Whether the terrible struggle at Eylau were a victory for the French or not, the very fact of its incompleteness was sufficient to inflict a severe blow on the reputation for invincibility of Napoleon, which had already been somewhat shaken by the indecisive results of Pultusk and Golymin, and the promptitude with which Bennigsen had resumed the offensive. [1]

It was absolutely necessary for the Emperor to convey to Europe, especially to Austria, the impression that he had conquered. The Poles, too, might be inclined to think that their hero was not invincible if he retreated too soon after the battle.

Anxious, therefore, though he was to give his troops their well-earned rest in cantonments, the Emperor was constrained by political considerations to remain some days on or near the battlefield, thereby showing that, if his army was too much shattered for him to dare a fresh advance on Koenigsberg, the Russians were equally not in condition to retrace their footsteps westwards. Even had the French corps been fit for a renewal of the campaign, its difficulties would have been vastly increased by the break-up of the frost on the roth February. One more reason for delay was the necessity for clearing the country, by sending to the hospitals in rear the many thousands of wounded French and Russians who were lying in every village near the scenes of the series of actions culminating at Eylau. Little or no attempt to bury the dead was made: they were left to the beasts and birds of prey. As Platow grimly remarked, when an armistice was proposed for this purpose after an action in March, the weather was so cold that there was no fear of pestilence from this source. [2] Besides, so long as the ground was unthawed, burial was almost a physical impossibility.

Napoleon at once issued orders for the removal of the wounded, no easy matter where carriages were scarce and could only be dragged through the snow and mud by double and treble teams. [3] Their sufferings, jolted, and shivering in the bitter cold, on open carts or sledges, must have been aggravated to a frightful degree. It was no short distance that they had to traverse, for the Emperor had resolved, at any rate, to abandon his forward position, where the difficulty of supplying his army was already felt. [4] He was uncertain even, whether he would be able to maintain himself beyond the Vistula at all. Therefore, he ordered the establishment of his hospitals at Posen, Thorn, Bromberg, and Gnesen, on or behind the great river. [5] So anxious was he that he sent Bertrand to open negotiations with the Prussian king, offering terms far more favourable than any suggested since Jena, and than those he subsequently granted, when he was in a position to dictate conditions. [6] To the credit of the king and his advisers, the offer was rejected.

On the 11th February, Bernadotte at last reached Eylau, and was sent on the road to Kreuzberg. [7] Murat was ordered to watch beyond the Frisching, supported by Ney on the Eylau-Koenigsberg road. Devout took up cantonments at Domnau, with cavalry towards Friedland. Soult was in the villages on the battlefield, the Guard at Eylau, and the remnant of Augereau’s corps on the Bartenstein road.

Bennigsen called in the Prussians from Allenburg, but left some 2600 cavalry there and at Friedland. The latter place Davout seized on the 13th. The events of the next two or three days are of no interest or importance; there were a few small combats of cavalry, but neither side was in a condition to undertake any serious operation. Napoleon was, in fact, preparing everything for retreat to the position behind the Passarge, which he hoped to be able to gain unperceived, and to hold during the rest of the cold season.

On the 16th, the wounded having for the most part been removed, the Emperor considered he had stayed long enough near the scene of the great battle to show, at least, that he had not been defeated. The orders for retreat were issued, therefore, on that date to the following effect :— [8]

On the 16th reserve parks, baggage, sick, and everything that would delay the march, to gain a start of 8 or 10 miles in the line to be followed by the respective corps. The march to commence on the 17th, all outposts remaining as they were, so as to deprive the enemy of any knowledge of the movement going on behind them.

Ney, commanding the rear-guard, with his own corps, with the cavalry divisions of Lasalle and Klein and the brigade of Guyot, would reach Eylau on the 17th, Landsberg on the 18th, and Freymarkt on the 19th. Campans, with the remains of Augereau’s corps, was to start on the 16th for Heilsberg, with two battalions sent on as far as possible towards Guttstadt, to which place he would follow with the rest on the 17th.

Davout to reach Bartenstein on the 17th, Heilsberg on the 18th, Guttstadt on the 19th. The battalion of the 85th, which he had left at Oertelsberg, would rejoin him at Heilsberg.

Bernadotte was to reach Schlautienen on the 17th, Seefeld on the 18th, Wormditt on the 19th. The country on his left, towards Zinten and Mehlsack, to be watched by light cavalry; from Seefeld more light cavalry to be sent to Orschen. [9] Ney was to be kept fully informed of what was happening in Bernadotte’s direction. Soult to reach Landsberg the 17th, Frauendorf 18th, and Liebstadt 19th.

Bessière’s marches, with the Guard, were to Landsberg on the 17th, to Freymarkt on the 18th, and to Liebstadt on the 19th.

By these movements the army would, on the 19th, be on the line Wormditt – Liebstadt – Guttstadt, with Ney somewhat in advance at Freymarkt. It will be observed that Augereau’s and Soult’s corps, which had been so shattered at Eylau, were kept well away from any pursuit the Russians might attempt, if they discovered the movement before it was complete. The brunt of the pursuit would fall on the unshaken corps of Ney and Bernadotte. Napoleon clearly thought it unlikely that Bennigsen would interfere with his right. He hoped, and the event justified him, that the retreat would, owing to the maintenance of the outposts to the last moment, remain undiscovered till it was complete. It was only on the 19th that Bennigsen realised that his enemy was gone. Platow, on that date, entering Eylau, found there 1500 Russians and a few hundred French, whose wounds were so bad as to render their removal impossible. On the 20th, the main body began to advance. The Prussians occupied Domnau and Bartenstein. Here they were joined by Sedmaratski, who had now arrived and marched on their left to Seeburg. That evening, Lestocq received orders to send part of his force to act as the right of the allied army, holding the French left in check.

