s dragoon brigade (Bernadotte, Arch. Hist.). The same authority puts the enemy’s strength at 20,000, which was considerably too high. [Back to paragraph text]

[37]  Bernadotte says that when he arrived, the plain in front of Pfarrersfeldchen was “inundated” by cossacks (Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[38]  For the attack of Pfarrersfeldchen, Bernadotte employed the battalion of the 9th, and one of the 27th. He pushed forward 4 guns on to a height commanding the village. The 9th were at first beaten off from Pfarrersfeldchen, whilst the 27th made steady progress against the wood on the right. The attack was then reinforced by the 2nd battalion, 27th, and by the 8th light infantry, with the 94th in reserve, and dragoons in support. The 1st battalion of the 27th, at the wood, lost, but again recovered, its eagle. [Back to paragraph text]

[39]  Bernadotte (Arch. Hist.) points out the danger of his position, liable, as he was, if defeated, to be cut from Rivaud’s division at Osterode. [Back to paragraph text]

[40]  According to Danilewski, the sound of the battle at Mohrungen did not, owing to the stormy weather, reach Gallitzin, so that Dolgoruki’s arrival was, in a sense, accidental (see Hœpfner, iii. 185). [Back to paragraph text]

[41]  According to Wilson (p. 35, note) they found in Bernadotte’s personal baggage 12,500 ducats which he had levied for himself in Elbing, as well as a quantity of plate bearing the arms of minor German states, from which it had been taken. Bernadotte’s servant, when asked to point out his master’s property, denied that these articles were part of it. They were, however, found in the marshal’s own quarters, and in such quantity that he could hardly have been ignorant of their presence. If this story is correct, the future King of Sweden cuts but a sorry figure in the episode. His own account (Arch. Hist.) of the movements of his corps omits all mention of the irruption of Russian cavalry into Mohrungen. [Back to paragraph text]

[42]  The military importance of the lakes in this direction is well brought out in the critical remarks of Count von Waldersee (representing Marshal von Moltke) on the 66th problem set by Von Moltke in 1882 (Moltke’s Tactual Problems, text, p. 164). In the problem the western army is supposed to be endeavouring to join an army corps to the north, and has to guard its flank against an army east of the lakes. [Back to paragraph text]

[43]  De Fezensac (p. 140) says Bernadotte had only 9000 against 16,000, but it is not quite clear whether he refers to the earlier portion of the action, or to the later period when Dupont had arrived. At the latter period the French probably had a superiority of numbers. [Back to paragraph text]

[44]  This is the number admitted by Wilson as the Russian loss. Bernadotte gives his own losses as 700 or 800, whilst patting that of the enemy at 1600 (report in Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[45]  Lestocq, unlike Gallitzin, had heard the cannon at Mohrungen (Hœpfner, iii. 186), from which it may be inferred that a strong east wind was blowing. [Back to paragraph text]

[46]  Bernadotte’s report says that the enemy’s movement on his left flank, threatening to cut him from Thorn, compelled his retreat. His corps was completely assembled only on the 28th, at Roecken on the road to Löbau. On the 30th and 3tst, he was drawn up there for battle. On the latter day at noon, he marched for Strasburg, his rear guard being roughly handled by the enemy at Brattian. He did not leave Strasburg to advance again till the 4th February (Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[47]  That is if the design was Bennigsen’s at all. There is some reason for believing it was not his, but Buxhowden’s. [Back to paragraph text]

[48]  Berthier to Bernadotte, dated Prasznitz, 30th January, Dumas, xviii. 374. [Back to paragraph text]

[49]  In Corr. 11,711, dated 28th January, Napoleon warns Lefebvre that the enemy, finding himself turned by the French advance from the right, may march on Thorn. [Back to paragraph text]

