KOENIGSBERG AND TILSIT
A glace back must now be given to the movements of the detached forces in the direction of Koenigsberg. Lestocq and Kamenskoi were last mentioned when, about 3 p.m. on the 13th, they met at Gollau. Between them they mustered about 25,000 men, all that were available to oppose 9000 of Murat’s cavalry, 22,000 of Soult’s corps, [1] and 29,000 of Davout’s; in all 60,000. Of the allied forces, Lestocq took command. They had been in touch with Murat’s cavalry, and fighting with them, on the evening of the 13th, on the direct road from Eylau to Koenigsberg.
On the 14th, Soult’s advanced guard, moving on the Kreuzburg-Koenigsberg road, first encountered the enemy at Bergau. Lestocq was at Gollau, opposing the progress of Murat, when Soult’s arrival on his right flank forced him to retreat on the city. A battalion of his infantry was cut off and captured by Milhaud’s dragoons with Soult.
Another attempt to make a stand against the now united corps of Soult and Murat, 1000 paces from the works of Koenigsberg, was found to be hopeless. Outflanked and severely pressed, the allies shut themselves into Koenigsberg. The French force was now supplemented by the arrival of Davout. Gudin’s division joined Must’s right, and extended towards the Pregel, above the city. A battery, which Davout established in this direction to test the possibility of an assault, was silenced by the superior fire of the defenders. Davout then ordered Friant, supported by Morand, to make preparations for the passage of the river, but only passed over one regiment.
About mid-day, a brigade of about 1200 men, which Lestocq had left behind to watch the direction of Brandenburg, appeared behind Soult’s left, attempting to rejoin the Prussians. It made a brave struggle for liberty, but, surrounded in a village, it was forced to lay down its arms.
All this time, Lestocq and Kamenskoi, ignorant of Bennigsen’s movements, were buoyed by the hope that a bold defence of the city could not fail to be supported by him in the course of a few hours. Setting fire to the Brandenburg suburb, on the left bank of the river, Lestocq withdrew most of his troops within the fortifications. Those which remained were attacked in the suburb by Legrand’s division, which inflicted heavy loss on them, and took a number of prisoners. The works of the place were strong enough to render an assault out of the question. Soult refused to listen to the rash counsels of Murat in favour of it.
In the evening, Murat receiving Napoleon’s order, dated 3 p.m. on the same afternoon before Friedland, at once started with Davout’s corps in the direction of Friedland. Soult, now left alone before Koenigsberg, was in strength inferior to that of the enemy. He therefore contented himself with taking up a position of observation in front of the fortress. Lestocq endeavoured to send, through Soult’s lines, a small body of cavalry with a despatch for Bennigsen, of whom he had still heard no news. The party was surrounded and the despatch captured, as was the cavalry belonging to the brigade which had been cut off in the afternoon.
On the 5th, Soult began preparations for an attack on the fortress, which he bombarded. At 10 p.m., it was ascertained, from deserters, that Kamenskoi’s corps had left as soon as the news of the battle of Friedland had arrived, and that the Prussians were preparing to follow. On the morning of the 16th, Soult entered the fortress, where he captured the single battalion which Lestocq had left to cover his evacuation. A large number of wounded Russians and Prussians were found in the town, and very large magazines and stores of every sort, as well as of artillery. [2]
To return to Bennigsen and Napoleon: the former, passing the Pregel, at Wehlau, on the 15th, by a single bridge, burnt it behind him, and, at Petersdorf, on the farther bank opposite the mouth of the Alle, gave his troops a few hours of much-needed rest. On the 16th, he marched 18 miles to a position between Mehlauken and Popliken. On the 17th he made another march of 18 miles, across the little river Schillup, where he was rejoined by Lestocq and Kamenskoi. On the 18th, the allied army, passing through Tilsit, crossed the Niemen on boat bridges, which were immediately afterwards burnt by Bagration, who, as before, commanded the rear-guard in this last retreat.
Napoleon, meanwhile, had moved thus:—
After the victory of Friedland, the march of Murat and Davout, towards that point, ceased to be necessary. They were diverted, therefore, from Abschwangen, across the Pregel, at Tapiau. Murat, sending his light cavalry to Wehlau, reached Tapiau with St. Sulpice’s dragoons and Davout’s corps, on the morning of the 16th.