On the 21st, the Russian advance guard reached Landsberg, where more of the most severely wounded were found. There was some fighting between the cossacks and the retiring French outposts in the village. The main body was at Eylau with its second line behind Kreuzberg; the reserve still behind the Frisching.

The Prussians were now partly on the right, partly on the left of the advance, while Bennigsen moved in a single column. Plotz, on the extreme right with part of the Prussians, crossed the Lower Passarge at Braunsberg. Encounters with the last rear-guards of the French frequently occurred.

Napoleon, before he retreated, had announced [10] to his army, by proclamation, his intention of taking up his quarters nearer the Vistula. He boasted loudly the success of his operations against Bennigsen. The latter, at Landsberg, on the 25th February, ín turn, appealed to his army with an equally exaggerated account of his alleged successes. [11]

Bennigsen hoped that Napoleon was still in retreat across the Vistula, but was not strong enough to dare to push him hard; the Emperor had no intention of reprising the river if he could help it, but he was far from certain that Bennigsen might not compel him to do so. He at once proceeded to issue orders for the assumption of winter quarters as he desired to hold them. His main line of communications was now changed. The route by Warsaw ceased to be his principal line, being replaced by that of Thorn. The chief depôt on that line would be Posen, whence canals afforded excellent communications, in open weather, with Magdeburg in rear, and Bromberg in front. [12]

The Warsaw line was by no means given up. It was necessary on all grounds, military as well as political, to retain the Polish capital. Savary’s success at Ostrolenka had cleared the country, and allowed of the establishment of direct communication between Warsaw and the main army on the Lower Vistula, instead of forcing convoys to hug the bank of the river. [13] To strengthen the force at Ostrolenka, Jerome was ordered [14] to send to it a Bavarian division of about 10,000 men, as well as about 5000 or 6000 Polish levies. Napoleon had also added to it a tower of strength in the person of Masséna, whom he had summoned from Italy to take the command of his right. Masséna’s relations with King Joseph at Naples had not been too cordial, and he welcomed the summons to more active duties in the field. He was, however, disappointed to find himself relegated to a secondary part of the theatre of war. He remarked to the Emperor, “Then, sire, it is a simple corps of observation that I am to command, on the rear of the Grand Army?” [15] The complaint was scarcely fair, for it was by no means impossible that the command might become of supreme importance, should the Russians once more attempt an advance on Warsaw. Moreover, as Napoleon explained to Masséna, he could hardly supersede men who had borne the brunt of the campaign in favour of the last comer, even if he were Marshal Masséna. Masséna’s objects were (a) to cover Warsaw; (b) to hold in check the enemy’s left; (c) to protect the country against incursions of cossacks, and to maintain the communications of the army. [16]

On the opposite flank, the capture of Danzig was urgently necessary, and orders were issued to Lefebvre, so early as the 18th February, [17] to proceed to its investment. The siege would be carried on, even if a retreat to the left bank of the Vistula were forced; in that case it could not be so effectually covered. Lefebvre would have the Poles, already assembled on the left bank, Menard’s division of French troops, which ought to have arrived, and the Saxons, about to march from Posen.

To cover this great siege, and the blockades of Graudenz and Colberg, the following orders for cantonments were issued, on the 10th February. [18]

Osterode was fixed as the rallying-point for all the corps of the centre and left, in the event of the enemy main advancing. Augereau’s corps ceased to exist, the small portion of it which had escaped at Eylau being distributed to others.

To Bernadotte was assigned the Lower Passarge, from its mouth to Spanden. He was to occupy Braunsberg and Saalfeld, with his troops cantoned in columns between the two; headquarters at Pr. Holland. Infantry and cavalry posts along the Passarge, watching all the passages so as to prevent a crossing by the enemy’s light cavalry.

Soult would take up the line on Bernadotte’s right, holding Wormditt, Liebstadt, Mohrungen, and Liebemuhl, having only advanced guards across the Passarge, and guarding its course from Spanden to Deppen. His troops, generally, would be in column from Wormditt to Liebemuhl.

Ney was to occupy Guttstadt and Allenstein, keeping cavalry and infantry posts between the Alle at Guttstadt and the Passarge at Elditten, watching the passages of the former river from Guttstadt to Allenstein. His park, ambulances, etc., somewhere between Allenstein and Osterode.

Davout was to occupy cantonments from Hohenstein to Gilgenburg, watching the country towards Passenheim and Willemburg with detachments.

These four corps were thus spread out like a fan, radiating from the centre at Osterode to the arc through Braunsberg, Wormditt, Guttstadt, Allenstein, and Gilgenburg. The Guard, and Oudinot’s grenadiers, were ordered to Osterode, Löbau, Rosenthal, Neumark, etc., forming a general reserve.