[50]  Berthier to Bernadotte, dated Willemburg, 31st January, Dumas, xviii. 380. A second despatch was sent off at 7 p. m., in which Berthier states that the Emperor does not understand Bernadotte’s meaning when he says that the enemy is manœuvring against the left by Mlawa. He only knows of one Mlawa, but that is not on Bernadotte’s left. The despatch continues: “I have sent you orders an hour ago; you will be guided by what has passed on the 31st; if the enemy is, as you suppose, in retreat on Osterode, you will pursue him prudently; nevertheless, His Majesty hopes he will not have been in time to escape altogether.” Then follows a long complaint of the delay in carrying despatches. The officer with Bernadotte’s despatch had been 15 hours on the road. This second despatch is not given by Dumas. The fate of these two despatches is narrated in one from Bernadotte (Arch. Hist.), dated 3rd February. In it he explains that what he meant about Mlawa was that, whilst 8000 or 10,000 of the enemy were manœuvring on his left, another column was reported to be moving towards M1awa on his right, and the Emperor’s left. He goes on to explain that he only received the second despatch, dated 31st January, 7 p.m., on the 2nd February. The one of an hour earlier never reached him, and he is ignorant of what the orders were. He had ascertained from the villagers that it was captured by cossacks at Lautenberg from a young officer of the Ecole Militaire, who was carrying it. The captain who carried the second despatch had heard the same story.
     The next despatch from Berthier to Bernadotte is dated 3rd February, 4 a.m., and says it appears possible Bennigsen will fight at Liebstadt, in which case the Emperor desires Bernadotte to join his left, viâ Osterode, for the battle. The next is dated 5th February, 8.30 p.m. It says that Ney has cut off the Prussians. The Emperor believes Bernadotte to be at Osterode, but has no news of him. He hopes Bernadotte is approaching the enemy by Liebstadt, or by Guttstadt, from Osterode. On the 6th, at 3 a.m., Berthier again writes that Ney had taken 3000 prisoners from Lestocq. Bernadotte is urged to try and come up with this disorganised corps, as Ney is wanted to join the Emperor’s left (Arch. Hist., daily correspondence). Evidently, Bernadotte’s despatch of the 3rd February, announcing the capture of Berthier’s of the 31st January, had not reached headquarters yet, and the Emperor was still ignorant of the marshal’s position.
    The first despatch of the 31st January was sent en clair. Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 359) makes the Emperor say that it would have been wiser to use a cypher, and that he afterwards adopted this practice. [Back to paragraph text]

[51]  It appears to have been the custom in the Grand Army to assume that every officer carrying despatches was properly mounted, and knew the country, whereas the contrary was more often the case. “An officer always had an excellent horse, he knew the country, he was never taken prisoner, he never met with an accident, he arrived quickly at his destination; and this was so little doubted that a second officer was by no means always sent. All this I knew,” says De Fezensac (p. 116), speaking of his mission with orders to Ney on the 8th February. [Back to paragraph text]

[52]  Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 355. [Back to paragraph text]

[53]  “This intelligence, which ought not to have been unexpected, created some surprise” (Wilson, p. 89). [Back to paragraph text]

[54]  Hœpfner (iii. 198) observes that Napoleon seems to have overlooked the fact that they could have retreated in safety on Danzig.
     The garrison of Graudenz had been closely blockaded and driven into the fortress on the 18th January (Bernadotte, Arch. Hist.). They were very short of supplies, and on the point of surrender, when relieved, and their magazines replenished by Lestocq (Wilson, 144). [Back to paragraph text]

[55]  In consequence of his perusal of the captured despatch to Bernadotte. [Back to paragraph text]

[56]  The rear-guard consisted of the 11th Regiment, the 2nd battalion 85th, and the 2nd Regiment of chasseurs à cheval (Davout, 159-160). [Back to paragraph text]

[57]  This place is called Jonkendorf on the modern map. The name has been retained here in the form used in all accounts of the campaign. [Back to paragraph text]

[58]  Up to the 3rd February, Napoleon was very doubtful as to the enemy’s intentions. On that day he writes to Murat: “Everything leads to the belief that the enemy will try to re-unite at Guttstadt; it is impossible to believe he will allow his left flank to be turned;” but he goes on to express his anxiety lest the enemy, instead of retiring, should march by Mohrungen, Liebstadt, or Osterode on Allenstein (Corr. 11,792). [Back to paragraph text]

[59]  Soult (Arch. Hist.) says the Bergfried position was defended by 8000 men, who were later reinforced by a second division of equal strength. This seems excessive. [Back to paragraph text]

[60]  Sunset about 4.40 on this date. [Back to paragraph text]

[61]  Dumas (xvii. 346) says Vivier was to ford (“passer á gué”) the river. Wilson (p. 89) says: “The Alle was long frozen, but impassable on account of the snow that rested on its bed.” What Vivier had to ford was not water, but soft, deep snow. [Back to paragraph text]