It was not till 24 hours later that Davout succeeded in getting across the river. With his light cavalry he set out in pursuit of the enemy in the directions of Koenígsberg amd Labiau, whilst Napoleon also manœuvred to his left, in the hope of driving the Prussians on the Curisches-Haff. It was too late. Marulaz alone reached the Prussian rear-guard, with which he engaged in small combats. Murat, after passing the Pregel on the 16th, rejoined the main army, with St. Sulpice’s dragoons, at Wehlau.
The army which had fought at Friedland marched, on the 15th, to Wehlau, except the corps of Ney, which remained at Friedland. On the 16th and 17th, Victor, followed by Lannes, Mortier, and the Guard, in the order named, passed the Pregel. He was at Petersdorf on the evening of the i~th. On the igth the cavalry, supported by part of Victor’s corps, had a slight engagement with Bagration at Mehlauken. He was again seen on the 8th near the Niemen.
On the morning of the 19th, Murat entered Tilsit; Victor was halted on the left bank of the river below Tilsit, Davout above it.
Ney, meanwhile, moved, on the 17th and 18th, to Gumbinnen, covering
the right flank of the army. Soult remained on the left, at Koenigsberg,
sending St. Hilaire to invest Pillau on the east, whilst Rapp’s detachment,
on the Nehrung, invested it on that side and from the sea. It shortly capitulated.
There remain to be narrated the operations of Masséna on the Narew. On the 11th June, the Russians, having advanced between the Narew and the Bug, attacked, with 6000 or 8000 men, Drenzewo and the French entrenched camp at Borki, a little below Ostrolenka on the right bank of the Narew. Claparède, defending it, was at the same time bombarded by batteries on the left bank. [3] He was finally forced out, [4] and the Russians entrenched themselves in it.
Suchet had reached Rozan with the rest of his division. On the 12th, at 10 a.m., Masséna in person directed an attack on the Russian lines. Overwhelmed by superior numbers, they were forced, under the protection of their batteries, partly across the Omulew, and partly across the Narew, at Ostrolenka.
No further movement of importance took place till the 22nd, when Masséna, already informed of the result of the battle of Friedland, marched on Ostrolenka which he reached on the evening of the 23rd, to find the Russians gone in the direction of Tykoczin. He followed them by Nowogrod, Lomza, and Sniadow towards Bialystok, as ordered by the Emperor.
On the 19th June, Bennigsen, now on the right bank of the Niemen, received orders from the allied sovereigns to demand an armistice. About mid-day the demand [5] was transmitted to Murat in Tilsit, and was passed on to Napoleon, who shortly afterwards reached the town, and who at once accepted the proposal to negotiate.
On the 21st, the armistice was signed on the following conditions:—
(a) Armistice to be for the purpose of negotiating a peace.
(b) Either party proposing to terminate it to give one month’s notice of his intention.
(c) A separate armistice to be concluded between the French and Prussian armies.
(d) The line of delimitation between the armies was fixed.
(e) Plenipotentiaries, for the negotiation of peace, to be at once appointed, and commissions for the exchange of prisoners.
Napoleon had spoken the prologue to the great drama in his proclamation of the 2nd December, 1806; on the 22nd June, he delivered the epilogue. “Soldiers, on the 5th June, we were attacked in our cantonments by the Russian army, which misconstrued the causes of our inactivity. It perceived, too late, that our repose was that of the lion; now it does penance for its mistake. In the days of Guttstadt, of Heilsberg, in the ever-memorable day of Friedland, in 10 days campaigning we have taken 120 guns, and seven standards; we have killed, wounded, or captured 60,000 Russians; torn from the enemy’s army all its magazines, its hospitals, its ambulances, the fortress of Koenigsberg, the 300 vessels which were in the port, laden with every kind of supplies, and 160,000 muskets, [6] which England was sending to arm our enemies.