The headquarters of the cavalry reserve were also at Osterode. Sahuc’s dragoons were made over to Bernadotte, another dragoon division to Ney, Millhaud’s to Davout. Klein was to occupy cantonments at Elbing, and on the road to Pr. Holland. There also Durosnel was to refit his light cavalry. That under Lasalle was to go to Neidenburg and the neighbourhood. The three cuirassier divisions, which had suffered heavily before and at Eylau, were sent to the rear, about Riesenburg, Freystadt, Bischofswerder, Strasburg, etc.

The movements, commencing on the 21st, were to be completed by the 23rd, except in the case of Bernadotte. Each corps was to have a small hospital on the right bank of the Vistula, besides a larger one on the left. At Osterode, food was to be stored sufficient for the army for 10 days; two points between Osterode and Thorn were also to be selected, and kept stored with 5 days’ supplies at each. At Thorn, 20 days’ more supplies were to be collected and kept up, thus making 40 days’ altogether in reserve. [19]

This seems to be the most convenient moment at which to interrupt the narrative of events for the purpose of sketching briefly the measures which, during the next four months after Eylau, the Emperor took for the purpose of reinforcing his army to a strenbth which should place beyond all doubt the result of the campaign in the spring or summer. He felt, too, that his prestige had suffered so severely that he must so strengthen himself in Germany as to render it almost impassible for Austria to dare the risk of interference, and, at the same time, to guard against an English descent, in support of the Swedes, on his left rear.

Such a descent he had always thought possible, though he estimated 25,000 men as the utmost number the expedition was likely to muster. [20] In the earlier stages of the war the possibility of its landing on the coasts of France was greater than it was now that the Emperor had transferred the seat of war to, and beyond the Vistula.

Under these circumstances, the Emperor felt that he could venture on a further denudation of the French and Dutch ports, and of the reserve at Paris, the void being filled by conscripts of 1807 and 1808; for he contemplated another draft on the military reserves of the future. [21]

Each of the 5 battalions in Paris, and the 6 at Brest, was reduced to 600 men, all above that number being drawn for the nucleus of fresh provisional regiments. The depôts of the 65th and 72nd, in Holland, were required to provide 160 men each for the same purpose. [22] Zayonchek’s Polish corps, which was destined to fill the gap between Masséna and the main army, was ordered to be recruited up to 25,000 men.

Napoleon’s design was to create an army of observation in Germany, to be placed under the orders of Brune. Raising it to 60,000 or 70,000 men, and having available on its wings the corps of Mortier in Pomerania, and of Jerome in Silesia, he would have at his disposal at least 100,000 men in rear of his army on the Vistula. This great force could be moved forward on the Vistula, back upon the Elbe, north to the coast, or south against Austria, as circumstances might require.

The conscripts of 1808 were demanded by a message to the Senate, dated 20th March, 1807, about one and a half years before they were due. [23] Their distribution was laid down precisely, the principle of sending them where they were not likely to see active service being carefully observed. [24]

From Italy were drawn, for the army of observation, the French division of Boudet and Molitor; [25] and other troops. Spain was called on to supply 15,000 men for the army of observation. The Prince of the Peace had been organising Spanish troops, nominally to be able to assist Napoleon if required, really to be prepared for action in the event of his defeat. The Spaniard’s hand was forced by the Emperor’s demand, and he meekly sent the troops.

In the latter half of April, the ports were once more drawn on for four divisions, to be replaced by the reserve legions and by conscripts. These four divisions would march parallel to the coast, following the English movements, and ready at any moment to meet a descent from the sea on their left. [26] To embarrass England, Admiral Decrés was ordered to make preparations in Brest, as if for a descent on Ireland. The Emperor believed an English expedition to be starting at the end of April. [27] Very complete instructions were sent to Brune for his action in every possible case. [28]

More cavalry was drawn from the army of Italy in May; [29] and, as the season for the resumption of hostilities approached, urgent orders were sent to Clarke [30] to hurry forward the provisional regiments; to Jerome, to forward all recovered invalids, especially cavalry, from Silesia; [31] to the Fusiliers of the Guard (2 regiments), to hasten their march through Germany, using carts as far as Bromberg. [32]

Immense efforts were made to increase the supply of horses. Napoleon expected to have 80,000, of which 56,000 would be with the Grand Army. [33]

To the increase of his artillery he gave special attention, even going so far as to cast guns of a different calibre to utilise the ammunition captured from the Prussians. [34]

By these and similar measures [35] the Emperor would have, in the middle or end of May, in addition to the garrison at home and the army on the Vistula, the strength of which will be dealt with later, roughly speaking, the following forces directly or indirectly covering him against possible aggression of the English and Swedes in the north, of Austria in the south of Germany, and of England in the south of Italy—

(a)  Brune’s army of reserve with the corps of Mortier and Jerome:  100,000 [36]

(b)  The army of Northern Italy, with Marmont’s corps in Dalmatia, both threatening Austria’s southern frontier:  72,000 [37]

(c)  Army of Naples:  52,000 [38]

Altogether Napoleon cannot have had less than 600,000 men in different parts of France and Europe – a gigantic army at that period.