[62]  Soult, Arch. Hist. [Back to paragraph text]

[63]  Davout, p. 152. [Back to paragraph text]

[64]  Lestocq reached Deutsch Eylau from Freystadt on the morning of the 3rd February. Later in the day he was at Osterode, where he received a despatch from Bennigsen, urging his junction with the Russian right. On the 4th, he was marching through the defile between the Marien and Mahrung lakes, with outposts towards the passages at Deppen and Waltersdorf. [Back to paragraph text]

[65]  5 or 6 battalions, 3 cavalry regiments, and a horse artillery battery. [Back to paragraph text]

[66]  Dumas (xvii. 355) says 2000 prisoners and 16 guns were taken, besides killed and wounded. Hœpfner (iii. 211) shows that this is an exaggeration. Only 8 guns were engaged on the Prussian side. Ont eh 6th February, at 3 a.m., Berthier wrote to Bernadotte that Ney had taken 3000 prisoners from Lestocq, on the road between Schlitt and Liebstadt, and had pursued him towards Mohrungen. Bernadotte was urged to fall upon, and complete the ruin of this beaten corps, this allowing Ney to join the Emperor’s left (Berthier’s correspondence, Arch. Hist.) Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 357) says Lestocq lost 16 guns and many prisoners. [Back to paragraph text]

[67]  Napoleon was by no means certain what troops had opposed Ney. This was perhaps due to the fact that Lestocq had Russians with him as well as Prussians. The Emperor (Corr. 11,781) writes to Talleyrand that his only fear is that it is nothing by the Prussians whom Ney had intercepted. [Back to paragraph text]

[68]  3000 men (Wilson, p. 93). Davout (p. 154) puts the force at 4 Russian regiments, several thousand cavalry, and 20 guns. [Back to paragraph text]

[69]  Wilson, p. 95. The Russians placed 8 picked battalions with their right on Hof, and their left on a wood, their front covered by a deep ravine and 8 guns. The Emperor ordered the cavalry to attack without waiting for Soult (Marbot, i. 254). [Back to paragraph text]

[70]  Soult says the first cavalry attacks were repulsed, but d’Hautpoult’s cuirassiers bore down everything before them, and broke a Russian square. Ledru’s brigade reached the Hof plateau at the same time as the cuirassiers (Arch. Hist.). Marbot (i. 254) says the Emperor thought it better to attack with the cavalry without waiting for Soult. The light cavalry was first repulsed, then the dragoons; finally d’Hautpoult’s cuirassiers crashed through all opposition.
    Speaking of Murat’s handling of the cavalry at Hof, Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 356) remarks that he insisted on passing his brigades, in succession, through the defile of a marshy brook, thereby exposing them to defeat in detail. [Back to paragraph text]

[71]  The Russian regiment thus defeated was the Petersburg dragoons. In its flight it broke two fo the supporting battalions, riding over them, and exposing them to terrible loss at the hands of the pursuing French cavalry (Wilson, pp. 95, 96). [Back to paragraph text]

[72]  The Prince Gallitzin, whose death in this action is mentioned by Wilson, was not the commander of the Russian cavalry, but a younger man of the same name who had just joined the army. [Back to paragraph text]

[73]  Soult (Arch. Hist.) gives the Russian loss at 8000, of whom 3000 were killed, and 1500 prisoners. It seems that this must be an exaggeration. His own losses he gives as—
                Legrand’s division  1750
                Light cavalry            210
                           Totals         1960
but this takes no account of the losses among the dragoons and cuirassiers. He also gives the guns taken as 11. The Russian losses in the text are those given by Hœpfner (iii. 216). [Back to paragraph text]

[74]  Davout, pp. 156, 157. [Back to paragraph text]

[75]  Bernadotte, Arch. Hist.  His marches in his fresh advance were: 4th February, Strasburg to Löbau; 5th, at Löbau; 6th, Löbau to Osterode; 7th, Osterode to Mohrungen; 7th Mohrungen to Reichertswalde. [Back to paragraph text]

[76]  He was at Liebstadt on the 5th, on the 6th at Wormditt, behind the Drewenz (the small stream near Wormditt), with a detachment at Pr. Holland; on the 7th he bivouacked outside Landsberg, on the Kreuzberg road (Ney, Arch. Hist., “journaux de marche”). [Back to paragraph text]