“From the shores of the Vistula, we have reached those of the Niemen, with the rapidity of the eagle. At Austerlitz you celebrated the anniversary of the coronation; you have this year worthily celebrated that of the battle of Marengo, which put an end to the war of the second coalition. Frenchmen, you have been worthy of yourselves, and of me; you will return to France covered with laurels, after having acquired a peace which guarantees its own durability. It is time for our country to live in repose, sheltered from the malign influence of England.
“ My rewards will prove to you my gratitude and the greatness of the love I bear you.”
The positions taken by the armies, pending the completion of the peace negotiations, of the result of which there could be no doubt, were the following:—
French:—
Headquarters of Guard at Koenigsberg, with detachments at Tilsit guarding the Emperor’s person. Soult at Labiau.
Davout, Lahoussaye, and Lasalle at Tilsit.
Ney, and Latour-Maubourg at Marienpol, east of Gumbinnen.
Mortier and the Polish divisions at Augustowo, Olitta, and Nsobra, on Ney’s right.
Victor at Wehlau. Lannes at Koenigsberg, Tapiau, and Brandenburg.
Espagne, Saint Sulpice, Nansouty, Grouchy, and Milhaud, the cavalry reserve, in cantonments on the Pregel and Alle.
Murat, fixing his headquarters at Koenigsberg, himself remained with the Emperor at Tilsit. Masséna’s corps was at Nowogrod.
Russians and Prussians:—
Imperial headquarters at Pickupponen, opposite Tilsit.
Gortchakow, with two divisions, the cavalry of the right wing, that of the advanced guard, and all the cossacks and bashkirs, at Willkischken, Limspohnen, and Bennigskeiten.
Essen, with four divisions and the cavalry of the left wing, at and about Georgenburg.
Lestocq and Kamenskoi’s two divisions, in cantonments, between the Gilge and Russ rivers.
Labanow, with two divisions, about Kanen.
Tolstoi, with three divisions, near Bialystock, with outposts on the upper Narew, facing Masséna.
Kologribow, with the Guard, except one battalion, one cavalry regiment, and one squadron of another, the Czars personal guard, retired to cantonments in Lithuania. [7]
With the armies thus posted, Napoleon proceeded to enact the transformation scene which was to mark his new position as the arbiter of the destinies of Europe.
Prussia he had crushed, and was determined to humiliate to the lowest depths. Russia he had defeated, not conquered. He required her aid in the struggle with the one enemy whom he had been unable to cripple. He proposed a personal meeting, to settle the bases of peace, between himself and the Czar Alexander. There was no mention of the King of Prussia. Alexander, flattered by the recognition of the pre-eminence of his own power, accepted the proposal.
An enormous raft was constructed by the French engineers, and moored in midstream. It bore a magnificently decorated pavilion, worthy of the memorable scene which was to take place within it.
On the 25th June, towards 1 p.m., Napoleon accompanied by Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt, left the southern bank at the same moment as Alexander, with the Grand Duke Constantine, Bennigsen, Labanow, Uvarow, and Count Lieven, set out from the northern. Reaching the raft simultaneously, the two Emperors embraced, and then, alone, entered on a discussion lasting two hours, the purport of which can be guessed only from its results. It has been said that Alexander’s first words were, “I hate the English as much as you do yourself.” To which Napoleon replied, “If that is the case, peace is already made.” It is unnecessary to put any great faith in this story. The Czar may have thought he had not received so much support, in men and money, as he had a right to expect from Great Britain; but her conduct had certainly not been such as to warrant so complete a revulsion of feeling towards her.
The King of Prussia was contemptuously left out of this meeting, at which, presumably, his spoliation was decided on. He was only admitted to the second interview, on the succeeding day, after which the Czar and the King occupied quarters in Tilsit, which had been neutralised for their accommodation. It was only on this day that the armistice with the Prussians was signed and ratified.
The beautiful and noble Queen of Prussia accompanied her husband. She it was who had been the spirit of the war. Napoleon had not the magnanimity to forgive her conduct, now that her power had been broken. His whole treatment of her and the King was such as to show that he regarded them, and Prussia, as unworthy of his consideration. With the unpleasant history of these days we need not deal fully.
Napoleon, determined to treat entirely separately with Russia and Prussia, insisted on distinct treaties. That between Russia and France was executed on the 7th July, and ratified two days later. The Prussian treaty was executed only on the day on which that with Russia was ratified, and it was not ratified till the 12th July.