The issue of all the numerous orders necessary for these preparations was alone a heavy piece of work; but it was only a portion of what the Emperor got through, in his seclusion from the distractions of the gay world, at Osterode or Finkenstein. [39] He had to deal with troubles at home, panic and a fall in the funds, [40] with matters of diplomacy all over Europe and in Persia, with a thousand great questions yet he found time to watch every detail concerning his army, its communications, and its supplies. Nothing seemed to escape him. It was he who called attention to the omission from a return of two regiments which had been overlooked at Luxembourg; [41] it was he who, by comparing hospital with regimental returns, discovered how many of his men were marauding all over the country. All this time he was being urged, by Murat and the other generals at Osterode, to retire to the left bank of the Vistula. [42] Napoleon’s correspondence during March and April, teems with complaints of insufficient information from his generals, with orders for the establishment of bakeries, for forwarding supplies of all sorts, for the establishment of hospitals and the removal of the wounded, with demands for more boots and with instructions for reconnaissances and surveys. There is hardly any point on which he insists more strongly than the provision of ample supplies of boots. The principal central depôt for boots and uniforms, as well as other stores, would now be Posen; thence, they could go by canal to Bromberg, and so to the army beyond the Vistula. [43]

As the hospitals at the front became crowded with the sick and wounded, the less serious cases were transferred to Breslau and Glogau, where fine barracks gave good accommodation. [44] In this way the congestion of the main hospitals was relieved. To facilitate communications, bridges at Thorn, Marienburg, and Marienwerder were built, or completed.

In seeking to take up the winter quarters prescribed by Napoleon, on the 20th February, the corps of Davout, Ney, Soult, the Guard, and the cavalry reserve, had nothing but a rearward movement to make. With Bernadotte the case was different, for he had to spread his corps down the Passarge to Braunsberg.

On the 25th February, the Emperor received information that the Prussians were marching on Elbing with about 4000 men, and also on Guttstadt. His first care was to guard with Soult’s corps, the bridge on the Passarge at Alken. [45] He seriously apprehended a general advance of the enemy, and he expressed his intention, in that event, of fighting a great battle on the Osterode plateau, where he calculated he could collect 95,000 men in thirty-six hours,[46] whilst he reckoned the enemy’s whole strength at 55,000. [47]

On the 25th, the Prussians had passed, in part, the Passarge at Braunsberg, and had pushed cavalry and infantry into and beyond Stangendorf and Zagern. Lestocq was moving on the Passarge through Wormditt, which the French had evacuated, towards Alken and Spanden.

His right was ordered to move cautiously, on the 26th, towards Muhlhausen. On that day, however, Bernadotte sent Dupont’s division, with three light cavalry regiments under Lahoussaye, and a dragoon brigade from Muhlhausen, to force the Prussians back across the Passarge at Braunsberg. Before these troops they retired. [48] Dupont, sending the 9th infantry and the 5th chasseurs to his right on Petelkau, himself moved direct on Braunsberg with 3 infantry and 2 cavalry regiments. He found the Prussians drawn up behind Stangendorf, with their left resting on Zagern. That village being carried by the French right column, the Prussians took up another position, behind a ravine, between it and Braunsberg.

Dupont, meantime, had carried the position behind Stangendorf. Once more the Prussians formed on the heights in front of Braunsberg. Hence, again overpowered, they were driven across the river beyond the town.

On the 27th, Dupont retired to the left bank, burning the Braunsberg bridge, and established himself at Braunsberg, Frauenburg, and Tolkemit. The Prussians lost at least 800 men in these actions.

On the 1st March the Prussians and Russians took up the following positions :

Russians:—
    Advanced guard (Platow) at and about Arensdorf, supported by the mass of the cavalry under Gallitzin, at Benern.
    1st line –   5th division (Tutchkow), Mehlsack.
                     8th division (Essen III.), Frauendorf.
                    3rd division (Sacken), Raunau.
                    2nd division (Osterman Tolstoi), Reichenburg, beyond the Alle.
    2nd line – 7th division (Dochtorow), Plauten.
                    14th division (Kamenskoi), Stabunken.
                    4th division (Somow), Heilsberg.
    Headquarters:  Heilsberg.

Prussians:
    1st advanced brigade, Grunau and towards Braunsberg.
    2nd advanced brigade, Schalmen, Anken, etc.
    3rd advanced brigade, Langwalde and along the Passarge.
    Supports in Plaswich, Lindenau, Damerau, etc.
    Main body in the neighbourhood of Hohenfurst and along the Mehlsack-Braunsberg road.
    Reserve about Lilienthal, etc.
    Headquarters:  Peterswalde.

Ney, during these days, on the 26th February, sending one brigade forward again from Guttstadt into the Schmolainen forest, had badly cut up an advanced Russian regiment. Reinforced, the Russians turned the tables on him, forcing him to evacuate Guttstadt in the following night. The town was of importance to the French, as a support for the advanced portion of their line, and Napoleon was annoyed at Ney’s retirement from it as there were only, the Emperor believed, 4000 or 5000 of the enemy in front of him. [49]

For its recapture measures were now taken. Ney had fallen back to a position with Deppen on his left, and the Emperor was inclined to think the enemy contemplated an advance against the right of the Grand Army. In that case, he would reply by a movement from Braunsberg, which would soon alarm Bennigsen for his communications with Koenigsberg, and put a check on the movement of the opposite wing. Bernadotte was therefore to support Dupont by a division at Muhlhausen. [50] To fill the gap between Davout and Masséna, Zayonchek’s Poles were ordered to the neighbourhood of Neidenburg. [51]

Davout was now at Mohrungen, not within reach of Ney; but Soult could support Ney at Deppen, beíng, in turn, supported by Davout, [52] behind whom, again, would be the Guard and Oudinot.

On the 3rd March, whilst Bernadotte and Soult made demonstrations on the Passarge, Ney moved, with about 18,000 men, an Queetz, which he occupied without much difficulty. On the 4th he continued his movement through Guttstadt on Schmolainen.

There, finding Sacken had concentrated at Launau, he stopped, and, on the 5th, retired again to Guttstadt, whilst Bernadotte and Soult, Ney’s object having been effected, recrossed the Passarge.

The Emperor was still apprehensive of a movement against his right, but was most anxious to hold on to his cantonments, and ordered them to be fortified as far as possible. “Il faut remuer de la terre et couper du bois,” he wrote to Soult, on the 5th March. [53] He now broke up and distributed to other corps the shattered remnant of the corps of Augereau, who had himself been allowed to return to France to get cured of his wounds. [54]

Napoleon had now discovered that there were many stragglers from the army, including, he heard, even officers. For the arrest of these, and their return to the army, he issued stringent orders to Rapp, now governor of Thorn, and to Clarke. [55]

Another point on which orders were issued was the strict blockade of the garrison of Graudenz by the Hesse Darmstadt troops. [56] They were placed under Victor, who was exchanged against Blucher early in March. [57]

Bennigsen appears really to have intended a further advance against Ney, and Napoleon considered it desirable to alarm him in the direction of Willemburg, where he thought it possible that there might be part of Essen’s troops, whom it was Masséna's duty to retain on the Narew. [58] He accordingly sent Murat with about 6000 cavalry, part of Oudinot’s grenadiers, and some of Zayonchek’s Poles against it. The movement was supported by Davout from Allenstein and Hohenstein. Murat, finding only cavalry at Willemburg, occupied it on the 10th. [59] He was ordered [60] to advance as far as Wartemburg, and then, after waiting a day to pick up stragglers, to fall back again to Osterode. [61]

After this period, comparative peace reigned in front of the enemy’s army. There were trifling outpost skirmishes here and there which are not worth detailing, but the Russian army had settled into winter quarters. On the 20th March its positions were:— [62]

     Bagration, with advanced guard, altogether about 11,000 men,
          besides artillery and Cossacks, at Launau.
     Markow, with the cavalry of the right wing, about Reimerswalde and Heilsberg.
     Right bank of Alle:—
          Gallitzin’s cavalry of the left wing about Kerwienen, Kiewitten, etc.
          2nd division (Osterman), Lauterhagen, Roggenhausen, Krekollen.
          14th division (Kamenskoi), Gallingen, Kraftshagen, etc.
     Reserve:—
          4th division (Somow): Tolks, Albrechtsdorf, Borken, etc.,
               on the left bank of the Alle.
          7th division (Dochtorow) about Tormitten, on the right bank.
          Tolstoi about Wargitten and towards Seeburg.
          Platow with Cossacks at Oertelsburg and Passenheim.
          Headquarters: Bartenstein.   Point of assembly: Schippenbeil.

Bennigsen had, by the middle of March, received reinforcements of about 10,000 men, partly fresh regiments, partly stragglers and recovered invalids.

The Prussians were about at Heiligenthal, Zinten, and Plauten, with advance guards towards the lower Passarge.

Napoleon held to his old line, vigorously pressing the siege of Danzig and the strengthening, by fortification, of his main front.

Lefebvre was ordered to occupy the Nogat island, between the branches of the Vistula, and to drive the enemy as far up the Nehrung as possible, blocking his return by fortifications. [63]

Masséna was required to send Garan towards Willemburg, which was the key of the Omulew, and where he would strengthen the link with the centre. [64]

Even on the 22nd March, the Emperor did not feel sure that he could maintain himself on the right bank of the Vistula. [65] He was still intent on the idea of a great battle, about Saalfeld or Osterode, should the enemy advance, and he ordered positions for the purpose to be carefully surveyed. [66]

In these positions the main armies may be left whilst we describe, as fully as space will allow, the great siege which it was Napoleon’s object to cover, Bennigsen’s to raise. The operations in Silesia and Pomerania will also be very briefly indicated to their conclusion.

[1]  Many French writers even do not attempt to represent Eylau as a victory.
     “The battle was long, very bloody, and, despite the pæans of victory and the bulletins, it is one of those which I have always held lost” (Comeau, p. 284).
     Savary (iii. 64) says that it could be considered a victory only if the retention of the battlefield, and the retreat of the enemy, can be considered alone to constitute victory.
     Ney’s exclamation, “Quel massacre! et sans resultat!” (de Fezensac, p. 149) shows what that marshal thought of it. [Back to paragraph text]

[2]  Wilson, p. 125. Platow’s words, according to this authority, were that “the weather, being cold, there was no danger of any inconvenience from their want of interment, and that he should give himself no thought about their obsequies, but he warned off, in future, all such frivolous messengers, unless they wished ro increase the number of the unburied.” Perhaps Sir R. Wilson would have better consulted the reputation of his hero by omitting this anecdote, which smacks strongly of the barbarian. [Back to paragraph text]