Of the complicated provisions of the treaties a short resumé is all that seems necessary. Napoleon, bent on passing every possible insult upon the unfortunate Prussians, attributed such poor terms as he granted them to the intercession of Alexander. Of the conquered territories, he restored to Prussia that part of the Duchy of Magdeburg which was situated on the right bank of the Elbe, thereby excluding the fortress itself, which he knew the Queen specially cherished. Also he surrendered Pomerania, Silesia, and other territories constituting approximately the kingdom as it was before the 1st January, 1772. From that portion of the ancient kingdom of Poland which had been acquired by Prussia in and after 1772 he constituted the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he presented to the King of Saxony, together with a military right of way across the intervening Prussian territory. He excepted a considerable area in the direction of Bialystock, which was made over to Russia. Danzig he made a free city, under the protection of Prussia and Saxony. The recognition of the Napoleonic Kings of Naples and Holland, of the Confederation of the Rhine, of the new kingdom of Westphalia, now carved out of Prussian territory west of the Elbe and bestowed on Jerome Bonaparte, was stipulated for.
Turkey, which had so materially helped him, was abandoned by Napoleon, anxious in every way to conciliate Russia. He merely offered his mediation between the two powers, whilst agreeing to accept that of the Czar between England and himself. Prussia, as well as Russia, was bound to aid his campaign against the commerce of Great Britain.
Such were the more important provisions of the treaties, the full details of which can be studied in the documents themselves. [8] Their result was aggrandisement of the power of Napoleon to an enormous, of Russia to a small extent, at the expense of Prussia.
Prussia was hedged round with states subservient to French interests – the Rhenish Confederation, Saxony, Westphalia, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Holland, and Danzig. England’s last allies on the Continent, with the exception of Sweden, which was soon to follow, were torn from her.
With the gradual withdrawal of the French armies it is not proposed to deal. Napoleon’s grasp on continental Europe was now assured, and it was not till his own action in the Peninsula of Spain sowed the germs of the “Spanish ulcer,” and until Austria, in 1809, made another struggle for liberty, that his almost universal power was challenged.
THE END.
[1] Soult, at the opening of the campaign, had
30,000 men; but he had lost 6600 at Heilsberg alone, and, including the
losses on the Passarge, he cannot have lost less than 8000 since the 5th
June.
The cavalry employed began the campaign at
the following strength:—
Lasalle 5703
St. Sulpice 1967
Milhaud 1859
9529
Davout, at the same time, had 29,560. [Back
to paragraph text]
[2] Soult’s report (Arch. Hist.) says he took, in Koenigsberg, 3600 sick and wounded Russians, and 4000 Prussians. [Back to paragraph text]
[3] According to the memoirs of Masséna (v. 331), there were 8000 Russians, and Tutchkow had covered his real attack by threatening a passage at Rozan. An attack by cavalry was also made on Gazan at Zawady on the Omulew. [Back to paragraph text]
[4] Back to Nozewo (Masséna, v. 331). [Back to paragraph text]
[5] The terms of Bennigsen’s letter to Bagration for communication to Murat were as follows: “After the torrents of blood which have lately flowed in battles as sanguinary as frequent, I should desire to assuage the evils of this destructive war, by proposing an armistice before we enter upon a conflict, a fresh war, perhaps more terrible than the first. I request you, Prince, to convey to the chiefs of the French army this my intention, of which the consequences may produce all the more salutary results, seeing that there is already question of a general congress, and which may prevent an useless effusion of blood. Kindly inform me of the result of your action” (Wilson, p. 170, note). [Back to paragraph text]
[6] Wilson (p. 166, note) denies the capture of these muskets, which, he says, were landed at Riga. He also affirms that there was very little left in Koenigsberg of supplies or artillery, most of them having been removed by Lestocq. It is hardly probable that that officer had time to make considerable removals. [Back to paragraph text]
[7] Some of the places named above are not marked on the map, being beyond its limits. [The map referred to here is in the printed book and is not included in this electronic version.] [Back to paragraph text]
[8] Printed in full by Wilson (pp. 263-271). [Back to paragraph text]