[3]  Marbot, one of the wounded himself, describing his journey, says: “So long as we were in that horrible Poland it required 12, sometimes 16 horses, to draw the carriage at a walk through the bogs and quagmires” (Marbot, i. 271).
     “The wounded, obliged to be moved in sledges in the open air to a distance of 50 leagues” (Napoleon to his brother Joseph, dated 1st March, 1807; see Confidential Correspondence with Joseph, No. 278, p. 231).
     “We had to add to our spring carriages, sledges and bad carts, the movement of which became more or less difficult with the thaws and frosts which alternated” (Larrey, iii. 48). [Back to paragraph text]

[4]  Corr. 11,805, dated 12th February, 1807. [Back to paragraph text]

[5]  Corr. 11,804, to Daru, dated 12th February, 1807. [Back to paragraph text]

[6]  Corr. 11,810, dated 12th February, giving instructions to Bertrand. That officer was to offer the restitution of the Prussian territories practically intact. He was to point out that, even if the position of Prussia were restored through Russia, the king would be, so to speak, a vassal of the Czar, which would suit neither Prussia nor France. Napoleon would prefer to make the restoration himself, but he absolutely declined the idea of a conference at which England should be represented. Such a course would involve endless delay, and might spread over the next two years. Prussia was necessary to Europe, as well as to France, as a barrier against Russia. The throne of Berlin must be filled shortly, whether by a member of the house of Brandenburg, or by some one else. The person to whom it fell must, however, clearly understand that it was the gift of Napoleon alone. [Back to paragraph text]

[7]  Bernadotte’s headquarters on the 11th, 12th, 13th were at Görken; on the 14th, 15th, 16th about Kreuzburg (“Journaux militaires,” 1st corps, Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[8]  Dumas, xviii. 54-60, and the detailed orders printed at pp. 432-439 of the same volume. [Back to paragraph text]

[9]  On Bernadotte’s pointing out the difficulty of moving his artillery by this route, he was allowed to move by the Mehlsack road, provided, always, he took good care to cover that to Landsberg (Berthier to Bernadotte, 16th February; printed, Dumas, xviii. 437). [Back to paragraph text]

[10]  “Pr. Eylau, February 16th. Soldiers, — We had begun to enjoy a little repose in our winter quarters when the enemy attacked the first corps, and showed themselves on the Lower Vistula. We broke up, and marched against him. We have pursued him, sword in hand, 80 miles. He has fled to his strongholds, and retired beyond the Pregel. In the battles of Bergfried, Deppen, Hof, and Eylau, we have taken from him 65 pieces of cannon, and 16 standards, besides his loss of more than 40,000 men in killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. The heroes who, on our side, remain in the bed of honour, have died a glorious death. It is the death of a true soldier. Their relatives will always have a just claim to our care and benevolence. Having thus defeated all the enterprises of the enemy, we shall return to the Vistula, and resume our winter quarters. Those who may dare to disturb these quarters shall have reason to repent; for, whether beyond the Vistula or on the other side of the Danube, whether in the middle of the winter, or in the beginning of autumn, we still shall be found French soldiers and soldiers of the Grand Army” (Proclamation, quoted, Wilson, p. 200). [Back to paragraph text]

[11]  Soldiers, — As I was informed by my outposts that the enemy flattered himself he would cut us from our frontiers, I caused the army to take a different position, so as to mar their plans. The French, deceived by this movement, fell into the snare which I had spread for them. The roads by which they followed us are strewn with their corpses. They were drawn on to the field of Eylau, where your incomparable valour surpassed my hopes; and you have shown them all that Russian heroism can do.
     “In that battle more than 30,000 French met their death. They have been forced to retire from every point, leaving us their wounded, their standards, and their baggage.
     “I vainly endeavoured to draw them under the walls of Koenigsberg – there to complete their destruction. Only eleven regiments dared to advance. They have been destroyed, or taken prisoners.
     “Warriors! you have now rested after your exertions; let us pursue these disturbers – let us crown our great deeds, and, after having, by fresh victories, given peace to the world, we will re-enter our beloved country. Our monarch awaits us to recompense your incomparable valour. In the arms of our wives and children, we shall console ourselves for all the misfortunes which have afflicted our dear country” (Bennigsen’s Proclamation, quoted, Dumas, xviii. 66, 67). [Back to paragraph text]

[12]  Corr. 11,804, dated 12th February, to Daru. [Back to paragraph text]

[13]  On the 19th February, the Emperor sent orders for the construction of a good road from Warsaw to Osterode, behind the Ukra, passing through Zakroczin, Plonsk, Raciaz, Soldau, and Gilgenburg (Corr. 11,831). Osterode was to be the principal depôt beyond the Vistula, and the construction there of great bread and biscuit bakeries was directed (Corr. 11,830, dated February 19th). [Back to paragraph text]

[14]  Corr. 11,811, dated 13th February, and orders of 24th February to Masséna (Dumas, xviii, 467). [Back to paragraph text]

[15]  Masséna, v. 316. [Back to paragraph text]

[16]  See full instructions to Masséna, dated Osterode, 25th February; printed. Dumas, xviii. 467, etc.
     He was, if possible, to maintain the line of the Omulew, with an advance guard in Ostrolenka, and the main body in Pultusk, Makow, and Prasznitz. If forced to do so, he could fall back successively on the lines of the Orezyc and the Ukra. In the last resort, he would have to defend the great entrenched camp at Praga and Warsaw. In the event of the Emperor’s deciding to resume the offensive, he would send Masséna special orders. If the Russian main body acted offensively against the Emperor, Masséna would take the offensive, with a view to detaining Essen on the Narew, or to follow him if he slipped away. Were Masséna’s corps attacked in great force, he would require to let go Pultusk, but should hold the bridge at Sierock as long as possible. By so doing, he would be in a position to follow the force which had driven him back, should it turn northwards against the Emperor. [Back to paragraph text]

[17]  Corr. 11,826, dated Landsberg, 18th February, to Lefebvre. [Back to paragraph text]

[18]  Orders printed in full, Dumas, xviii. 448, etc. [Back to paragraph text]

[19]  Berthier to Daru, 20th February, 1807, Dumas, xviii.; 453. [Back to paragraph text]

[20]  Corr. 12,135, dated 23rd March, 1807, to his brother Louis. Also Corr. 12,075, dated 18th February, in which he tells Clarke that it is even possible Berlin might be temporarily occupied by a raid from the sea.
     The estimate of numbers was certainly a liberally high one. [Back to paragraph text]

[21]  Corr. 12,080, dated 19th March, G> Lacuée, in which Napoleon says he proposes demanding the conscription of 1808. Reckoning it at 80,000, he would send 36,000 to 5 legions of reserve, and 24,000 to complete the 3rd battalions at home. Thus the boys of under 20 would be kept back from the scene of active operations, for which he thought them unfit. Writing to Kellerman on the 4th June, he says that the conscripts of 1808 are too young for work at the front (Corr. 12,722). [Back to paragraph text]

[22]  Corr. 12,901, dated 28th February, to Dejean. [Back to paragraph text]

[23]  Corr. 12,100. [Back to paragraph text]

[24]  The distribution was thus—
         60,000 for the Active Army (20,000 for the 5 legions. 15,000 to Italy. 25,000 for the rear of the Grand Army.)
         20,000 for the Reserve (10,000 to the legions. 5,000 to Italy. 5,000 to the Grand Army.
         (Corr. 12,228, dated 30th March.) [Back to paragraph text]

[25]  Corr. 12,232, dated 30th March. [Back to paragraph text]

[26]  Corr. 12,435, dated 2rd April, 1807, to Lacuée. The Emperor again says he does not believe England able to embark more than 25,000 men. If the expedition, which he believed to be starting shortly, should appear to be making for the Baltic, the four divisions would march off thus, following its movement, and being replaced as they started by the legionaries and conscripts:---
     1st division from Boulogne                   7,680 men
     2nd     ”         ”     St. Lo                      6,540   ”
     3rd     ”         ”      Pontivy                    7,000   ”
     4th     ”         ”      Camp Napoleon       4,480   ”
                                                               25,700 [Back to paragraph text]

[27]  Corr. 12,486, dated 29th April, to Decrés. [Back to paragraph text]

[28]  Corr. 12,494, to Brune, dated 29th April.
     His corps observation, irrespective of Mortier’s and Jerome’s corps, would for the present consist of 20,000 French troops (Boudet’s and Molitor’s division, from Italy), 14,000 Dutch and 14,000 Spaniards: the new draft from Spain could not arrive before June (Corr. 12,465).
     The left of this corps should be between the Elbe and the Weser, the centre between Lubeck anal Demmin, the right between Demmin and the Oder, Molitor and Boudet at Magdeburg, the Spaniards in Hanover. If the English landed in Holland, Brune would move on that country. If they made for Hamburg, Brune would also go there. If Danzig was their objective, he would move to his right. Should they go still further east, he would lean on Stettin, leaving but a small force to resist a possible diversion towards Hanover.
     Corr. 12,495, dated 29th April, instructed Mortier to besiege Colberg and cover the coast from the Oder to the Vistula. If a landing were attempted at the mouth of the Oder, the marshal would lean to his left and support Brune; if at Colberg, all his forces (about 18,000) must unite to cover the siege, Brune supporting him.
     If Danzig or Koenigsberg were the landing-place, Mortier would march on the former, Brune moving up behind him. [Back to paragraph text]

[29]  Corr. 12,543, dated 6th May, to Eugene, and Corr. 12,567, dated 10th May. [Back to paragraph text]

[30]  Corr. 12,542, dated 6th May. [Back to paragraph text]

[31]  Corr. 12,545, dated 6th May. [Back to paragraph text]

[32]  Corr. 12,038, dated 15th March, to Dejean. [Back to paragraph text]

[33]  Corr. 12,038, dated 15th March. [Back to paragraph text]

[34]  Jomini, Art of War, p. 318. [Back to paragraph text]

[35]  A new provisional regiment was formed from the 3rd battalions of the 59th and 69th (Corr. 12,485, dated 29th April).
     There were 16 provisional regiments from which to recruit the army on the Vistula (Corr. 12,472, dated 25th April).
     Also 7 new provisional garrison regiments (Corr. 12,433, dated 21st April).
     On the 21st April, Napoleon notes, in a letter to Lacuée, that, out of 160,000 fresh troops expected by him, 113,000 had already arrived (Corr. 12,431, dated 21st April). [Back to paragraph text]

[36]  This does not appear to include the French troops marching up parallel to the coast from Boulogne, etc. , but they would about compensate for the movement of Mortier across the Vistula at the re-opening of the campaign.
     On the 30th May, the Emperor, writing to Brune (Corr. 12,704), says that marshal will have, by July, 60,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 7000 or 8000 men in the provisional battalions at Hameln, etc. This army, left in his rear, was not meant merely to check England. Should Austria move, it would have to go to Silesia and Gallicia, in which case it would be reinforced by 20,000 Poles, and 20,000 men in Silesia, and would have 100 guns. Its composition is summarised as: (a) Dutch troops; (b) Spaniards froid Etruria; (c) Spaniards arriving in June from Spain; (d) Molitor’s and Boudet’s divisions; (e) Loison from before Colberg. [Back to paragraph text]

[37]  Corr. 12,543, dated 6th May, to Eugene. [Back to paragraph text]

[38]  Letter to Joseph, dated 1st March, 1807, No. 278, at p. 231, vol. i., Corr. with Joseph. [Back to paragraph text]

[39]  “If the Emperor, instead of sitting in a hole, like Osterode, had gone to a large place, he would have taken three months to do all he actually did in one” (Savary, iii. 65). [Back to paragraph text]

[40]  Savary, p. 65. [Back to paragraph text]

[41]  Corr. 12,485. [Back to paragraph text]

[42]  Savary, 65. [Back to paragraph text]

[43]  Corr. 12,804, dated 12th Ju1y, to Daru. [Back to paragraph text]

[44]  Corr. 12, 102, dated 20th March, to Jerome. [Back to paragraph text]

[45]  Corr. 11,877, dated 25th February, to Soult. [Back to paragraph text]

[46]  Corr. 11,882, dated 26th February, and 11,889 of the same date, both to Soult. [Back to paragraph text]

[47]  Hœpfner (iii. 293) gives the allied strength as—
                                 Russians:   39,545
                                 Prussians:  11,300
                                                  50,845
which the expected arrival of Sedmaratzki would raise to about 61,000 regular troops, and 6,300 cossacks. [Back to paragraph text]

[48]  They retired to Heiligenbeil and Mehlsack, with outposts at Wormditt. “The loamy ground was so slippery from the thaw that cavalry and artillery were useless” (Wilson, p. 246). [Back to paragraph text]

[49]  Corr. 11,895, dated 27th February, to Soult. [Back to paragraph text]
 

[50]  Corr. 11,905, dated 28th February, to Bernadotte. [Back to paragraph text]

[51]  Corr, 11,909, dated 1st March. This force should amount to 10,000 or 12,000 (Corr. 11,925, dated 4th March). It was afterwards ordered to be raised to 25,000. Its mission was to guarantee the flank from Neidenburg to Allenstein, to keep touch also with Masséna, and to protect the road on the right bank of the Vistula from Warsaw to Mlawa, Soldau, and Osterode (Corr. 11,957 and 11,958, dated 6th March). [Back to paragraph text]

[52]  Corr. 11,915, dated 2nd March, to Soult. [Back to paragraph text]

[53]  Corr. 11,939 and Corr. 11,962, dated 6th March, to Lefebvre. [Back to paragraph text]

[54]  The corps was distributed thus:—
                   16th Light Infantry, 63rd, and 24th of line, to Bernadotte.
                   7th Light Infantry to Davout.
                   14th (almost destroyed) and 105th to Soult.
                   44th to Lefebvre (Corr. 11,951, dated 6th March, to Daru). [Back to paragraph text]

[55]  Corr. 11,951 and 11,955, both dated 6th March. [Back to paragraph text]

[56]  Corr. 11,904, dated 28th February. [Back to paragraph text]

[57]  The exchange is mentioned as having been effected in Corr. 11,976, dated 8th March. [Back to paragraph text]

[58]  Corr. 11,978, dated 9th March. [Back to paragraph text]

[59]  Corr. 12,000. [Back to paragraph text]

[60]  Corr. 12,008, dated 12th March. [Back to paragraph text]

[61]  Gazan’s division from Masséna’s corps was sent to Willemburg. The objects of this were explained by the Emperor to Masséna as: (1) that the division might be available on the third day at Osterode, should the enemy move in that direction; (2) to maintain communication between Masséna and the Emperor, and to hold Willemburg, which was the key of the Omulew (Corr. 12,016, dated 13th March). [Back to paragraph text]

[62]  Hœpfner, iii. 325, etc. [Back to paragraph text]

[63]  Corr. 11,962, dated 6th March. [Back to paragraph text]

[64]  Corr. 12,016, dated 13th March, to Masséna (see note, p. 239). [Back to paragraph text]

[65]  On that date he wrote to Daru that the country in which he was could not long feed his army. When the bridges and bridge heads at Marienburg, Marienwerder, and Sierock were quite complete, it would be necessary to consider whether he would not be constrained to lead his army to the left bank, in which case his chief positions would be Dirschau, Mewe, Schwetz, Bromberg, Thorn, and Wrocawik. Then the Marienwerder bridge would be of special importance (Corr. 12,120, dated 22nd March). [Back to paragraph text]

[66]  Corr. 12,321, dated 6th April. A most interesting document, showing how fully the Emperor appreciated the advantages, to the defensive, of the lakes and marshes, as a protection against turning movements. [Back to paragraph text]